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Abstract
In the last decades, the computing technology experienced tremendous develop-
ments. For instance, transistors’ feature size shrank to half at every two years as
consistently from the first time Moore stated his law. Consequently, number of
transistors and core count per chip doubles at each generation. Similarly, petascale
systems that have the capability of processing more than one billion calculation per
second have been developed. As a matter of fact, exascale systems are predicted to
be available at year 2020.
However, these developments in computer systems face a reliability wall. For in-
stance, transistor feature sizes are getting so small that it becomes easier for high-
energy particles to temporarily flip the state of a memory cell from 1-to-0 or 0-to-1.
Also, even if we assume that fault-rate per transistor stays constant with scaling,
the increase in total transistor and core count per chip will significantly increase the
number of faults for future desktop and exascale systems. Moreover, circuit age-
ing is exacerbated due to increased manufacturing variability and thermal stresses,
therefore, lifetime of processor structures are becoming shorter.
On the other side, due to the limited power budget of the computer systems such
that mobile devices, it is attractive to scale down the voltage. However, when the
voltage level scales to beyond the safe margin especially to the ultra-low level, the
error rate increases drastically.
Nevertheless, new memory technologies such as NAND flashes present only lim-
ited amount of nominal lifetime, and when they exceed this lifetime, they can not
guarantee storing of the data correctly leading to data retention problems.
Due to these issues, reliability became a first-class design constraint for contem-
porary computing in addition to power and performance. Moreover, reliability
even plays increasingly important role when computer systems process sensitive
and life-critical information such as health records, financial information, power
regulation, transportation, etc.
In this thesis, we present several different reliability designs for detecting and cor-
recting errors occurring in processor pipelines, L1 caches and non-volatile NAND
flash memories due to various reasons. We design reliability solutions in order
to serve three main purposes. Our first goal is to improve the reliability of com-
puter systems by detecting and correcting random and non-predictable errors such
as bit flips or ageing errors. Second, we aim to reduce the energy consumption
of the computer systems by allowing them to operate reliably at ultra-low voltage
level. Third, we target to increase the lifetime of new memory technologies by
implementing efficient and low-cost reliability schemes.
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1
Introduction
In the last decades, the society benefited immensely from Moore’s Law, which states that the
number of transistors on chip doubles every two years. However, the computing community
faces a reliability wall – similar to memory and power walls of the past – in the sense that the
future of semiconductor device scaling is threatened.
The problem has three dimensions. First, transistor feature sizes are getting so small that
it becomes easier for high-energy particles to temporarily flip the state of a memory cell from
1-to-0 or 0-to-1. These faults are increasing not only in the probability but also in the impact.
For instance, a single such corrupt bit completely collapsed Amazon’s S3 cloud computing
service [5]. Second, the increase in total transistor and core count per chip will significantly
increase faults for desktop and exascale systems even if we assume that fault-rate per transistor
stays constant with scaling. If no drastic action to improve reliability is taken, exascale fault
rates will be in the orders of minutes, in practice rendering these systems inoperable. We
already see warning signs: HP´s ASC Q supercomputer was crashing 15 times a week due to
the inability of software and hardware to collaborate in error recovery [5]. Third, increased
manufacturing variability and thermal stresses exacerbate circuit ageing; resulting in timing
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violations in processor structures earlier in their lifetime.
Due to these issues, reliability became one of the first-class design constraint for modern
systems in addition to power and performance. Moreover, reliability plays even increasingly
important role when computer systems process sensitive and life-critical information such as
health records, financial information, power regulation, transportation, etc.
Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) are the most well-known reliability techniques which rely
on encoding some information from the stored data and checking this information upon reading
the value [6]. They are widely used to detect and correct faults in the memory structures such
as caches, main memories, hard disks or non-volatile memories. However, ECC is not adequate
to provide reliability for combinational logic (e.g. execution units). Also, ECC may increase
the execution time of applications when it is utilized for the time-critical memory components
in the microarchitecture (e.g. register file). Thus, other reliability schemes should be provided
for processor pipeline structures.
Similar to the ageing problem of CMOS technology, newer non-volatile memory technolo-
gies (i.e. Flash Memories, Phase Change Memories, Memristors and Nano-Electromechanical
Switches) also suffer from the finite endurance problem. These new memory technologies are
proposed as a replacement of CMOS technologies since scaling of the CMOS technology is get-
ting closer to the limits. The current mainstream non-volatile memory is Flash memory. NAND
and NOR flash memories are used for quite different applications – data storage for NAND and
code storage for NOR flashes. However, as Flash cells scale down to smaller technology nodes,
they become increasingly vulnerable to circuit level noise. Thus, fault rate increases exponen-
tially when they are programmed/erased many times (i.e. P/E cycle) and get older. This fault
mechanism leads to concerns regarding the reliability and endurance of flash memories. One
way to improve flash lifetime is to use stronger error correction codes (ECC) [7]. However, the
bit fault rate increases exponentially with P/E cycles while ECC error correction capability in-
creases less than linearly. Thus, techniques that tolerate bit faults in flash cells without relying
on stronger ECC are desirable.
On the other side, as the power envelope becomes one of the key design concerns, re-
searchers proposed reducing the voltage to the ultra-low level for microarchitectures and caches.
Although voltage downscaling offers substantial energy savings, it also introduces additional
reliability challenges due to drastically increasing fault rate. Utilizing ECCs in the low-power
operating mode is an appealing and prevalent solution for reducing the safe operating margin
for Vdd of memory structures. However, ECC schemes may require complex encoders/decoders
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which may increase the energy consumption and latency of accessing the memory structure
which cannot be tolerated in level-1 caches. Thus, to take advantage of potential energy sav-
ings, it is essential to design suitable reliability mechanisms for both the microarchitecture and
the level-1 cache.
In this thesis, we present reliability designs for detecting and recovering the faults occurring
in the microprocessor, in the L1 cache and in the NAND flash memory. While these designs
increase the reliability of the computer components, they also provide execution at the ultra-
low voltage level to reduce energy consumption as well as increase the lifetime of CMOS
technologies and NAND flash memories.
1.1 Problem Statement and Contributions of Thesis
This thesis addresses several issues of reliability that we briefly list in this section. We also
present the contributions of this thesis that address these issues.
1.1.1 Error Detection for High Reliability
Executing instruction streams redundantly in chip multiprocessors (CMP) provides the strict re-
liability requirement of mission-critical systems. However, even if there are enough resources
for replication in the system, redundancy-based error detection presents a performance over-
head every time it is triggered for the comparison of execution results in order to detect a
divergent execution. Moreover, if error-detection is frequently triggered, the possibility that a
benign fault cause an error recovery increases.
In this thesis, we propose utilizing transactional semantics of Hardware Transactional Mem-
ory (HTM) in order to defer error detection until a transaction commits so that the cost of error
detection can be reduced while its efficiency can be increased. Transactions record their ten-
tative reads and writes in a read-set and write-set respectively. HTM systems already have
well-defined comparison mechanisms of read-/write-sets in order to detect if there is any con-
flict between transactions. While comparison of addresses is sufficient for conflict detection,
some systems also send data along with addresses. We adapt these already existing conflict
detection mechanisms for error detection. We build error detection on top of an HTM featur-
ing lazy conflict detection and lazy data versioning. The main advantage of using lazy-lazy
HTM is that comparison of write-sets for error detection reduces the comparison overhead of
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redundancy-based fault detection due to multiple writes to the same address.
1.1.2 Error Recovery
A reliable system requires a simple recovery mechanism to roll back to an error-free state after
detecting an error. Checkpointing is a well-known error recovery scheme which would present
scalability issues as we move towards many-core systems. This drawback of checkpointing is
due to the required synchronization mechanisms to guarantee that all structures (e.g. cores)
rollback to the same state in case of an error. Also, when an error is detected in one core,
all the other cores communicating with it (faulty or not) have to roll back since errors could
have propagated to the error-free cores through shared variables. Moreover, in addition to the
performance degradations, checkpointing schemes require supplementary hardware structures
(e.g., buffers to save checkpoints) which are non-functional for performance, but they are only
utilized for reliability. These structures increase system verification and test complexity. Thus,
most of the academic reliability proposals have not been implemented in real hardware. Al-
though software-based reliability schemes have been proposed in order to avoid new hardware
design, these schemes present high overhead in the execution time, and they require the recom-
pilation of the system software or the application code.
In this thesis, we propose leveraging Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) for low-cost
error recovery which provides mechanisms to roll back to an earlier state in the execution for
resolving conflicts occurring during the parallel execution. In HTM, transaction-start can be
viewed as a checkpointed stable state and provides a simple recovery mechanism. We minimize
the implementation complexity of error recovery by utilizing existing hardware.
1.1.3 Executing at Ultra-Low Voltage Level
As the power envelope becomes one of the key design concerns, the dramatic improvement
in the energy efficiency in computer systems is required in order to keep the power under
control. A very effective approach in reducing the energy consumption is to reduce the supply
voltage (Vdd) below the safe margin. Voltage downscaling can offer substantial energy savings
by trading off performance. However, the energy reduction in the low-power mode comes
with a drastic increase in the number of faults [8] both in combinational logic and memory
cells. In order to fully exploit the dynamic energy savings of voltage downscaling, a potentially
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attractive idea is to implement reliability solutions that allow the system to operate below the
safe margin of Vdd .
In this thesis, we handled the microarchitecture and L1 cache separately for the operations
below the safe margin of Vdd . For microarchitectures, we investigate the usefulness of TM-
based error detection schemes such as replication, encoded processing, symptom-based and
invariants for reducing energy consumption. For L1 caches, we propose two schemes: 1)
We Adopt a Single Error Correcting - Multiple Adjacent Error Correcting Error Correcting
Code [9] in the faulty lines of L1 caches for below safe voltage operations. 2) We present a
simple, circuit-driven solution that duplicates or triplicates all the available lines in the cache
and achieves each read or write access to multiple lines without increasing access latency.
1.1.4 Limited Endurance of NAND Flash Memories
A flash memory cell has limited endurance; i.e. data cannot be reprogrammed into the cell more
than a limited number of times. A single-level flash cell (SLC) can tolerate∼10k program/erase
(P/E) cycles while a 2-bit, multi-level cell (MLC) can only survive for ∼3k P/E cycles for 30-
40nm (i.e., 3x-nm) technology generations. The available P/E cycles are expected to decrease
even more as flash cells continue to scale down in size and more than 2 bits are programmed
per cell. Generally, storage systems have strict requirements on reliability. For example, the
uncorrectable bit error rate during usage should be less than 10−15 and stored data should be
available for 5-10 years [10]. Thus, it is a challenge for flash memories to satisfy the lifetime
requirements for enterprise Solid State Disks (SSDs).
In this thesis, we exploit the dominance and characteristics of retention errors and pro-
gramming errors. In order to mitigate retention errors, we introduced Flash Correct-and-
Refresh scheme that periodically reads, corrects, and reprograms or remaps the stored data.
In order to mitigate programming errors, we introduced Neighbor-cell Assisted Correction
scheme in which data is re-read by utilizing the information extracted from the data stored
in neighbor cells.
1.2 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 presents the nomenclature of faults in a computer system and the state-of-the art for
error detection and recovery schemes.
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Chapter 3 introduces FIMSIM, a fault injection infrastructure for microarchitectural simulators.
Chapter 4 introduces SymptomTM, an architectural reliability scheme which leverages Hard-
ware Transactional Memory (HTM) mechanisms for error recovery and detects errors by mon-
itoring error symptoms.
Chapter 5 presents FaulTM, a redundancy-based error detection and recovery proposal based
on Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) providing high reliability for mission-critical sys-
tems.
Chapter 6 seeks architectural solutions for energy minimization by executing at ultra-low volt-
age level.
Chapter 7 presents on-chip SRAM memory designs which can tolerate very high bit failure
rates of ultra-low voltage execution in L1 caches.
Chapter 8 presents flash data correct techniques which increase the lifetime of flash memories
significantly.
Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation.
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2
Background in
Faults and Reliability
In this chapter, we present the nomenclature of faults in computer system, and the state-of-the
art for error detection and recovery schemes.
2.1 Faults in Computer Systems
In computer system, a hardware defect is termed as a fault. Errors are the manifestation of
faults. This means that an error is caused by faults but not all faults lead to errors. Also, fault
within a particular scope (i.e. circuit, architecture, operating system) may not appear as an error
outside the scope if the fault is either masked or tolerated within the scope.
Faults experienced by semiconductor devices fall into three main categories: transient, in-
termittent and permanent. Moreover, when these faults affect more than a bit at a time, multi-bit
faults occur. In this section we explain these faults.
Besides this classification, faults are also classified according to their outcomes [11]. If a
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fault disappears or is masked without being noticed by the user, it is termed as benign. Obvi-
ously, if the fault is not benign, it leads to an error unless it is detected and corrected. If an
error is not caught by the system, it leads to a Silent Data Corruption (SDC). In another case,
an error can be caught by the system but it can not be corrected. In this case, the error is termed
as Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE). Mission-critical systems such as airplanes must have
extremely low SDC and DUE because people’s lives may be at stake. Both SDC and DUE lead
to an error showing up at a boundary where it becomes visible to the user such as a change in
the bank account with or without warning. A failure, simply a special case of an error, is de-
fined as a system malfunction that causes the system to not meet its correctness, performance,
or other guarantees.
2.1.1 Transient Faults
A transient fault (also known as Soft Error: a transient fault cause a soft error) is a bit flip due
to some radiation event or power supply noise.
Three key radiation mechanisms inducing transient fault in computer systems have been
discovered: (1) Alpha particles from packaging material, (2) high-energy neutrons from cos-
mic radiation and (3) low-energy cosmic neutron interactions with the isotope brone-10. Obvi-
ously, these radiation events are unpredictable and it is not easy to avoid from them. Energetic
particles (e.g. alpha or neutron particles) generate electron–hole pairs (directly or indirectly)
as they pass through a semiconductor device. Transistor source and diffusion nodes can collect
these charges. The state of a logic device (i.e. latch, static random access memory (SRAM)
cell, or gate) is inverted if a sufficient amount of charge accumulates, thereby a logical fault
is introduced into the circuit’s operation. These faults are temporal (transient) since the data
bit stored in a device is corrupted until new data is written to that device [12]. As transistor
dimensions and operating voltages shrink, sensitivity to radiation increases dramatically. Thus,
it is foreseen that future systems will be more prone to transient faults.
Despite the fact that transient faults are nondestructive functional errors and they can be
fixed by re-setting or re-writing of the device, they may cause dramatic impact on computer
systems unless they are mitigated [13]. Here we present examples from the reported past events
that are due to transient faults.
• In 1978-1979, Intel Corporation delayed in delivering its chips to AT& T due to soft error
problem. The problem was because the packaging modules were made by a new ceramic
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factory and in the factory these modules got contaminated with uranium from the water
of Colorado’s Green River that passes through an old uranium mine [14].
• In 1986-1987, IBM Corporation faced a similar radioactive contamination problem. The
source of the problem was that bottles used to store the acid required in the chip manu-
facturing process was cleaned by using a radioactive contaminant [15].
• In 1996, Normand studied the error logs of several large computer systems and reported
a number of incidents induced by cosmic ray strikes [16].
• In 2000, Sun Microsystems observed soft error phenomenon in their UltraSPARC-II-
based servers, where the error protection scheme implemented was insufficient to handle
soft errors occurring in the SRAM chips in the systems.
• In 2004, Cypress semiconductor reported a number of incidents arising due to soft er-
rors [15]. In one incident, a single soft error crashed an interleaved system farm. In
another incident, a single soft error brought a billion-dollar automotive factory to halt
every month.
• In 2005,Hewlett-Packard acknowledged that a large installed base of a 2048-CPU server
system in Los Alamos National Laboratory which is located at about 7000 feet above sea
level, crashed frequently because of cosmic ray strikes to its parity-protected cache tag
array [17]. It is reported that HP’s ASC Q supercomputer was crashing 15 times a week
due to the inability of software and hardware to collaborate in fault recovery.
• In 2008, a single corrupt bit completely collapsed Amazon’s S3 cloud computing service
which took 6 hours to recover the entire system [5].
2.1.2 Permanent Faults
Irreversible physical changes in the semiconductor devices are called permanent faults. Per-
manent faults tend to occur early in the processor lifetime due to manufacturing faults (called
"infant mortality"), or late in the lifetime due to thermal and process related stress. Thus they
are typically characterized by the classic bathtub curve, shown in Figure 2.1. Initially, the error
rate is typically high because of either bugs in the system or latent hardware defects. Beyond
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Figure 2.1: Bathtub Curve: The fault rate in the phases of infant mortality, useful lifetime and
wearout phases.
the infant mortality phase, a system typically works properly until the end of its useful lifetime
is reached. Then, the wearout accelerates causing significantly higher error rates.
Reliability mechanisms usually disconnect the faulty structures hit by permanent faults,
and replace them with fault-free spare structures. Systems having these mechanisms tolerate
permanent faults. In fact, the lifetime reliability of a system is defined by its ability to tolerate
these faults.
The silicon industry typically uses a technique called burn-in to pass the infant mortality
phase and move the starting use point of a chip to the beginning of the useful lifetime period
Burn-in removes any chips that fail initially, thereby leaving parts that can last through the
useful lifetime period. Further, the silicon industry designs technology parameters, such as
oxide thickness, to guarantee that most chips last a minimal lifetime period.
Faults in the wearout phase are caused by electro-migration, stress-migration, gate oxide
breakdown or thermal cycling. Electromigration is the current-induced atomic transport gen-
erated by collision of electrons with metal atoms. The depletion and accumulation of material
creates voids and hillocks which can lead to open and short faults respectively. Stress migra-
tion is caused by thermo-mechanical stress which are caused by differing thermal expansion
rate of different materials in the device. So that metal atoms in the interconnects migrate due to
mechanical stress. Gate oxide breaks down with time and fails when a conductive path forms
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in the dielectric. In thermal cycling, permanent damage accumulates every time there is a cycle
in temperature in the processor, eventually leading to failure.
A permanent fault can be detected by performing built-in self test (BIST) [18]. For instance,
to check that in a memory structure if there is a permanently faulty bit producing always ‘0’or
always ‘1’(i.e. stuck-at-zero or stuck-at-1), first ‘0’s are written to the memory structure and
read back to see if they are read correctly. Then the process is repeated with writing all ‘1’s to
the memory structure.
Typically faults in the wearout epoch are manifested first as intermittent faults (we explain
in the next section) then progress to permanent faults.
2.1.3 Intermittent Faults
Process variation or in-progress wear-out, combined with voltage and temperature fluctuations
cause burst of frequent faults, called intermittent faults, that last from several cycles to several
seconds. An intermittent fault occurs repeatedly at the same location; It tends to occur in bursts
for a period of time when the fault is activated and the replacement of the offending circuit
mitigates the intermittent fault [19, 20]. It has been suggested that intermittent faults have
the potential to impact program execution to a greater extent when compared with transient
faults [21]. In this sense, intermittent faults can be considered as similar to permanent faults.
However, similarly to transient faults, it is hard to diagnose an intermittent fault by post facto
using hardware/software tests because intermittent faults do not persist and the conditions that
caused the fault are hard to regenerate.
Continued device scaling results in increased Process, Voltage and Temperature (PVT) vari-
ations, increased cross-talk and decreased noise margins all of which lead to increased suscep-
tibility to intermittent faults. Moreover, wear-out failures are expected to become much more
frequent but devices typically do not fail suddenly, they display intermittent behaviour for a pe-
riod of time beforehand. Therefore, it is prevised that the rate of occurrence of the intermittent
faults will increase [22, 23].
2.1.4 Multi-bit Faults
Multi-bit faults occur when hardware faults affect multiple bits at a time due to several reasons.
In this section we explain a couple of them. Multi-Bit Upsets can be transient or permanent.
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Spatial multi-bit upsets of transient faults occur when a single particle strike causes more
than one bit-flip in the neighbourhood. Results of irradiation tests on 90nm commercial pro-
cesses reveal that multi-bit upsets as large as 13 bits can occur in sub-100nm technologies [24].
These faults are expected to increase in the future processors due to shrinking size of the tran-
sistors. A two-bit spatial multi-bit upset in a memory structure can manifest in two ways:
horizontal or vertical [25]. Horizontal means two adjacent bits on the same word are upset.
Vertical, on the other hand, means that two bits in two adjacent words but in the same bit
position are upset.
Temporal multi-bit upsets of transient faults happen when multiple independent particles
strike distinct locations of the structure causing upsets on multiple bits. Since the likelihood of
particle strike is high in the high altitudes, the probability of temporal multi-bit upsets increases
in higher altitudes [26].
Bridging permanent faults are caused by shorts between normally unconnected signal lines.
There are two types of bridging faults: (1) dominant-1 which is modelled by assuming that
there is an AND gate between bits and (2) dominant-0 which is modelled by using an OR-gate.
Note that, if there is a short between two bits, only the value of one bit changes. However, we
classify these bridging faults under multiple faults since it is related to multiple bits. Also, this
short can be between more than two bits which leads to changes in the values of multiple bits.
In bridging faults, when two shorted lines have the same value, the result comes the same. On
the other side, when two shorted lines have opposite driven values, one value (the strong one,
either 0 or 1) overrides the other.
2.2 Reliability Schemes
In order to characterize the behaviour of a system in the presence of a fault, two attributes are
defined: Reliability and Availability. The reliability of a system is the probability that the sys-
tem does not experience a user-visible error. Availability, on the other hand, is the probability
that a system is functioning correctly at a particular time. Fault-Tolerance is the ability of a
computer system to survive in the presence of faults. In the literature, Fault Tolerance and Re-
liability are tend to be used interchangeably. A reliable system should have two main aspects
in order to avoid errors: Error Detection and Error Recovery. Error Detection is the process of
discovering that an error has occurred. Error Recovery is the process of restoring the system’s
integrity after the occurrence of an error.
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Some reliability mechanisms just detect errors and alert the Operating System (OS) or the
user (the so-called fail-stop systems) while other mechanisms both detect and recover from
errors (the so-called fail-safe systems).
One of the simplest ways of error detection in memory structures is using parity bits. A
parity bit is added to a string of a binary code and it indicates whether the number of bits with
the value of ’1’ is even or odd. Single bit parity can be used to detect odd number of errors.
However, it is not adequate to correct errors or to detect even number of errors.
Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) are the most well-known reliability techniques rely on en-
coding some information from the stored data and checking this information upon reading the
value [6]. They are widely used to detect and correct faults in the memory structures such as
caches, main memories, hard disks or non-volatile memories. However, ECC is not adequate
to provide reliability for microarchitectures and execution units.
In this section, we cover error detection and recovery schemes providing reliability for
microarchitectures.
2.2.1 Error Detection
Redundant execution is the most common error detection solution utilized for detecting faults
occurred in microprocessors including execution unit and other data-path components. The
value is generated multiple times with a single or multiple resources and later checked with
simple voting. To protect processor logic from transient faults, some studies utilize Simultane-
ous Multi-threading (SMT) by executing two identical threads in the same core and comparing
their results [27, 28, 29]. However, they are not suitable to detect permanent faults. In recent
work, researchers leveraged chip multiprocessing (CMP) for error detection by pairing cores
for redundant execution and checking their results [30, 31, 32, 33].
Lockstepping is a classical, redundancy-based error detection scheme for microprocessors
that is widely used by systems integrators [32, 33]. In lockstepping, two synchronized and
lockstepped processors run two identical instruction streams by receiving the same input. The
output signals from processors are compared in each cycle to check for faults. When a mis-
match is detected in the outputs, it triggers a relevant action, such as alerting the OS in a
fail-stop system or triggering hardware or software recovery actions in a fail-safe system.
Lockstepping can be deployed at different granularities. For instance, in the fine-grained
approach, output of each instruction or even the output of each pipeline stage is compared.
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Although the error detection occurs immediately when the execution of the faulty instruction
completes, the overhead of this approach across threads is significantly high. On the other side,
in the coarse-grained approach, only the off-core activities such as the result of the memory
instructions are compared by considering that the fault is benign unless it goes out of the scope.
In a coarser approach such that in HP non-stop servers [33], full boards are replicated and only
off-board activities are compared. Trivially, the error detection overhead of coarse-grained ap-
proaches are much lower than the fine-grained ones. On the other side, error detection latency is
much higher in coarse-grained approach compared to the fine-grained one. In order to provide
early error detection in a coarse-grained lockstepping system, Hernandez and Abella proposed
LiVe in which register values are exposed in the network for comparison in the round-robin
fashion [34]. Lockstep systems can be implemented for mixed-critical systems where core
may run reliability-critical instruction streams in lockstep mode while non-critical ones are
executed in non-lockstep mode. For instance, Infineon AURIX implements 3 core processor
in which two of them are lockstepped by comparing off-core activities while one of them is
non-lockstep [35].
Lockstepping can reduce the undetected Silent Data Corruption rate to almost zero for
components it is covering, i.e. microprocessors. However, it can also increase the rate of
the false positive case especially when it is implemented with fine granularity in which error
recovery is triggered although the detected fault is benign. For instance, a fault in the branch
predictor do not usually cause incorrect execution, it only slightly impacts the performance due
to the misprediction, thus it is generally benign. However, two lockstepped processors do not
follow the same execution path although the final output of the execution is the same, hence,
they consider the fault as an error. On the other side, Lockstepping requires tightly coupled
processor pairs driven by the same clock signal. Driving the clock signal across cores becomes
an increasing burden as device scaling continues. Later studies avoid this burden by focusing
on two main issues: (1) input replication and (2) output comparison
Input replication ensures that both processors observe identical load values, cache invali-
dations and external interrupts. Chip-level Redundant Threading (CRT) [31] and Chip-level
Redundant Threading with Recovery (CRTR) [30] utilize load-value queue (LVQ) to provide
an identical view of memory to the redundant executions. However, this strict input replication
requires significant changes to the critical components of the processor core and cache hierar-
chy. Also, it forbids using the cache hierarchy for multi threaded executions. ReUnion [36]
relaxes the input replication by allowing redundant cores to issue memory operations indepen-
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dently. It solves incoherant inputs of redundant threads by rolling back the threads if their
outputs are different. However, ReUnion is not convenient for permanent fault detection, since
it can not differentiate if two successive mismatches between redundant executions are caused
by input incoherence or a permanent fault. Note that, ReUnion utilizes the rollback mechanism
of reorder buffer (ROB) to recover from detected faults which requires architectural register file
to be protected by ECC with encoding/decoding overhead at every access.
Output comparison checks the result of redundant executions to determine if they are iden-
tical. CRT [31] validates only the memory values assuming that a fault is benign unless it
propagates to the memory. However, full-state comparison is essential to guarantee the error-
free execution since the last validation. For this issue, CRTR [30] compares the results of
register instructions together with memory values which makes the comparison overhead very
high. It reduces the bandwidth requirement by employing dependence-based checking elision
which lets only the last instruction in the queue to use the register value queue. However, it
still has a high comparison overhead. Fingerprinting [37] strives to compare the result of all
instructions with a very low comparison overhead by producing the signature of execution his-
tory. However, it has two main drawbacks. Firstly, it is highly likely that some faults are not
detected in the summary value. Thus, the fault coverage of Fingerprinting is not 100%. The
consequence of undetected faults could be catastrophic in mission-critical domain. Secondly,
it treats benign faults and errors equally. which presents unnecessary recovery time overhead
of benign faults (In our experiments in Chapter 5, we find that 19% of transient faults for
spec cpu2006 applications are benign and 20% of them are treated as error by Fingerprint-
ing). Moreover, it necessitates hash value circuits in the architecture which increase the power
consumption and necessitate additional pipeline stages [36]. Note that, ReUnion [36] utilizes
efficient compression through Fingerprinting for output comparison.
In order to avoid the redundancy overhead, researchers propose other error detection schemes
such as online testing or symptom-based error detection. ACE [38] is one of the latest on-line
testing schemes which stops the execution of the system periodically in order to execute prede-
fined test vectors to check if the system produces the expected results. However, on-line testing
schemes can not detect transient faults. Symptom-based error detection schemes [39, 40],
which monitor error symptoms (e.g. fatal traps, miss-predictions) for error detection in order
to avoid redundancy. However, their error coverage is limited which causes higher Silent Data
Corruption (SDC) rate [41]. For instance, a fault may cause an erroneous amount of money to
be transferred to a bank account. Due to this limitation, Shoestring [41] partially replicates the
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instruction stream to reduce the SDC rate.
2.2.2 Error Recovery
There are mainly two categories of recovery mechanisms: 1) Forward Error Recovery (FER)
and Backward Error Recovery (BER). FER is based on replicating the execution in order to
use the correct results if the actual execution fails. This approach assumes that the replicated
execution is error-free. Hence, we do not consider further this mechanism in this study. BER
(also called checkpoint/rollback mechanism) stores an error-free state of the system (check-
point) and reverts the system state upon error detection (rollback). BER is classified in three
groups according to the checkpointing strategy used.
2.2.3 Global Checkpointing
Global checkpointing, a well-known recovery scheme, recovers detected errors by rolling back
all processors to an earlier validated state [42, 43]. The scalability of this approach is limited
when we move towards many-core systems, as it introduces the significant overheads due to
two reasons: (1) during barrier synchronization performed at checkpointing, some processors
might stay idle if load is not properly balanced between them (e.g., some processors perform
I/O operations before the checkpoint), (2) the recovery requires all communicating processors
to rollback to an earlier validated state, which causes unnecessary rollbacks of the error-free
processors.
2.2.4 Coordinated-local Checkpointing
The overheads of global checkpointing are mitigated by synchronizing only the set of proces-
sors that have communicated with each other between two checkpoints to decide on a common
checkpoint, whereas all other processors can perform local checkpoints [44, 45]. This approach
has been shown to outperform global checkpointing [46]. ReVive [43] and SafetyNet [47] are
well-known coordinated-local checkpointing schemes that create system-wide checkpoints pe-
riodically. ReVive is only feasible in coarse granularity due to its large checkpoint size. How-
ever, I/O operations can only be supported in small checkpointing intervals [37]. Also, large
checkpoints suffer from long recovery times. These schemes present several difficulties. First,
they typically implement relatively complex synchronization mechanisms to guarantee that all
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structures (e.g. cores) rollback to the same state in case of an error. For instance, in Safe-
tyNet, late synchronization causes several unvalidated checkpoints to be saved in the system
which leads to an area overhead. Second, these schemes rollback all processors during recovery
which causes a loss of error-free operations. In order to address this limitation, Rebound [46],
the state-of-the-art architectural checkpointing scheme, rollbacks only the communicating pro-
cessors after error detection instead of all processors. However, it still may require more than
one processor to rollback and it suffers from the problem of cascading rollbacks.
2.2.5 Uncoordinated-local Checkpointing
In contrast to the two previous approaches, uncoordinated-local checkpointing performs check-
pointing locally at each processor without any synchronization and also stores the interactions
between processors in order to rollback to a consistent checkpoint [48, 49]. This approach is
interesting for executions where processors communicate rarely.
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FIMSIM: Fault Injection Infrastructure
Technology trends are leading to more hardware errors (transient or permanent errors) due to
various phenomena such as high energy particle strikes, ageing or wear-out, infant mortality,
and so on. Thus, Reliability is becoming a first class design constraint for computer designers.
However, reliability techniques introduce penalties in performance, in power, in die size or in
design time. Therefore, it is essential to carefully evaluate the level of reliability provided by
these schemes.
Fault injection is a widely used experiment-based reliability evaluation approach in which
faults are injected either (1) to the real hardware, (2) to the simulator or (3) to the software
(operating system or application). While hardware fault injection requires at least the physical
prototype of the system, software fault injection is limited in the sense that they cannot inject
faults into locations that are inaccessible to the software. On the other hand, simulation based
fault injection is applicable early in the design time and it can inject faults to the processor struc-
tures that cannot be excited by injecting faults at the software level. Nevertheless, it provides
the correlation between the criticality of circuit level faults and their impact on the application
level. Consequently, simulation based fault injection is more appealing for researchers than
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software and hardware based fault injections.
Several simulation based fault injectors model the Register Transfer Level (RTL) of micro-
processors [50, 51]. These models are incapable of modelling a wide range of systems (e.g.
multi core multi threaded architectures) due to their design complexity and their high simu-
lation time. Moreover, they are impractical for the researchers who design reliability in the
microarchitecture level since they use microarchitectural simulators for their design. In this
chapter, we present FIMSIM, a fault injection infrastructure for microarchitectural simulators.
Reliability schemes generally targets particular fault models. FIMSIM is capable of inject-
ing transient, permanent and intermittent faults either as a single-bit fault or multi-bit faults
as combination of several fault models. Hence, FIMSIM is convenient for the evaluation of
many dependable systems. On the other hand, faults in small-sized structures (bypass logic,
PC) may lead to drastic errors despite the fact that the likelihood of the fault occurrence in a
bigger-sized structure (e.g. register file) is higher. FIMSIM, apart from the prior fault injec-
tors, injects faults also to critical small sized structures besides other large buffered structures.
Inevitably, the sizes of structures are taken into account by FIMSIM for the calculation of the
reliability of the entire microarchitecture. Consequently, the compact characteristic of FIM-
SIM provides opportunity to make a comprehensive evaluation of the vulnerability of different
microarchitectural structures against different fault models.
Simulation time is a prominent limitation for the fault injection technique. FIMSIM, re-
duces the simulation time due to two reasons. First, FIMSIM is on microarchitecture level sim-
ulation which keeps the simulation time shorter compared to RTL level simulations. Second,
we utilize M5 [52], a microarchitecture simulator that provides a checkpointing mechanism
for the implementation of FIMSIM. Therefore, numerous fault injections, especially in the late
phase of the applications, are achieved in shorter amount of time by restoring the checkpoints
in the later phase without the need to run the application from the beginning.
Repeatability of fault injection experiments (injecting the exact fault again) is also an es-
sential issue for validation of dependability since, compelling test cases can be determined and
prepared. FIMSIM is able to repeat a fault injection experiment easily. In FIMSIM, the user
can define the fault injection point explicitly instead of injecting faults to randomly generated
points.
In Section 3.1, we explain the design principles of FIMSIM. In Section 3.2, we present our
fault injection result evaluating the vulnerability of the in-order Alpha [53] microarchitecture
by utilizing spec cpu2006 [54] benchmark suit.
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3.1 Implementation
In this section, we describe the infrastructure of the FIMSIM tool and its capabilities. First, we
define the simulator that we enhanced with fault injection capability. After that, we describe
the aspects of a golden run. Then, we explain the fault injection implementation. Finally, we
present the calculation of the processor reliability according to the fault injection results.
3.1.1 Simulator
We enhance the M5 full system simulator [52] with fault injection capability. M5 includes pro-
cessor cores, peripheral devices, memories, interconnection buses, and network connections.
The timing model of M5 ensures that all operations (i.e. branch prediction, cache misses,
fetches, pipeline stalls, thread context switching, and many other subtle aspects of micropro-
cessors) are executed in the proper virtual time. M5 is an execution-driven simulator which
takes the binary file of applications to be simulated. We select M5 for our base simulator due
to its several properties that are convenient for a fault injection tool. First, M5 is a full system
simulator that we can observe the effects of hardware faults on the operating system and user
applications. Second, M5 has a checkpointing mechanism that dump the whole inner-state of
the architecture to a checkpoint file whenever it is desired. In FIMSIM, we can trace the ef-
fect of a fault by comparing checkpoints easily. Moreover, we can accelerate repetitive fault
injections to the late phase in applications by restoring the checkpoints without requiring the
execution until that point. Note that M5 is a deterministic simulator that the results do not vary
at all between two identical runs at different times. Third, in M5, we can add command line
options easily by modifying Python scripts. This is beneficial because we can define the fault
injection and the golden run options without modifying the simulation fundamentals. Fourth,
the M5 is implemented in an object oriented programming manner so that we can enhance the
simulator with fault injection capabilities without modifying the rest of the simulation dramat-
ically. Fifth, M5 is a popular open-source simulator with a large user-base, therefore it is a
good substrate for FIMSIM; especially with a view towards releasing FIMSIM to the reliability
research community.
Figure 3.1 presents the fault injection classes that we added to the M5 simulator and how
these fault injection classes interact with the existing classes in M5. The white area was already
implemented by M5, we add the shaded classes: FaultList and Fault.
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Figure 3.1: Class Diagram of FIMSIM. Blue classes are the extensions for the fault injection
purpose.
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Figure 3.2: Checkpoint generation in golden run
3.1.2 Golden Run
In the golden run which is executed only once for each application, FIMSIM produces error
free checkpoints periodically during the execution of the entire application. For example, in
Figure 3.2, FIMSIM generates checkpoints at every N cycles (e.g. N = 10M), so that 6 check-
points are generated for the whole application. For instance, to inject faults to the 4th chunk of
the application, CP3 is loaded to the FIMSIM simulator without having to execute the appli-
cation from the beginning. After the fault injection, CP4 of the golden run and the faulty run
are compared without waiting until the end of the application in order to see whether the fault
has completely disappeared (masked) or it still stays in the architecture. We argue that instead
of comparing the final results of the application, comparing the architectural states is essential,
because a fault may stay in the system or worse propagate to the operating system although it
does not affect the final output of the application.
3.1.3 Fault Injection
In FIMSIM, we simulate transient faults by flipping (changing 0 to 1 or vice versa ) the value of
the randomly selected bit in a randomly selected cycle. We use stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 fault
models to simulate the permanent faults in which a randomly selected value becomes stuck
from the fault injection cycle until simulation ends. We simulate intermittent faults by utilizing
stuck-at fault models for a predefined number of cycles.
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In FIMSIM, the user defines the list of fault(s) in the input file (e.g. a single permanent
fault and/or spatial multi-bit transient faults). In this file, the user defines each fault with the
following properties:
• the processor id where the fault will be injected (0..(number of processor-1)),
• fault type (transient, stuckat0, stuckat1, dominant0, dominant1, intermittent0, intermit-
tent1),
• fast-forward cycle before fault injection
• the cycle of the fault injection (0..(total Execution Cycle -1)),
• the faulty structure (intRF, specialRF, ALU, ITB, DTB, Bypass, PC),
• the faulty entry (e.g. register number),
• the faulty bit number (0..31 for 32 bit machine).
• persisting time of the intermittent faults,
• neighbour fault id for multi-bit fault injections (0..(number of faults-1)).
• direction of neighbourhood for spatial faults (vertical, horizontal)
These properties are also shown in Figure 3.1 under the class Fault. These parameters
explicitly define a fault so that the user can repeat a fault injection experiment for debugging the
effect of a particular fault definition. Note that, the user can prefer any/all of these parameters
to be random so that multiple fault injection campaigns could be conducted and their results
processed to calculate overall processor reliability.
At the beginning of the simulation, FIMSIM reads the list of faults from an input file and it
sets the list defined by the FaultList data structure. Making a list of faults gives an oppor-
tunity to add multiple bit faults at a time. Some of these multi-bit faults affect the neighbour
bits as well. In FIMSIM, these faults are described with the neighbour attribute to define the
place of the second bit. For example, a spatial multi bit fault is defined as two faults that are
neighbours to each other. In this case, the second fault takes the place of the fault from the first
fault’s options and it is located just next to it.
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After starting the simulation, at every cycle (e.g. in nextCycle() method), M5 calls
the FaultList’s injectFaults() method which also calls the injectFault()
method of each fault. injectFault() method first compares the injection cycle of the
fault and the executing cycle of the simulator. If the executing cycle is late enough, FIMSIM
modifies the corresponding value in the pertinent structure according to the fault type of the
fault. For instance, for a transient fault injection to the register file, FIMSIM flips the corre-
sponding bit in the register file. After the injection, if the injected fault is transient, it is deleted
from the fault list. Otherwise (permanent and intermittent), it keeps being injected in the fol-
lowing cycles either until the end of the simulation (permanent) or until the persisting time of
the fault (intermittent).
In each fault injection, the checkpoint is created in the following checkpoint creation cycle
unless the fault causes the application to crash. This faulty checkpoint is compared with the
one produced in the golden run to see whether the fault is masked or it has changed the state of
the microarchitecture. Thus, there are three possible outputs of the fault injection:
• Crash: The application crashes before the simulation reaches to the checkpoint creation
cycle therefore it does not generate a checkpoint. This crash might be due to a segmen-
tation fault or a fatal trap exception (e.g. incorrect program counter).
• Benign: If the checkpoints of the faulty run and the golden run are identical, that means
that the injected fault was masked (e.g. a faulty register is written before it is read by any
instruction)
• Error: If the faulty checkpoint is different from the golden one, that means that the
fault led to a different architectural state. This error group also includes the silent data
corruptions (SDC).
Here one can think that classifying faults in the checkpoints instead of waiting until the end
of the application would not present an accurate result. In this sense, faults classified as errors
at the checkpoint time may be masked or may lead to a crash after the checkpoint. However, Li
et al. showed that for the faults causing a fatal trap exception after executing 10M instruction
is less than the 5% of the injected faults. Similarly, we argue that some errors may stay in the
architectural state although they do not change the output of the application. Thus, we believe
that checkpoint comparison provides a fast and sufficiently accurate classification within the
defined tracing window.
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3.1.4 Reliability of Processor
When calculating the vulnerability of whole architecture, there are two essential points that
need to be focused.
(1) the results of the faults (e.g. system crash or SDC)
(2) the likelihood of the fault occurrence in the structure (e.g. size of the structure)
We classify the faults into three groups according to the way they manifest themselves: be-
nign faults, catastrophic failures and errors (including SDCs). In result critical applications (e.g.
financial applications), SDCs are the most critical faults for reliability in which the user must
completely trust the result computed by the application (e.g. transferring the correct amount of
money). On the other hand, some other applications are required to operate continuously (e.g.
web servers). In these applications, catastrophic failures are more critical than SDCs. Thus,
when FIMSIM calculates the vulnerability of the entire architecture, it multiplies the error rate
and the catastrophic failure rate with Ce , Cc coefficients respectively. The weight of these
coefficients are application dependent and defined by the user.
There are several aspects that affect the likelihood of the fault occurrence (LF) in a structure
such as size, temperature, age, environmental conditions etc. In this study we consider two
aspects. First, we give the higher weight to bigger structures according to the number of wires
in the structures. Second, for the combinational logic (e.g. ALU) we multiply the likelihood
with the probability that a fault injected to the inner state of the structure propagates to the
output of the combinational logic without being masked inside the structure. We adopt these
probabilities from a previous study of RTL analysis of the processor structures [55]. Note that,
for more accurate LF calculation, other aspects can be considered as well.
We calculate the processor vulnerability (V) with the following formula:
V =
∑st ructures
i
 
Ce x ERi + Cc x CRi

xLFi

Ce = Error Coe f f icient
Cc = Crash Coe f f icient
ERi =
Number o f Er rors
Number o f In jec ted Faul ts : ErrorRate
CRi =
Number o f C rashes
Number o f In jec ted Faul ts : CrashRate
LFi = SRi x ORi : Likel ihood o f Faul t Occurrence
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SRi =
Size o f theSt ructure
Size o f the Entire Processor
ORi = The probabil i t y o f f aul t propagation to the output
Note that FIMSIM is flexible enough so that users can also generate their own processor
dependability models.
3.2 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the vulnerability of in-order Alpha 21264 microarchitecture by
utilizing our FIMSIM fault injection infrastructure and spec cpu2006 benchmark suite with
test data set. We inject the faults to seven different structures in the core; bypass logic, data
TLB (DTB), instruction TLB (ITB), arithmetic logic unit (ALU), integer register file (int-RF),
special purposed register file (RF-special) and program counter (PC). Note that, in-order cores
do not have some complex structures required for out-of-order execution such as the reorder
buffer, issue queue and rename logic. We did not inject faults to caches such as L1 and L2
caches. It is because due to their large sizes, they require higher number of fault injection
experiments and longer time to simulate those experiments. We inject 100 faults per structure
in each application to a random location in the structure (e.g a random bit of a randomly chosen
register in the int-RF). In each fault injection, we start the error-free application, execute until
the randomly chosen fault injection cycle and continue executing until the next checkpoint
creation time without any other fault injection. Each of experimental results presented in this
work represent the result of 20 applications from spec cpu2006 benchmark with 2000 fault
injections per structure. In total, we injected nine different fault models (i.e. transient, stuck-
at-0, stuck-at-1, intermittent-0, intermittent-1, multi bit transient horizontal, multi-bit transient
vertical, dominant-0, dominant-1) to 7 different structures (i.e. bypass, DTB, ITB, ALU, int-
RF, RF-special, PC), thus, in total we run 126000 fault injection experiments which is similar
or very higher than prior fault injection analysis [55, 56, 57, 58].
First, we generate checkpoints of the golden run at every 100M cycles after warming up
70M cycles. Then we inject faults at a random time (within 100M cycles) by loading the
checkpoints by performing one injection per simulation. We injected faults to the first chunk
since some applications in the spec cpu2006 benchmark suite does not have more than 200M
instructions with test dataset. We calculate the vulnerability of the processor (V) by utilizing
the formula that we explain in Section 3.1.4. The size values of each structure and other related
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Structure SR OR
Program Counter 0,003 1
Special Register File 0,4 1
Integer Register File 0,4 1
Instruction TLB 0,05 1
Data TLB 0,05 1
Arithmetic Logic Unit 0,08 0,7
ByPass Logic 0,003 1
Cc Ce
1,0 1,0
Table 3.1: Number of Bits in Microarchitecture Structures and their average temperature.
coefficients that we utilized in the formula, are presented in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 presents the single fault injection results. Unsurprisingly, processors are vul-
nerable to permanent faults at most, as it is seen in the figure. The interesting result is that
stuck-at-1 faults are more harmful for the applications than stuck-at-0 faults. This is because
bit values are mostly zero (e.g. more than 70% of bits in PC and more than 90% of bits in
special register file are zero). Thus, stuck-at-0 faults (permanent or intermittent) are generally
benign.
When we compare the effects of the faults on ALU and Bypass logic, the bypass logic
is slightly more vulnerable to the faults. This is because the fault affects the next instruction
in the bypass logic. In TLBs (ITB or DTB), short term faults (transient or intermittent) are
compensated. However, when there is a permanent fault in TLB, it is harmful for the whole
architecture. Finally, the PC is the most vulnerable structure in these structure that any fault in
the PC result in either error or system crash.
In Figure 3.4, we present the effects of multiple faults on the processor. Note that we can
inject the vertical multi-bit faults only to the buffer structures (i.e. register files and TLBs). In
the figure, it is seen that the multi-bit transient faults in the horizontal direction are not more
harmful than a single bit transient fault. However, in the vertical direction, multi-bit transient
faults become significantly more harmful in the register files since it affects more than one
entry in the buffer. Bridging faults (dominant-0 and dominant-1) affecting the vulnerability in
the similar way. Because the final result of the bit values changes if two bits are different from
each other meaning that they are effective in the same conditions.
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Figure 3.3: Single Fault Injection to Spec2006 Benchmark.
3.3 Related Work
Many fault tolerant system design have been proposed by the increasing importance of the
reliability since scaling of new technologies leads to reliability issues. Architectural Vulner-
ability Factor (AVF) is one direction to measure the reliability of a microarchutecture which
is proposed by Shubu Mukherje [59]. The main advantage of AVF analyse is that it is fast to
consulate in the early in the design time without needing the hardware prototype. Although
AVF analysis can be used to estimate the vulnerability of the system against single-bit transient
faults, it is not adequate to be used for multi-bit transient faults or intermittent and permanent
faults. Thus, AVF only gives the lower bound for reliability [58].
Another well known reliability measurement technique is fault injection which is being in-
creasingly consolidated and applied a wide range of fields. Besides supplying an infrastructure
to measure the reliability performance of a computer system, fault injection schemes can also
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Figure 3.4: Multi-bit Fault Injection to spec2006 benchmark.
help to measure the error recovery time of a reliability scheme. In this section, we present
previous fault injectors implemented in simulators.
Many simulation based fault injectors simulate the models in Very high speed integrated
circuits Hardware Description Language (VHDL). Gil et. al. [50] studied and compared these
fault injection methods. Nicholas J. Wang et. al. [51] implemented The Illinois Verilog Model
(IVM) for injecting transient faults and characterizing the effects on a high performance pro-
cessor pipeline. They created a highly detailed RTL model of microprocessor. The results are
traced by using uniform sampling. Later in another study, Nicholas J. Wang et. al. [58] injected
transient faults to IVM and they compared fault injection results with AVF analyse.
Although low-level simulators would provide the ability to use more accurate fault models,
they present a trade-off in speed and the ability to model long running workloads with OS
activity. Given our emphasis on understanding the impact of faults on the OS and the need to
simulate for long periods, gate level simulation is not feasible
Michail Maniatakos et. al. [60] pinpointed some limitations of IVM (e.g. can not imple-
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ment the floating point instructions, inefficient to inject permanent or intermittent faults). They
developed an extensive fault simulation infrastructure by interacting IVM with a functional
simulator (simplescalar). Also, Man Lap Li et. al. [55] combined microarchitecture simulation
with RTL level fault injectors to inject permanent faults to ALU, Decoder and Address Genera-
tion Unit (AGEN) to gain accurate fault injection results. However, these schemes are complex
and slow for microarchitecture designers since they include RTL model.
Nishant J. George et. al. [25] injected single and double transient faults due to single particle
strike. They injected faults to the register file and to the reorder buffer by using a functional
simulator (PtlSim). The effects of the injected faults are classified according to the final results
of the applications. Therefore, they could make their experiments only on short applications
due to time constraints. Also, they can not distinguish whether a fault is benign or hidden in
the architecture.
Man-Lap Li et. al. [57] injected permanent faults to a microarchitectur level full system
simulation environment (GEMS+Virtutech Simics). They injected both single (stuck-at) and
double (bridging) faults. Also, they pointed out the advantages of fault injection into microar-
chitecture level simulator (e.g. presenting a trade-off in speed and the ability to model long
running workloads with OS activity).
So far, very few tries have been done in order to study the effects of intermittent faults by
fault injection. Layali Rashid [21] injected intermittent faults in software level to understand
their affects on the software. However, they made their experiments only on two applications
(matrix multiply and insertion sort). Gracia et. al. injected intermittent faults in a VHDL based
simulator [61].
3.4 Summary
Fault injection is a widely-used experiment-based reliability evaluation approach in which
faults are injected either (1) to the real hardware, (2) to the simulator or (3) to the software
(operating system or application). While hardware fault injection requires at least the physical
prototype of the system, software fault injection is limited in the sense that they cannot inject
faults into locations that are inaccessible to the software. On the other hand, simulation based
fault injection is applicable early in the design time and it can inject faults to the processor
structures that cannot be excited by injecting faults at the software level.
In this chapter, we present FIMSIM, a fault injection infrastructure in the microarchitecture
31
Chapter 3. FIMSIM: Fault Injection Infrastructure
level. FIMSIM is a compact tool that can inject transient, permanent or intermittent faults
either as a single bit fault or as multi-bit faults. Therefore, it provides opportunity to analyse
the affects of the faults on the software since it is on a full-system simulator. In this chapter, we
also evaluate the vulnerability of in-order Alpha microarchitecture by using FIMSIM.
32
4
SymptomTM: Symptom-Based Error
Detection with Transactional Memory
It is important to develop simple (in terms of complexity-effectiveness) and powerful (in terms
of error detection and recovery coverage) reliability and availability mechanisms to address
the increasing number of transient and permanent faults. In order to provide low-cost error
detection, Symptom-Based error detection has been proposed which monitors the execution
to determine if there is a symptom of hardware error such as fatal traps, high number of OS
activities, mispredictions in high confidential branches or too many misses to caches [39, 40].
Although these symptom-based error detection schemes provide acceptable fault coverage (ex-
cept Silent Data Corruptions) with minimum performance degradation, they require a simple
recovery mechanism to roll back to an error-free state after detecting an error [62].
Error recovery is the process of restoring the system’s integrity after the occurrence of an
error. One of the well-known error recovery scheme is global checkpointing [43, 47]. How-
ever, as we move towards many-core systems, it is foreseen that global checkpointing will not
be scalable due to two reasons. First, global checkpointing schemes should implement syn-
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chronization mechanisms (either at checkpoint creation or checkpoint validation) to guarantee
that all structures (e.g. cores) rollback to the same state in case of an error. Second, when an
error is detected in one core, all the other cores communicating with it (faulty or not) have to
roll back since errors could have propagated to the error-free cores through shared variables.
Thus, assuming that error rate will be higher for higher core counts, it is foreseen that in future
many-core processors, global checkpointing may take even more time than the execution of the
application itself [63].
In addition to the performance degradation in the error-free execution, recovery schemes
require supplementary hardware structures (e.g buffers to save checkpoints) which are non-
functional for performance but they are only utilized for reliability. These structures increase
system verification and test complexity. Thus, most of the academic reliability proposals have
not been implemented in real hardware. Although software based reliability schemes have been
proposed in order to avoid new hardware design, these schemes present high overhead in the
execution time and they require the recompilation of the system software or the application
code.
In this chapter, we introduce SymptomTM, an architectural reliability scheme which lever-
ages Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) mechanisms for error recovery and detects errors
by monitoring error symptoms. HTM systems provide mechanisms to abort transactions in case
of a conflict, thus they discard or undo all the tentative memory updates and restart the execution
from the beginning of the transaction. Thus, transaction start can be viewed as a checkpointed
stable state. SymptomTM uses the TM abort mechanisms for error recovery. SymptomTM
executes vulnerable code in a special transaction and it monitors if this transaction presents an
error symptom. In case of an error symptom, SymptomTM aborts the transaction to recover
from the error. Thus, SymptomTM provides a simple recovery mechanism.
We designate fatal traps (e.g attempting to execute an undefined instruction code) as our
error symptom which is examined by SWAT group for permanent faults in detail [39, 62, 64].
They conclude that it has high error coverage with no false positive impact. Although other
symptoms (e.g. mispredictions in high confidence branches or high OS activity) can be consid-
ered to improve the error coverage, these symptoms may result in false positives that increase
the performance degradation.
In Section 4.1, we present a background information for Transactional Memory. In Sec-
tion 4.2, we explain the design principles of SymptomTM with its benefits. In Section 4.3, we
provide our experimental results for SymptomTM.
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4.1 Background about Transactional Memory
Transactional Memory (TM) is a promising technique which aims to simplify parallel program-
ming by executing transactions (sequences of instructions) atomically and in isolation [65, 66].
Atomicity means that all the instructions in a transaction either commit as a whole, or abort and
roll back their changes. When a transaction commits, its tentative updates are made permanent.
Transactions record their tentative reads and writes in a read-set and write-set respectively. TM
provides mechanisms to abort transactions in case of a conflict. In order to abort a transaction,
TM systems discard or undo all the tentative memory updates and restart the execution from
the beginning of the transaction. Thus, a transaction’s start can be viewed as a checkpointed
state.
TM systems can be implemented in the software, in the hardware or in a hybrid fashion.
Hardware Transactional Memory is already implemented in mainstream processors and avail-
able from large system integrators [67, 68].
All TM proposals implement three key mechanisms: data versioning, conflict detection and
conflict resolution.
Data versioning manages all the writes inside transactions until transactions successfully
commit or abort. It can be implemented in eager or lazy manner. Eager data versioning systems
put the new versions of the data values in-place and keep the old versions of the data values
in an auxiliary structure. On the contrary, in lazy data versioning systems, old values are kept
in-place while new values are stored in separate buffers. In both data versioning system, in
transactional aborts, old values are restored while in transactional commit new values are made
visible to the entire system.
Conflict detection tracks addresses of transactional reads and writes to identify concurrent
accesses that violate consistency. Conflict detection can also be implemented in lazy or eager
manner. In the eager manner, every memory accesses are inspected while in lazy manner
conflict detection is deferred until the end of the transaction.
Conflict resolution aborts one or more transactions to resolve conflicts.
We believe that building reliable systems on HTM systems is an appealing approach. First,
the hardware structures required for reliability are also implemented in HTM systems for op-
timistic concurrency. For instance, HTM systems provide mechanisms to abort transactions in
case of a conflict, thus they discard or undo all the tentative memory updates and restart the
execution from the beginning of the transaction. Thus, a transaction’s start can be viewed as
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Figure 4.1: Sample TCC Hardware, the figure is taken from [1]
a locally checkpointed stable state. Second, a reliable system should ensure that faulty tasks
do not negatively affect other tasks in the system. Hence, it should provide a failure isola-
tion which is not easy to achieve since tasks need to communicate. TM executes transactions
atomically and in isolation which also supports the isolation of failures.
One of the main challenges in TM is how to cope with external actions such as system
calls or I/O operations. Note that external operations are an issue for reliable systems as well
and they are mostly deferred after validating that all operations are error-free. Besides external
actions, TM systems have inefficiency at executing large transactions. However, when trans-
actions are not used for concurrency control (i.e. reliability purposed transactions), transaction
demarcation can be changed and these two disadvantages of TM can be eliminated for reliable
systems. Thus, the size of reliability-purposed transactions can be limited and those transac-
tions can be committed before system calls and I/O operations wait too much to be handled.
We build SymptomTM on top of an HTM system that features lazy conflict detection and
lazy data versioning. We present the main hardware components of Transactional Coherence
and Consistency system, a conventional lazy-lazy HTM system, in Figure 4.1 .
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Figure 4.2: Design of SymptomTM
4.2 Basic Design of SymptomTM
We build SymptomTM on top of an HTM system that features lazy conflict detection and lazy
data versioning. The SymptomTM system starts a single special transaction at the beginning of
the application (see Figure 4.2). Here, the applications requiring to be executed reliably can be
annotated by the programmer. The transactions are started by the hardware automatically. From
now on, we call this transaction as availableTX. Note that, in lazy-lazy HTM, creating a
transaction means starting to write the values to the local buffer area instead of shared memory,
thus it does not present a transaction creation overhead. This special transaction is executed
atomically and isolated from the system until commit. Hence, possible error does not propagate
out of the availableTX until commit. Register file is also checkpointed at the beginning of the
availableTX as in transactional memory which would be used for error recovery if necessary. In
SymptomTM, applications are executed in back-to-back availableTXs. Also, the execution of
the availableTX is monitored to detect if there is any symptom of hardware errors, in this case
fatal traps (e.g., undefined opcode). Unless any fatal trap exception is raised in the availableTX,
the write-set is committed to the shared memory at the end of the availableTX. Commit process
starts whenever write-set size equals to the transactional log size.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, if a symptom is detected, the availableTX aborts and restarts the
execution from the beginning of the availableTX. If there is no symptom at the end of the second
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Figure 4.3: Error Detection Algorithm of SymptomTM
restarted execution, that means that the error was transient and that it was corrected. If the
second execution raises the fatal trap exception signal again, this could be due to a permanent
fault. In this case, SymptomTM allocates another core, copies the checkpointed state of the
availableTX to the second core and re-executes the availableTX. If the second core does not
raise an exception, that means that the first core had a permanent fault and finally it should
be disconnected from the system. Otherwise, either the error is caused by the software or
SymptomTM can not recover from the error. The algorithm used to diagnose the faulty core is
quite similar to the one utilized in TBFD [64]. Fatal traps can be either because of a software
bug or because of an error triggered by a transient or permanent fault. SymptomTM can not
recover from an error if it raises the exception after the transaction commits. Therefore, the
transaction size is a critical parameter for the error coverage.
SymptomTM does not have a perceptible performance degradation in the error free execu-
tion. It only increases pressure on memory bandwidth since the write operations are convoyed
on commit. However, SymptomTM has limited error coverage since it cannot detect silent data
corruptions (SDC) and, further, exceptions can be raised after the commit of the transaction.
Thus, we argue that SymptomTM is an attractive scheme to provide high availability to the
systems such that web-search engines and it is not convenient to be used for high reliability
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Figure 4.4: In global checkpointing, when an error is detected in one processor, all the commu-
nicating processors should rollback.
requiring systems such as the ones executing mission critical applications.
Some symptoms can be observed very efficiently (e.g., catching exceptions) and symptom-
based error detection can be easily combined with other error detection mechanisms. Some
other symptoms such as mispredictions in the high confidential branches can also be used as
symptoms of errors. However, they may cause false positive impact (i.e. a misprediction which
are not due to a fault) unlike fatal traps, thus, they are not convenient to be used for permanent
fault detection. Similarly, those symptoms (e.g., infinite loops due to a corruption of the stop
condition) may require an instrumentation of the source code or a support by the operating
system (e.g, adding timeouts).
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4.2.1 Lightweight Checkpointing with Transactional Memory
The main benefit of SymptomTM is that it provides an error recovery mechanism by leveraging
the abort mechanism of TM. SymptomTM presents a lightweight checkpointing scheme with
TM hardware. It presents less overhead compare to global checkpointing. In Figure 4.4, we
demonstrate the global checkpointing scheme. In global checkpointing, all processors in the
system agree on a valid checkpoint by passing several messages or synchronization primitives.
When a fault is detected in one processor (1), this valid checkpoint is reloaded to the shared
memory for recovery (2). Also all communicating processors in the system rollback even if
they are error-free (3) which causes additional performance loss and power dissipation. For
system-wide checkpointing and data sharing systems, once a fault is detected, no core in the
system can be assumed to be fault-free. Due to this problem mSWAT [62] replays all cores in
the system up to three times to diagnose the faulty core. SymptomTM replays one core once.
SymptomTM uses HTM with lazy data versioning in which shared memory keeps only
validated data, therefore any error occurring in a core does not propagate to other cores through
memory. Thus, only the erroneous core rolls back while the rest of the system keeps running
without wasting any error-free work done. SymptomTM recovers from errors using the abort
mechanism of TM which rolls back to the beginning of the availableTX in the erroneous core.
We argue that this is a simpler method than system-wide checkpointing [43, 47] that requires
complex synchronization mechanisms to guarantee that all structures rollback to the same state.
Moreover, system-wide checkpointing requires long recovery time due to its long checkpoint
interval. SymptomTM flushes the local log area and loads back the checkpointed register file
for recovery only in the faulty core which has a negligible overhead. Moreover, SymptomTM
does not require any additional hardware structures on top of transactional memory hardware
to save checkpointed state. Also availableTX sizes are very short compared to system-wide
checkpointing.
4.2.2 Architecture of SymptomTM
SymptomTM extends a popular lazy-lazy HTM design [1] with minor modifications. In this
section, we explain these extensions.
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Figure 4.5: Fatal Trap Rate of Injected Transient Faults
Splitting the availableTXs
In HTMs with lazy data versioning, local log buffers can emerge as a bottleneck for large
transactions. Therefore, it is infeasible to execute the entire application in one availableTX.
Fortunately, we can split availableTXs since they are for error recovery not for parallelism and
they can be validated when it is desired. SymptomTM can commit when the write-set size
reaches the transactional log size. Therefore, in run-time, the whole application is split into
finer grained back-to-back availableTXs with constant-size log buffers. When the whole write-
set is committed, a new availableTXs starts by clearing the write-set. Splitting availableTXs
allows us using a very small fully associative special transactional cache which holds the write-
set and read-set of the whole availableTX.
Protection of Checkpoint
HTM systems checkpoint the register file at the beginning of a transaction. This checkpoint is
utilized to be able to roll back to the beginning of the transaction when the transaction aborts.
However, this buffer area is vulnerable to hardware errors, as well. Thus, we protect register
checkpoints of availableTXs by ECC as in ReStore [40] in order to cover the worst case scenario
in which both the instruction execution and the checkpoint of the register file are faulty due to
multiple faults. Note that this ECC protection is to reduce the error rate from the checkpoint
storage rather than to reduce the error rate from the instruction execution pipeline. Encoding
and decoding of these ECC do not present an extra time overhead to the common error-free
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case. This is because ECC is generated only at the beginning of the availbaleTX, in parallel with
the execution and it is decoded only in the erroneous case to safely rollback to the beginning of
the availableTX. As opposed to SymptomTM, in several previous fault recovery schemes [30,
36], it is ensured that the architectural state is error-free by utilizing ECC on the architectural
register file which presents encoding/decoding overhead every time the architectural register
file is accessed. On the other hand, since shared memory is not in the coverage of SymptomTM,
ECC values of the write-set entries are generated during the execution of store instructions.
Watchdog Mechanism
Assuming that an error in one availableTX leads to an incorrect execution path (i.e. an infinite
loop), the availableTX may not reach the write-set limit or end of the application. Symp-
tomTM employs a watchdog mechanism which records the time passed since the commit of
the last availableTX in the processor. So that it enforces the availableTXs to abort and recover
if the watchdog threshold has been exceeded since the last commit. As we stated in Figure. 4.3,
the fault can be permanent and the second execution of availableTX after the recovery may
exceed the watchdog threshold. In this case, the availableTX is enforced to abort again and it
is re-executed for the third time in another core. If the third execution of availableTX finishes
successfully that means that the first core had a permanent fault and finally it should be discon-
nected from the system. Otherwise, either the error is caused by the software or SymptomTM
can not recover from the error. Here, we set the watchdog threshold long enough (i.e. couple
of minutes) not to cause the termination of the application erroneously.
Handling Input/Output Operations
In reliable systems, only error-free data can be communicated outside of the sphere which is
called output commit problem. For example, the system can not print unvalidated data to the
user screen. Also, input commit presents problem in reliability since input messages should be
replayed after recovery. In SymptomTM, we adopt the practical solution of both TM and check-
pointing in which output values are deferred until validation (end of availableTXs in our case),
and input values are logged to replay after recovery. Note that the size of the availableTXs are
small enough for output delay.
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Figure 4.6: Fatal Trap Rate of Injected Permanent Faults
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the reliability performance of SymptomTM. We use the M5 full-
system simulator [52] with an implementation of a Hardware Transactional Memory system
that uses lazy data versioning and lazy conflict detection [69]. We extend this simulator with our
SymptomTM implementations. We evaluate our schemes in in-order Alpha 21264 cores [53]
having L1D and L1I caches and a unified L2 cache. Each L1 cache is 64KB with four-way set
associativity, and a two-cycle hit latency. The L2 cache is 2MB with eight-way set associativity,
and 10 cycles of hit latency. All caches are write-back with a line size of 64B and a local HTM
write-set buffer with 32 entries. Main memory latency is 100 cycles. We evaluate SymptomTM
by using spec cpu2006 [54] benchmark suite with test data-set by executing either 2 billion
instructions or until application termination.
We use FimSim fault injection infrastructure that we explain in Chapter. 3 to measure the
reliability performance of SymptomTM for both transient and permanent faults. We inject
the faults to five different structures in a core; instruction opcodes, program counter (PC),
integer register file (int-RF), special purposed register file (RF-special) and arithmetic logic
unit (ALU). We did not inject faults to TLBs since our experimental results in Chapter. 3 shows
that TLBs are not vulnerable to transient and intermittent faults. Also we did not inject faults
to caches and main memory since these structures are out of the coverage of SymptomTM. We
inject 100 faults per structure in each application to a random location in each structure at a
random time after warming up 200M instructions by performing one injection per simulation.
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Figure 4.7: Number of Stores Executed between Fault Injection and Exception Raise
While we flip the chosen bit for transient fault injection, we use stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1
models for permanent faults. We simulate 10M cycles after fault injection to observe the effect
of the injected fault. Although we are aware of the fact that a fault may manifest itself as an
error even after 10M-cycles, it is not feasible to simulate many cycles at every fault injection,
thus we limited our tracking window to 10M-cycles.
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 shows the hardware exception rate of transient and permanent
faults according to our fault injection experiments. As expected, permanent faults are more
likely to induce catastrophic failures than transient faults ( 21.6% vs. 4.8%). We present the
exception ratio for different microarchitectural structures, because, in terms of system failures,
each structure in the microarchitecture is not equally vulnerable. Note that our fault injection
structures are different from SWAT [39] so that our exception ratio for permanent faults is
different. Also, SWAT does not present these results for transient faults in detail.
SymptomTM can detect all these critical faults. However, it is able to recover from an
error if it raises the exception before the end of the transaction. Therefore, transaction size is
a critical issue for recovery. Also, the transaction size is limited by the size of the local buffer
area that is correlated with the maximum number of store instructions within a transaction.
Figure 4.7 depicts the number of store instructions executed between the bit flip and exception
raise. 87% of catastrophic failures induced by transient faults raise an exception within 32
store instructions (Transaction size in SymptomTM). However, fewer amount of the permanent
faults (70%) raise exceptions within 32 store instructions. SymptomTM with a write-set of 32
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Figure 4.8: Error Recovery Performance of SymptomTM
entries recovers, on average, 86% and 65% of catastrophic failures caused by transient faults
and permanent faults respectively (Figure 4.8). Note that, our evaluation is pessimistic for
permanent faults assuming that the fault can be recovered only by going back to the first bit
flip state which may be in an earlier transaction. This coverage can be increased with larger
write-sets. As it is seen from Figure 4.7 within 1M stores (~10M instructions which is the
checkpoint interval in SWAT) all catastrophic failures can be recovered.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce symptomTM, an availability approach that leverages lazy-lazy
hardware transactional memory (HTM) system for both transient and permanent faults. Symp-
tomTM avoids catastrophic failures by monitoring fatal traps without any performance or core
overhead in the general error-free case. Also, the hardware overhead of SymtomTM is negligi-
ble compared to lazy-lazy HTM system. SymptomTM leverages the lightweight checkpointing
mechanism of Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) for error recovery. Also, it avoids error
propagation to the whole system by utilizing the isolation property of transactions.
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FauTM: Redundancy-Based Error Detection
with Transactional Memory
Reliability is a first-class design constraint for processor designers, especially in mission-
critical domain (e.g. automotive cruise-control systems or financial applications). A reliable
system should include two key capabilities: 1) error detection and 2) error recovery.
In the previous section, we present that the lightweight checkpointing mechanism of trans-
actional memory can be utilized for error recovery. In this way, hardware structures imple-
mented for optimistic concurrency in HTM systems can be leveraged in order to provide low-
cost error recovery. However, symptom-based error detection as in SymptomTM, despite its
very low performance degradation, is not convenient to be used for the systems requiring high
reliability.
To satisfy the strict reliability requirement of mission-critical systems, various redundancy-
based error detection solutions have been proposed [30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37]. Executing instruc-
tion streams redundantly in chip multi processors (CMP) provides high reliability since it can
detect both transient and permanent faults. Additionally, it also minimizes the Silent Data Cor-
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ruption rate. In particular, lockstepping is a popular hardware based error detection scheme and
is widely implemented in systems requiring high-reliability such as the IBM S/390 G5 [32] or
the HP NonStop servers [33]. Lockstepping executes an instruction stream redundantly in two
synchronized and lockstepped processors and checks if both produce identical results.
Error detection presents a performance overhead in reliable systems every time it is trig-
gered. For instance, the comparison of execution results in order to detect divergent execution
of redundancy-based error detection causes synchronization and comparison overheads in the
execution time especially if the inter-processor communication channel has a limited band-
width. Moreover, if error-detection is frequently triggered, the possibility that a benign fault
causes an error recovery increases. In TM, transactional semantics allow the error detection to
be deferred until a transaction commits (or the value becomes externally visible), so that the
cost of error detection can be reduced while its efficiency can be increased.
In this chapter we present FaulTM, an error detection and recovery proposal based on Hard-
ware Transactional Memory (HTM). We design FaulTM for mission-critical systems that re-
quire high reliability (e.g. financial or health applications) in which redundancy is essential to
provide high error-detection rate. We have two main goals in designing FaulTM:
(1) to minimize the implementation complexity by utilizing existing hardware with minor
changes,
(2) to reduce the performance degradation of redundancy-based error detection.
FaulTM utilizes an HTM which detects conflicts at the end of transactions (lazy conflict
detection) and commits the validated version of the data at the end of the transactions (lazy
data versioning). The main advantage of using lazy-lazy HTM is that comparison of write-sets
for error detection reduces the comparison overhead of redundancy-based fault detection due
to multiple writes to the same address. In this chapter, we explain how a generic HTM could
be minimally modified so that it can also support reliability in addition to HTM’s intended
purpose of supporting optimistic concurrency. FaulTM executes applications in two redundant
threads (i.e it creates a backup thread) and in special-purpose reliable transactions (From now
on, we will call these reliable transactions as reliTX in order to avoid any confusion with regu-
lar TM transactions). FaulTM classifies any mismatch between the write-sets and register files
of reliTX pairs (i.e. original reliTX and backup reliTX) as a hardware error (transient or per-
manent), and aborts both reliTXs, which are then restarted. In the case of a complete match,
original reliTX commits the changes to the shared memory. FaulTM utilizes an HTM which
detects conflicts at the end of transactions (lazy conflict detection) and commits the validated
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version of the data at the end of the transactions (lazy data versioning). HTM systems already
have well-defined comparison mechanisms of read-/write-sets in order to detect if there is any
conflict between transactions. While comparison of addresses is sufficient for conflict detec-
tion in TM, some systems also send data along with addresses. FaulTM adapts these already
existing conflict detection mechanisms for error detection.
FaulTM is a self-contained reliability proposal in which error detection and recovery is in-
tegrated without requiring any external mechanism. It provides reliability for sequential and
parallel (non-TM and TM) applications against transient and permanent faults. Also, compared
to lockstepping [32], it reduces the execution time overhead. It avoids error propagation out of
the processor. It leverages the checkpointing mechanism of TM that provides local checkpoint-
ing for fault tolerance. It eliminates the requirement of separate input replication mechanism.
In this chapter, we first explain our motivation to use transactional semantics for error de-
tection in Section 5.1. Then, we present the design of FaulTM for sequential applications in
Section 5.2. We extend the FaulTM design for parallel applications by addressing the chal-
lenges of traditional lock-based and TM applications in Section 5.3. After evaluating FaulTM
in Section 5.5, we present other reliability schemes utilizing transactional memory which are
published after FaulTM and SymptomTM are published in Section 5.6. We also present the
pros and cons of the different design parameters of transactional memory from the point of
reliability in Section 5.6.1.
5.1 Motivation
In Figure 5.1(a) and Figure 5.1(b), we show a simple loop written in C and in pseudo-assembly-
language respectively. In several fault detection schemes [31, 32, 33, 70] only the results of the
store instructions are compared assuming that an error is benign unless it propagates out of the
core. With these schemes, there should be 2*N comparisons/synchronizations in the example
(Figure 5.1(c)). Alternatively, with FaulTM, the processor splits the code into series of reliTXs,
and performs validation of replicas at the granularity of complete reliTX, rather than at the
granularity of individual stores. If reliTX correspond to loop iterations as in Figure 5.1(d), then
it reduces the comparison and synchronization overhead significantly (from 2*N to 2). Also,
the register file can be compared at this synchronization state to guarantee that it is error-free
since the last validation.
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Figure 5.2: Design of FaulTM for Sequential Codes
5.2 Basic Design of FaulTM
In Figure.5.2, we demonstrate the basic design of FaulTM that we explain in this section.
FaulTM provides high reliability based on 4 steps:
Creating reliTXs:
At the beginning of the execution, FaulTM hardware creates a backup thread which ex-
ecutes the identical instruction stream to the original thread. Then the original and backup
threads are executed as two separate reliTXs. In lazy-lazy HTM, creating a transaction means
starting to write the values to the local buffer area instead of shared memory, thus it does not
present a transaction creation overhead.
Executing reliTXs:
Both original and backup reliTXs are executed atomically and in isolation. Each reliTX
independently sends load requests to shared memory or read-sets. In the FaulTM approach,
there are no conflicts between the original and the backup reliTXs, because the backup reliTX
is only for validation of error-free execution and it does not modify shared memory. Note that,
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Figure 5.3: Full-State Comparison Ensures the Error-Free Operation Since the Last Validation
an original reliTX may conflict with normal transactions or other reliTXs except its pair reliTX.
When a reliTX aborts to resolve a conflict, its pair reliTX also aborts and restarts.
FaulTM executes original and backup threads in different cores in order to detect both
transient and permanent errors. This cause 100% core and energy overhead which is paid by all
previous redundancy-based reliability schemes [30, 31, 36, 37] on CMPs for high reliability.
While reading from memory is done redundantly by each core, writing to main memory is
achieved only by one core after validation. Thus, FaulTM can detect the errors on the bus
during the read operation from the memory. However, it can not detect errors during the write
operation to the memory.
Ending reliTXs:
In FaulTM, we start commit processes whenever the write-set size reaches the transactional
log size. Since both threads have identical instructions in the absence of a fault, their read-
/write-sets have to be identical as well. Note that, we left the randomness and non-determinism
problems out of the coverage of FaulTM as previous redundancy-based reliability methods
do [30, 31, 37].
Original and backup reliTXs wait for each other (spin) to reach the commit stage. Then, the
reliTX pair compare their write-sets and register files through the comparators in the backup
reliTX. (From now on we call this operation as validation). Note that, the comparison of read-
set is not necessary since it can be recovered by re-loading from shared memory. If they match,
the original reliTX commits its changes to memory, and the backup reliTX is cleared as if it
aborts and it does not re-execute. Mismatch means an error due to a hardware fault in one of
the reliTX and it starts the recovery.
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Figure 5.4: Error Detection Algorithm of FaulTM
Redundancy based fault tolerance methods detect errors by comparing either only the re-
sults of store instructions [27, 31] or results of all instructions [29, 30, 37] due to the assump-
tion that a fault is benign unless it propagates to the architectural state. However, only full-state
comparison (e.g. checking the register file) guarantee the error-free operation since the last val-
idation. We demonstrate an example that presents the importance of full-state comparison in
Figure 5.3. In the example, a register (R11) becomes faulty after the validation of a checkpoint
(CP_1). However, until the validation of the next checkpoint (CP_2), the fault does not affect
the output of any instruction nor an instruction writes over R11. When this unmasked fault
causes a detected error after the validation of CP_2, the system rolls back to the CP_2 which,
unfortunately, is not fault-free and cannot recover from the error. FaulTM compares register
file (including special purposed registers such as PC) at the end of reliTX (instead of after every
instruction) with acceptable performance degradation. Note that, whole inner-state comparison
can be supported as well.
Error Recovery:
If either write-sets or register files do not match at validation, both the original and backup
reliTXs abort and they restart execution (Figure 5.4). If they match in the second execution,
that means that there was a transient fault either in one of the cores or in the comparators in the
first execution.
Two successive mismatch signals between the same original and backup reliTXs signify
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that either one of the cores or the comparators has a permanent fault. FaulTM executes the
reliTX in a third core to detect the source of the permanent fault by comparing the results with
this third core’s comparators. If the write-set of the third reliTX matches with either the original
or the backup reliTX, the mismatched core is marked as the faulty core. If both the original and
backup reliTXs match the third reliTX, the comparators are marked as faulty. The algorithm
that is utilized to diagnose the faulty core does not have a performance impact in the common
error free case as it is explained in mSWAT [62] and TBFD [64]. Note that, FaulTM can not
detect more than one faulty component (e.g. both cores are faulty) at a time.
5.2.1 Architecture of FaulTM
FaulTM extends a popular lazy-lazy HTM design [1] with minor modifications. First of all, we
apply the extensions required for SymptomTM to FaulTM as well. To this end, to handle the
I/O operations, we deferred output values until the end of reliTXs and we logged input values
to reply after recovery. Similarly, we protect the checkpoints of the register file via ECC. Also,
we split the reliTXs into finer granularity and start the validation process when the write-set
size reaches the transactional log size. Finally, we also elaborate the watchdog mechanism to
avoid the infinite loops.
In this section, we explain the additional extensions required for FaulTM.
Microarchitecture Extensions for FaulTM implementation
We need a simple controller having the list of processors in order to manage reliTXs. Be-
sides coreIDs, we add several bits per core to this list such as isReliable, isOriginal, peerCPU,
wasFaulty and controlCore bits, to account for mechanisms to deal with reliable execution.
isReliable/isOriginal: We may have additional TM applications running con-
currently with our reliability-critical applications. Therefore, we use the isReliable bit to dis-
tinguish between the transactions and reliTXs. This bit is also sent together with the write-set
at validation. If isOriginal bit is set, it indicates that the reliTX is the original one otherwise it
is the backup reliTX.
peerCPU((dlog2ne)-bits for an n-core system): reliTX pairs have to be aware of each
other to compare their results. The peerCPU bits point to the processor that has the peer
reliTX of the reliTX that runs in the current processor.
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(a) Processor Executing Original reliTX (b) Processor Executing Backup reliTX
(c) Data Sent to the Interconnect During Comparison
Figure 5.5: The Validation Mechanism of FaulTM (Modified Structures are Shown in Grey)
wasFaulty: This bit records if the core had a fault at the last time it executed a reliTX,
hence it distinguishes if there might be a permanent fault. The wasFaulty bit is reset every
time the core executes an error-free reliTX.
controlCore: When FaulTM detects two consecutive mismatches, it allocates a new
core to recover from a permanent fault. The controlCore bit is set in the allocated core
which is reset when an error-free reliTX is committed.
Adapting Conflict Detection for Error Detection
In Figure 5.5, we demonstrate the paired processors running original and backup reliTX as well
as the interconnect during error detection. Lazy-lazy TM systems compare address values of
stores in both read-sets and write-sets for conflict detection. FaulTM compares address values
as well as data values of stores in write-sets to detect if an error has manifested itself either in
the address or in the data. This comparison is essential for reliability and FaulTM reduces the
overhead of this comparison compared to prior reliability techniques [30, 31, 32]. Furthermore,
only reliTXs that set the isReliable bit send store data to their peer reliTX. Reliability
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purposed comparison can be performed as in-order buffer comparison without requiring the
associative address search of HTM since, write-sets are identical in the absence of faults. Also,
normal parallelism purposed transactions are not affected by this overhead.
In order to improve the performance and energy consumption, we propose two extensions
for the comparison operation: 1) Designing comparators for error detection 2) Generating sig-
natures of the comparison data.
Comparators for Reliability Comparison
In most transactional memory implementations, only address values of both read and write
sets are compared and match means conflict and reason to abort. In FaulTM, although data
comparisons present an overhead over a usual HTM, this overhead is paid by most of the
redundancy based fault tolerance techniques [30, 31, 32, 33]. Note that, writesets of reliability
purposed transactions are in order without necessitating CAM logic. In FaulTM, first, the write
set addresses are compared, a match signifies that there is no error in the store address. Once
a match in the addresses is found, then the data are compared; in case of a match there is no
error in the store data. Since the error case is rare, most of the time data comparison will
register a match in FaulTM. Therefore, we use dissipate-on-mismatch comparators [71, 72] for
data comparison. However, when the address comparisons is conducted in normal HTM, it
mostly registers a mismatch since a store address is compared against the whole write set. Here
special comparators that dissipate little energy on mismatches or partial matches as proposed
by Ponomarev et al. [72] could be used to save energy. Figure 5.6-a shows an 8-bit dissipate-
on-mismatch comparator with a pull-down design that compares two 8-bit comparands with
each other. The output is precharged high in the precharge phase. It remains high unless any bit
mismatch occurs in the evaluation phase. If there are any mismatches in bit positions, the output
will discharge via one of two parallel branches of NMOS transistors in the related gray block.
Thus the significant amount of energy is dissipated on a mismatch. As in our case, mismatches
occur less frequently than matches, more energy saving can be realized by using these kind
of comparators. Figure 5.6-b depicts a new scheme for comparing longer arguments of 32
bytes. An obvious way might be to extend the traditional dissipate-on-mismatch comparator
bits to 32 bytes. However, this method leads to significant increase in delay time and power
consumption. Therefore we use the evaluation tree design that is the better approach [72].
Normally final output is in low level. If there is even one mismatch bit position in 32 bytes,
the final output will be charged to high level. We design and simulate this 32 bytes comparator
with Hspice 2003.03 using HP 45nm Predictive Technology Model [73] for VDD=1V, 1GHz
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a) Dissipate on mismatch comparator b) Comparator for 32 bytes
c) Timing Diagram of the Comparator
Figure 5.6: Comparator Design for Data Comparison
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(a) Composition of the signature of the writesets including
addresses and data
(b) A Case that signature can not
detect the error
Figure 5.7: Signature of Writeset
frequency, and T= 25_C. Figure 5.6-c shows the simulated timing diagram of the internal nodes
when there is only one bit mismatch in the first TRAD, bits a7 and b7, which is the worst case
scenario for delay time. At the evaluation time, when signal evaluate goes high, a7 remains
low but b7 goes high. In fact, the worst case for discharging the output of TRAD is only one
bit mismatch occurring. The output of the first TRAD, output0, goes low; the output of the
first NAND, out1nand1, goes high; Our timing analysis confirms that this operation can be
performed in one cycle at our target frequency of 1GHz.
FaulTM-sig: Comparing Signatures of Write-Sets
We can also reduce the cost of error detection with signature comparison. There are Trans-
actional Memory systems using signatures (i.e. bloom filter) to compress a transaction’s read-
and write-sets to reduce the cost of conflict detection. False positives (detecting conflict al-
though there isn’t) are possible in these signatures but they never give a false negative signal
(missing the detection of conflict). Similarly, FaulTM reduces the comparison cost signifi-
cantly by utilizing an XOR-based signature as shown in Figure 5.7(a). This signature is known
as overlapping parity [74] in which each bit is covered by more than one parity. The ECC
values are calculated during the composition of writesets, because the bus between processors
and shared memory is not protected by FaulTM. The parity bits of the columns are calculated
at the end of the transactions.
We call this mechanism as FaulTM-sig in order to separate it from the base design. This
mechanism is similar to Fingerprinting [37] in which a cumulative signature of the execution
58
Chapter 5. FaulTM
trace is generated after every instruction instead of after every reliTX.
Fatal Trap Exceptions
Hardware faults may lead a fatal trap exception. For instance, a fault may change the opcode
of an instruction to an undefined opcode which is a defined hardware exception. If one re-
liTX raises a hardware exception while its pair reliTX comes to commit, the recovery process
starts and both reliTXs abort and restart execution. In Chapter 4, we explain that SymptomTM
provides a similar mechanism using a single reliTX to recover from catastrophic failures. In
SymptomTM, a reliTX is aborted and re-executed on encountering a fatal trap. Although this
enables to recover from fatal crashes, the scheme has very limited error coverage since it cannot
detect silent data corruptions and, also, exceptions can be raised after the commit of reliTX.
SymptomTM can not distinguish if the fatal trap is caused by a hardware fault or a software
bug. In FaulTM, software induced fatal traps cause both reliTX pairs to raise an exception
while hardware fault makes only the faulty reliTX raise the exception.
Possible Programming Model
We argue that availability or reliability requirements of systems depend on the application.
Some applications require a highly-reliable environment that can detect any error including
silent data corruptions. For instance, a financial application should prevent transferring an in-
correct amount of money to a bank account. These systems prefer seeing Segmentation Fault
messages on the screen and rebooting their system rather than making an incorrect money
transfer. We argue that FaulTM should be utilized for those systems that require high relia-
bility. Some other applications demand high availability. For example, a web search engine
is expected to be serving 7/24 while an error in the search result is not vital. We believe that
SymptomTM can be utilized for high availability demanding applications. Another group of
applications, i.e. airplane applications, require both reliability and availability since they can
not boot the application to solve an error and also the correct result of the application is vital.
For these applications, we utilize SymptomTM and FaulTM together.
FaulTM and SymptomTM can be extended with the programming model in order to pro-
vide reliability/availability in the finer granularity instead of duplicating the entire application.
For this purpose, we add the keyword “reliable”to denote sections of code that should
be protected by FaulTM against hardware errors including silent data corruptions. Similarly,
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in SymptomTM approach, programmer defines the vulnerable section by using the keyword
“available”which means only catastrophic failures will be detected and recovered in the
section to provide high availability. Using these keywords, programmers only need to define
the vulnerable sections in their applications. They can insert vulnerability boundaries as if they
define atomic sections in TM applications. The vulnerable sections can be either fine-grained,
lasting for a few instructions or coarse-grained such as the entire application. While the fine-
grained approach causes less performance degradation, coarse-grained approach provides more
reliability/availability. For instance, for an airplane control application, the programmer could
identify that the code that is responsible for controlling the flaps should be protected coarsely,
whereas the code regarding the on-flight entertainment system is not protected at all. Alterna-
tively in the fine grained version of flap controlling code, the programmer decides to protect
only the calculation of desired flap angle but he leaves the graphic user interface unprotected.
5.3 Extending FaulTM for Multi-threaded applications
In this section, we present how FaulTM can be extended for multi-threaded applications run-
ning on transactional memory hardware. We provide the details of FualTM for both traditional
lock-based parallel applications and TM applications.
5.3.1 Non-TM Parallel Applications
There are two main challenges in redundantly executing multi-threaded applications: (1) han-
dling instructions dedicated to maintaining synchronization such as locks, barriers or create/join
threads and (2) maintaining identical instruction streams of redundant threads.
Synchronization Instructions
In FaulTM, until reliTX commits its write-set to the shared memory, the rest of the system
can not be aware of the instructions in reliTX. However, the thread management (e.g. cre-
ate/join thread), coherency (allocate/release lock) and synchronization (e.g. barriers) instruc-
tions should be committed to the system to avoid deadlocks. Also, before the execution of these
instructions, all the older instructions on the thread should be validated from the reliability point
of view and committed. In this way, it is confirmed that the synchronization instruction is not
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Figure 5.8: FaulTM for traditional, lock-based parallel applications
in an erroneous path in the execution. When FaulTM (Figure 5.8) encounters one of these
special instructions (e.g. test-and-set, compare-and-swap) in a reliTX, before executing the in-
struction, it first validates and commits the current reliTX pair and starts a new reliTX pair. As
soon as the special synchronization instruction is executed, FaulTM starts the commit process
in order to make the system aware of the instruction. FaulTM executes a special instruction in
a reliTX pair to keep it fault tolerant. Also, in this way, even if one of the reliTXs aborts due
to a detected error after acquiring the lock, it will not try to reacquire the lock that it already
held, which could have led to a deadlock. Note that lock release operations are accomplished
by simple store instructions which can not be detected by the hardware so that it does not force
reliTX to commit. However, delaying lock release instructions until the end of reliTX does not
present any forward progress issues. Lock allocation/release is accomplished by only the orig-
inal reliTX since the backup reliTX does not write anything to the shared memory. However,
backup reliTX is allowed to operate on the data locked by its original pair.
In Figure 5.8 we demonstrate how FaulTM handles special instructions dedicated to main-
tain synchronization. In the figure, the application starts with a single thread and FaulTM
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Figure 5.9: Addressing input replication in FaulTM
creates a backup thread in order to make it fault tolerant. Also these two threads are executed
in reliTX pairs. When the application attempts to create a thread to execute some parallel op-
erations, FaulTM forces the reliTX pair in the system to start validate/commit process. After
the thread creation, there are 4 threads in the system (i.e. 2 originals, 2 backups) running in
reliTXs. Later on, the first reliTX pair attempts to acquire a lock. Before executing the lock
acquire instruction, the reliTX pair validates and the original reliTX commits its changes to
the shared memory. After that, they execute the lock acquire operation reliably and only the
original reliTX issues the instruction to shared memory. After the lock is acquired, original and
backup reliTX pair operates on the data and writes the changes to their write-sets. After some
point, when the write-set is full according to the FaulTM design, the reliTX pair compares their
write-sets for validation and original reliTX commits its write-set to the shared memory. Since
backup reliTX does not commit any data to shared memory, it does not present any correct-
ness issue that it operates on a locked data by its original reliTX. Similar to the thread creation
and lock acquiring, reliTX pairs are also forced to validate/commit at barriers and thread join
instructions.
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Input Incoherence
The second challenge for multi-threaded applications is maintaining identical instruction streams
to replicated threads called input incoherence problem. Input incoherence occurs in redundancy-
based reliability schemes when a value is changed by another thread in the system between the
time it is read by the original thread and it is re-read by the backup thread. In Figure 5.9, we
demonstrate an input incoherence in FaulTM and how the conflict detection mechanism of TM
solves it. In the example, there are two original threads and two backup threads in the system
which are executed in reliTX pairs namely reliTX(1) and reliTX(2). The original thread in
reliTX(2) reads the value A before the reliTX(1) pair commits the new value of A to the shared
memory. After reliTX(1) commits the new value of A, the backup thread in reliTX(2) reads
A. Thus, in reliTX(2) the original thread reads the old version of A while the backup thread
reads the new version written by reliTX(1). reliTX(2) detects an error since the original and the
backup reliTXs operate on different values. Note that this case occurs in an application with
a data race. However, the fault tolerance scheme treat this kind of race as an error and it calls
the recovery scheme. If the race occurs repetitively in a fault tolerant architecture, the system
treats the race as a permanent error and disables the hardware structure although it is not faulty.
In the example, although error-detection is adequate to abort and restart reliTX potentially
solving the input incoherency, conflicts should also be detected after error detection to distin-
guish input incoherence, transient faults and permanent faults. For instance, two consecutive
input incoherences on the same processor is considered as a permanent fault if conflict detec-
tion is not done. Note that both the original and the backup reliTXs should accomplish conflict
detection since the late reader can be either the original or the backup reliTX.
5.3.2 TM Applications
Many researchers have developed applications using TM with the purpose of benchmarking
different implementations, and studying whether or not TM is easy to use [75, 76]. We be-
lieve that, since HTM systems are implemented and by the time the TM programming model is
adopted by programmers, there will be many TM applications to be executed on HTMs. Provid-
ing reliability to TM applications on HTM by using the conventional fault tolerance schemes
is infeasible since they require additional comparison and checkpointing over TM itself. In
this study, we provide error detection and recovery for TM applications in lazy-lazy HTM by
leveraging the existing structures on the hardware (Figure 5.10).
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Figure 5.10: Design for TM Applications
When a thread encounters the instruction that starts a transaction, FaulTM first validates/-
commits the reliTX before it starts the transaction. Then transaction starts both in the original
and the backup processors and they are executed in reliTX. Since transactions already write
the produced values to their write-sets, reliTXs do not need to register the write values again.
ReliTXs do not start the validation until the transactions commit. If the TM transaction com-
mits, the reliability validation is carried out before the TM transaction publishes its write-set to
avoid any error propagation out of the core. In case the TM transaction aborts due to a conflict,
reliTX is also aborted to avoid any correctness issues. After both transactions reach the commit
stage, their write-sets and register files are compared before collision detection in order to abort
erroneous transactions before they cause other transactions abort erroneously.
There are two key implementation questions for FaulTM for TM applications: 1)irrevocable
operations in transactions and 2) nested transactions.
In TM, if there is an irrevocable operation in a transaction, TM marks this transaction
as such and the transaction does not abort. There can be only one irrevocable transaction in
the system. If a transaction conflicts with an irrevocable transaction, the conflicting revoca-
ble transaction aborts and the irrevocable one commits. When an irrevocable transaction is
executed with reliTX, reliTX is validated before the irrevocable operation. reliTX creates a
checkpoint of the register file and the write-set in order to ensure that if an error is detected af-
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ter the irrevocable operation in the irrevocable transaction, it can roll-back after the irrevocable
operation.
In TM systems, there can be nested transactions that begin and end within the scope of
surrounding transactions. There are two types of nested transactions: closed and open. In a
closed-nested TM system using flattening, either all or none of the transactions in a nested
region commit. In contrast, in an open nested TM, when an inner transaction commits, its
effects become visible for all threads in the system. In FaulTM, validations of the close-nested
transactions are performed at the commit of outer most transaction while the validations of an
open-nested transactions are performed when the nested transaction commits.
5.4 Benefits and Overheads of Using TM for Reliability
FaultTM also presents a lightweight checkpointing scheme by utilizing the abort scheme of
TM as similar to SymptomTM. In this section, we explain other benefits and overheads of
using Transactional Memory for fault tolerance.
5.4.1 Less Comparison Overhead
FaulTM reduces the comparison overhead compared to the previous redundancy-based fault-
detection schemes [30, 31] due to two reasons. First, it compares the write-sets (instead of each
store values) which have a fewer amount of entries than the total number of store instructions
due to multiple stores to the same address (e.g incrementing a counter in a loop causes several
store instructions but only one entry in the write-set). Also, it spins only at the end of reliTXs
instead of after each store instruction. Second, register file comparison is done only at the
commit stage of reliTXs (instead of after each instruction). Furthermore, comparison only
at the commit point reduces the probability of detecting benign faults; because if a fault is
masked within the reliTX, its effect is eliminated before the end of the reliTX. The comparison
overhead of FaulTM can be reduced further by comparing hash-based signatures of write-sets
and register files of reliTX pairs as in FaulTM-sig.
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5.4.2 Full-state Comparison
Redundancy based reliability methods detect errors by comparing either only the results of
store instructions [27, 31] or results of all instructions [29, 30, 37] by assuming that a fault is
benign unless it propagates the architectural state. However, only full-state comparison (e.g.
checking the register file) guarantees the error-free operation since the last validation. FaulTM
provides full-state comparison at commit point with acceptable performance degradation.
5.4.3 Eliminating the requirement of separate input replication mecha-
nisms
Previous redundancy based methods [30, 31] require input replication mechanisms such as a
load value queue, because a value can be changed by another thread in the system between
the time it is read by the first thread and it is read by the second thread. In FaulTM, the con-
flict detection mechanism of TM guarantees that there would not be any modifications in the
loaded values by other threads. In this sense, FaulTM is similar to ReUnion [36] which does
not require an extra hardware component for input replication. ReUnion recovers from the
input incoherence by benefiting from the fact that if redundant threads read different values,
they produce different results, otherwise the difference is benign. Therefore, it solves the input
incoherence by utilizing an error detection mechanism. However, ReUnion is not convenient
for permanent fault detection since it can not differentiate if two successive mismatch of results
are due to a permanent fault or an input incoherence. FaulTM, on the other hand, solves the
input incoherence issue between redundant reliTXs by benefiting from the lazy conflict detec-
tion of HTM which identifies concurrent accesses by tracking the addresses in read-sets and
write-sets. Note that loading data redundantly by original and backup reliTXs can detect faults
in memory buses as well.
5.4.4 Overheads
FaulTM presents 100% core overhead as previous redundancy based reliability schemes on
CMPs [30, 31, 36, 37]. During the execution of a sequential application in a multi-core archi-
tecture, only one core is occupied and the others stay idle. FaulTM leverages one of the idle
cores for the reliability purpose which supplies the capability of detecting both transient and
permanent errors.
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FaulTM does not present any overhead for the creation of ReliTXs since in a lazy-lazy
HTM, creating a transaction means starting to write the values to the local log area instead of
writing to the shared memory. However, the backup reliTX is obliged to copy the register file
and TLBs from the original thread to be able to produce the same results. Fortunately, this copy
operation is not required to be done when the transactions are back-to-back. Nevertheless, this
copy operation is not vulnerable to hardware errors because, if a strike changes the value of
some data on the bus, this would cause the final results of pair transactions to be distinct thus
the error is detected.
In FaulTM, out-of-order memory operations may cause false positives. Although we detail
FaulTM for in-order executions, a straightforward solution for out-of-order cores is storing
only retired instructions to writesets.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, first we explain the evaluation environment then we present our experimental
results. In the experimental results, we first evaluate the performance overhead of FaulTM
for sequential and parallel application in the error free execution. Second, we evaluate the
reliability performances of FaulTM by utilizing FimSim fault injector. Finally, we evaluate the
recovery overhead of lightweight checkpointing mechanism of transactional memory.
5.5.1 Simulation Setup
We use the M5 full-system simulator [52] with an implementation of a Hardware Transactional
Memory system that uses lazy data versioning and lazy conflict detection [69]. We extend
this simulator with our FaulTM implementations. We evaluate our schemes by using in-order
Alpha 21264 cores [53] with L1D and L1I caches and a unified L2 cache. Each L1 cache
is 64KB with four-way set associativity, and a two-cycle hit latency. The L2 cache is 2MB
with eight-way set associativity, and 10 cycles of hit latency. All caches are write-back with
a line size of 64B and a local HTM write-set buffer with 32 entries. Main memory latency is
100 cycles. We evaluate FaulTM using spec cpu2006 [54] benchmark suite with test data-set
by executing either 2 billion instructions or until application termination in 1 (original) thread
(i.e for FaulTM with also 1 more backup thread). For the evaluation of FaulTM for multi-
thread applications, we use 4 original and 4 backup threads using splash2 [77] and stamp [78]
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benchmark suites which are the representative of lock-based parallel and TM applications.
For the time overhead of error detection in the error-free execution, we compare FaulTM
system against off-core lockstepping, a standard error detection method. In the lockstepping
approach, after every store instruction, two threads synchronize and the results of the store
values are compared as we explained in Chapter 2. Note that, validation of store values is
common in several recent redundancy-based error detection techniques [27, 30, 31].
We use FimSim fault injection infrastructure that we explain in Chapter. 3 to measure the
reliability performance of FaulTM for both transient and permanent faults. We inject the faults
to five different structures in a core; instruction opcodes, program counter (PC), integer register
file (int-RF), special purposed register file (RF-special) and arithmetic logic unit (ALU). We
did not inject faults to TLBs since our experimental results in Chapter. 3 shows that TLBs are
not vulnerable to transient and intermittent faults. Also we did not inject faults to caches and
main memory since these structures are out of the coverage of FaulTM.
We inject 100 faults per structure in each application to a random location in each structure
at a random time after warming up 200M instructions. We perform one injection per simulation.
While we flip the chosen bit for transient fault injection, we use stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1
models for permanent faults. We simulate 10M cycles after fault injection to observe the effect
of the injected fault.
For the time overhead of error recovery, we compare transactional checkpointing with Re-
bound [46], the state of the art checkpointing scheme. In Rebound, whenever a core check-
points its execution, it writes the dirty lines to the shared memory (or main memory) which is
protected by other means such as error correcting codes. This scheme is quite similar to our
scheme in which write-sets are written to shared memory in every checkpoint interval (i.e. in
every reliTX). In Rebound, when core A checkpoints, all other cores which produce data used
by core A checkpoint (i.e. all producers of core A checkpoint). Also, when core A needs to
recover due to a detected error, all the cores which has consumed any data produced by core
A also recovers (i.e. all consumers of core A recovers). For comparing TM-based error recov-
ery with Rebound, we execute splash applications in 32 threads by using PIN [79], a dynamic
binary instrumentation tool to instrument the execution.
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5.5.2 Performance Overhead in the Error-Free Case
FaulTM reduces store value comparison overhead since it compares the write-sets (instead of
each store values) which have fewer amount of entries than total number of store instructions in
transactions due to multiple stores to same addresses. In Figure 5.11, we present the normalized
value of the total amount of entries in write-sets according to total number of store instructions
in each application on different write-set sizes (i.e. 16, 32 and 64 entries which is determined
during the design time of an HTM). In the figure, each bar represents the normalized value of
the total amount of entries in write-sets as compared to total stores. The dashed line in the graph
shows the normalized value of stores in applications. Note that, for the rest of the experiments
for FaulTM we use 64 entries for the write-set.
We find that, in our benchmarks, the percentages of entries in write-sets are smaller than the
percentages of all stores (on average, 35% less among all benchmarks when WS=64 entries),
because some store instructions in transactions write to the same addresses multiple times.
For instance, in raytrace, labyrinth and barnes with WS_64, write-sets have around 90% less
entries than stores. When we increase the size of the write-set, we reduce the total number
of entries in write-sets since the temporal locality of the store addresses increases. Due to the
temporal locality of the stores, our FaulTM technique requires fewer comparisons compared to
lockstepping in order to check errors.
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Figure 5.13: Register File Comparison Overhead
In Figure 5.12, we compare the performance overhead of error detection of FaulTM in
error-free case with lockstepping including comparison and spin overheads. Note that we did
not include the error recovery overhead in the graph. We use 64 entries in the write-sets of
FaulTM. We assume that each comparison (e.g. comparison of either a store value or an entry
in WS) can be accomplished in one cycle on an idealized bus where collisions are not modelled.
This favours lockstepping since lockstepping is penalized more when the latency of the bus
is higher. Spin overhead is, on average, 1 cycle for lockstepping and 4 cycles for FaulTM
according to our simulation results.
Compared to lockstepping, FaulTM reduces the performance degradation by 2.5X for SPEC2006
benchmarks. We find that, on average, the performance degradation of our approach in error
detection is 8% for spec2006, 10% for splash and 2% for stamp applications which are 56%
and 75% less than lockstepping for splash2 and stamp applications respectively. In Figure 5.12,
lockstepping fares poorly for two applications in particular: Barnes from splash2 and Labyrinth
from stamp. Barnes is a particularly resource-hungry application with respect to stores; Kir-
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man et al. [80] also comment on this issue and describe the challenges they faces when trying to
optimize the store queue design for Barnes. Labyrinth, on the other hand, features large trans-
actions writing to local copies of a 3D grid, and exhibits high contention, mostly due to false
conflicts on the same cache line [81]; this increases the comparison overhead for lockstepping.
In the figure, FaulTM-sig shows the performance degradation of FaulTM when hash-based sig-
natures are compared instead of the entire write-sets. Note that, error coverage of signature
comparison is not 100%.
In Figure 5.13, we present the comparison overhead of the entire register file in FaulTM
(13%) in order to guarantee the error-free execution since the last validation. Register value
comparison after each instruction in lockstepping would cause extremely high overhead (not
included in the evaluations here). For instance, in the LiVe design which accomplishes register
file comparison on top of lockstepped cores, the overhead can be very huge when the register
values are compared in the short interval to detect every fault immediately after they occurred.
Note that the register file can also be included in the signature value in FaulTM-sig which
compares signatures instead of the entire write-set and register file.
5.5.3 Reliability Performance
In this section we evaluate the reliability performances of FaulTM.
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Figure 5.14 presents the reliability performance of FaulTM. For parallel applications, the
potential problem is shared variables that might propagate errors to other cores. We avoid this
problem by performing the reliability verification just before publishing the write-set to shared
memory. According to our fault injection experiments with a 10M-cycle tracking window (we
wait 10M-cycle after injecting a fault), our FaulTM design provides 100% error coverage for
both transient and permanent faults with the comparison of entire write-set and register file. In
the figure, we present the rate of the faults which is detected in the relevant mechanism. These
mechanisms are detecting
1) a fatal trap exception in a reliTX,
2) a mismatch between write-sets of reliTXs,
3) a mismatch between register files of reliTXs,
4) an error which cause a time-out in the watchdog mechanism.
FaulTM, also, avoids detecting benign faults which is 20% of injected transient faults and
39% of injected permanent faults. There are several cases that end up as a benign fault for
transient faults. One such case is when a fault (e.g. in a register) is overwritten by a new
value before being read, this case is not detected by any reliability scheme. In a second case,
the faulty value is read by an instruction however the fault does not change the result of the
instruction, an example would an arithmetic operation that masks the fault. A third case occurs
when an instruction stores the faulty value but this value is then overwritten by another store to
the same location before it is read by another instruction, this is the case of the so-called silent
store. Note that lockstepping would detect the silent store as an error and produce a spurious
error signal; while FaulTM would filter it out since it only sends the overwritten store value to
main memory. We present a similar example for register instructions.
Ex: I1: R3(faulty) = R1(faulty) + R2
I2: R1 = R7 + R5
I3: R3 = R3(faulty) AND 0x00
---commit---
In the example, I1 reads R1 which is faulty and it propagates the fault to R3. I3 then reads
faulty R3 and by AND ing with zero removes the fault on R3. Also, I2 writes over R1 which
masks the transient fault on R1 (unnecessarily detecting a benign fault can be considered as a
“false positive” from a reliability view point). We find that 4% of transient faults (not in the
graph) are treated as error in Fingerprintig [37] while FaulTM does not try to recover these
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Benchmark Size Benchmark Size Benchmark Size Benchmark Size Benchmark Size
401bzip2 1139 456hmmer 980 410bwaves 1120 458sjeng 379 429mcf 823
459GemsFDTD 352 433milc 408 462libquantum 772 435gromacs 607 464h264ref 683
437leslie3d 591 470lbm 277 444namd 536 471omnetpp 373 445gobmk 173
473astar 1876 450soplex 543 482sphinx3 317 453povray 469 483xalancbmk 612
barnes 2548 cholesky 909 fft 149 fmm 1634 lu_con 516
lu_noncon 387 ocean_cont 642 ocean_noncont 623 radiosity 110 radix 705
raytrace 5801 waternspatial 458 waternsquare 421 bayes 152716 genome 567
intruder 591 kmeans_hi 1886 kmeans_low 1043 labyrinth 50314 ssca2 505
vacation_hi 6545 vacation_low 6520 yada 7668
Table 5.1: Average Number of Instructions in a reliTX.
benign faults and it does not cause a false positive signal since they are masked before the end
of reliTXs. We believe that using larger transactions is effective to reduce the false positives
since it increases the probability of that some instructions may mask benign faults within trans-
actions. For permanent stuck-at faults, they are benign if a same bit value is written with the
stuck value (e.g. a bit cell which is generally 0 is stuck at 0).
In case of comparing signatures instead of comparing entire write-sets, 5 transient errors
(among 155000 transient fault injection in spec2006 applications) are not detected in FaulTM-
sig (not in the graph), thus, in extremely high reliability requiring systems, signature usage
might not be appropriate.
The error detection rate of register file comparison is 30% for transient faults which presents
the importance of register file comparison.
5.5.4 Error Recovery Overhead
For error recovery, reliable systems require additional checkpointing mechanism which presents
checkpoint creation and recovery overhead. Table 5.1 shows the average number of instructions
in transactions when the write set size is 64 entries. In FaulTM, the number of instructions in
transactions is very low (generally less than 10K instructions) compared to system-wide check-
pointing mechanisms (about 10M instructions) such as ReVive [43] or SafetyNet [47]. Note
that, smaller checkpoint interval is essential to support I/O operations [37].
The error recovery overhead of FaulTM comes from two reasons. First, it needs to write
the write-sets to the shared memory. Second, after an error is detected, it re-executes the in-
structions from the beginning of the reliTX. Similarly, in Rebound, each core writes the dirty
lines to the shared memory whenever they create a checkpoint at every 100M cycles.
In Figure 5.15, we compare the number of checkpoints created in FaulTM and in Rebound.
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Figure 5.15: The figure compares the number of checkpoints created in FaulTM and Rebound
in the error free execution
To be able to provide a fair comparison, we create checkpoints in Rebound and set the size of
reliTX according to number of instructions executed. Thus, FaulTM sets the size of reliTXs
as 10000 instructions and Rebound checkpoints a core when it executes 10000 instructions
since the last checkpoint creation. Note that, in the normal case, FaulTM checkpoints a core
when the write-set is full. In Rebound, when a core checkpoints, all producers of the core also
checkpoint thus some checkpoints include less than 10000 instructions. FaulTM, on the other
side, presents a lightweight checkpointing scheme which reduces the number of checkpoints
by 28% compared to Rebound. Note that, besides writing back the dirty lines, before and after
each checkpoint creation Rebound has an additional overhead of synchronization.
In order to provide a close look, in Figure 5.16, we present the number of instructions
executed in each checkpoint for cholesky (In cholesky, ö800M checkpoints are created). As it
can be seen from the figure, many checkpoints are created with the instruction numbers much
lower than the normal checkpoint interval.
After the error is detected, FaulTM re-executes the instructions only in one reliTX pair.
Rebound, on the other hand, recovers all the consumers of the erroneous core if there is any.
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Figure 5.16: The figure presents the size of the checkpoints created by Rebound for cholesky.
In Rebound, when a core checkpoints, its producers also checkpoint, thus, some checkpoints
have less instructions than the checkpoint interval (i.e. 10M instructions).
Obviously, FaulTM presents less recovery overhead than Rebound. In Figure 5.17, we present
this reduction visually for one application, barnes. In the Figure, we present the number of cores
which requires recovery for barnes application in case of an error is detected in the related
checkpoint. At some point, all cores (i.e. 32) need to be rolled back due to communication
within checkpoint interval while FaulTM rolls back only the erroneous core.
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Figure 5.17: The figure presents the number of cores which require recovery in case of an error
detection in barnes application. At some point, all cores(i.e. 32) need to be rolled back due to
communication within checkpoint interval while FaulTM rolls back only the erroneous core.
5.6 Other Reliability Schemes utilizing Transactional Mem-
ory
After we introduce SymptomTM and FaulTM, there have been further reliability proposals
leveraging Transactional Memory semantics for reliability. In this section, we present these
further studies.
In FaulTM the execution is stalled at the commit stages of the transactions since transaction
pairs are tightly coupled. Also, after the verification of the correct execution of transactions,
buffered values must be visible to the rest of the system. This commit process presents a
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pressure over the memory hierarchy and the performance of the system. In order to provide an
alternative design overcoming these limitations, Log-Based Redundant Architecture (LBRA),
a reliability scheme build on an eager data versioning HTM system is proposed [82].
In LBRA, the thread pairs are termed master-slave threads akin to original-backup threads
of FaulTM. The master thread executes the transaction but, additionally, it keeps the results of
its progress (i.e. Verification Signature which summarizes the computation performed during
the execution of the transaction) in a pair-shared log. By means of this log, the slave verifies
that the results produced by master are correct. Using the eager-eager HTM, LBRA decouples
the pair transactions so that master transaction can commit without being stalled for the execu-
tion of the slave transaction to be finished. However, it requires additional implementation of
three mechanisms: i) input replication: Since master and slave transactions are not decoupled,
the execution of redundant memory instructions would probably lead to input incoherence. In-
put replication is required to solve this issue. LBRA extends the log area provided by the TM
to contain the history related to memory operations for the purpose of keeping track of the data
values that the master thread accesses. The load instruction of the slave transaction is served
through this log (in program order), thus, slave thread obtain the same value as its master-pair.
ii)Providing a stable recovery state: As memory values are allowed to be shared and shared
memory is eagerly updated in LBRA, potential faults could be propagated across the system.
Thus, when a fault is detected in a transaction and this transaction aborts, all other transac-
tions using the data produced by this faulty transaction (i.e. consumer of the faulty transaction)
should also abort. To this purpose, in LBRA, master thread track the producer/consumer depen-
dencies with other threads in the system by means of the conflict detection support provided
by TM. Thus, when a faulty transaction aborts, it also sends an abort request to all its con-
sumers. iii) output comparison: If a thread is the consumer of another thread, the validation of
the consumer thread is accomplished after the validation of its producers.
Wamhoff at el [83] proposed Transactional Encoding which combines arithmetic codes for
error detection and Software Transactional Memory for error recovery. They provide the de-
sign for both lazy and eager conflict detections. They use AN arithmetic codes together with
symptom-based error detection. Besides the advantage of encoding processing that allows exe-
cuting non-deterministic applications, the software-based Transactional Encoding also provide
achieving reliability using unreliable commodity hardware. However, software-only solutions
can not guarantee the detection or the recovery of permanent errors since replicas or recovered
executions can be issued to the same hardware structures.
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Data Versioning - Conflict Detection
lazy-lazy lazy-eager eager-eager
Checkpointing Overhead High High Low
Recovery Overhead Low Low High
Error Containment High High Low
Error Detection Latency High Low Low
Error Detection Overhead Low High High
Table 5.2: Reliability attributes of different TM implementations (Bold is Better).
In the transactional encoding, first, the application written in C is transformed to the en-
coded version by using an encoding compiler. During this transformation, the main module
initializing the application is not encoded. Also, encoded versions of public functions and
wrappers of those functions are added to the encoded application. Wrappers encode the pa-
rameters for the function, call the encoded version of the function and then decode the returned
value (if there is any). In the second step of the transactional encoding, transactional memory
semantics are added to the encoded version. In this sense, Transaction Begin/End instructions
are added to the wrapper. Also, all accesses to the state are redirected to the TM by invoking
read and write operations from the encoded functions. Also, before reading/writing to/from
memory, the memory address is decoded so that the correct memory location can be accessed.
The error detection can be accomplished in either lazy or eager manner similar to the con-
flict detection of TM. If the error detection is accomplished eagerly, all transactional writes
conduct decode operation of encoded processing for the written data. Otherwise, if the error
detection is deferred until transaction commit, the entire write-set is decoded only in the com-
mit stage. If transactional encoding detects a divergence of any value from the valid state, it
aborts the transaction and starts it from the beginning. Otherwise, the transaction commits and
all the memory operations can visible by the system.
5.6.1 Discussion: Pros and Cons of TM design parameters for Reliability
TM proposals implement two key mechanisms: data versioning and conflict detection. Each
of these mechanisms can be implemented either in lazy or eager policies. Out of four possible
combinations of these policies, the lazy-lazy [1], lazy-eager [84], and eager-eager [85] schemes
are the most popular implementations. In the rest of this section, we provide a succinct dis-
cussion of the impact of TM policies on reliability by considering five desirable features for a
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reliable system:
(1) Low checkpointing overhead,
(2) low recovery overhead,
(3) high error containment, to limit the propagation of errors in the system,
(4) low error detection latency, to detect errors as soon as possible, and
(5) low error detection overhead.
In Table 5.2, we summarize effects of the data versioning and conflict detection policies on
reliability. As we show in the table (bolds typeface denotes the desired properties), none of the
possible three TM policy combinations has all these features.
The cost of providing checkpoint/rollback behavior depends mainly on the data versioning
strategy. Lazy data versioning works in two stages, a pre-commit phase and a commit phase. In
the pre-commit phase, the modifications are made on private copies and at the commit phase,
these modifications are written to the memory. Since the modifications within transactions are
repeated—at least once for the private copy and once for the shared memory—a significant
overhead is introduced for checkpointing even for error-free executions. However, it provides
a very fast error recovery. Eager data versioning performs in-place memory updates during
transaction execution and introduces overhead only upon abort, i.e., upon error recovery. The
abort overhead is caused by the replacement of modified versions of data with their versions
prior to the transaction. Thus, eager data versioning presents less overhead for checkpointing
compared to lazy data versioning, however, its recovery overhead is much higher than the
lazy data versioning. Eager data versioning is preferable in terms of performance and energy
efficiency when the error rate is low and the system presents few rollback. On the contrary,
when the error rate is high (e.g in low Vdd or when the hardware is located in a high attitude),
using lazy data versioning is preferable since the system would require many rollbacks and a
rollback for lazy data versioning is cheaper in comparison to eager data versioning.
In TM implementations with eager data versioning, main memory keeps the latest specula-
tive version of the data. If we use eager data versioning for reliability, some data in the shared
memory which is not validated for being error-free, can be read by other cores. Assuming any
of these data or any address is erroneous, this error might then easily propagate to concurrently
executing tasks. Therefore, error propagation in eager data versioning is high while lazy data
versioning presents high error containment. Thus, eager data versioning requires additional
synchronization mechanisms for error recovery in order to rollback the communicating tasks
when an error is detected in a transaction. Due to the error propagation, all transactions ex-
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ecuting in the systems may require recovery. On the contrary, in lazy data versioning, only
error-free data is written to the shared memory, therefore any error occurring in a certain trans-
action does not propagate to the other transactions through memory. Thus, only the erroneous
transaction rolls back while the rest of the system keeps running without wasting any error-free
work done.
For Error Detection, from time to time the normal process should stop and the error detec-
tion operations (e.g. in redundancy-based error detection, comparing the results of instructions)
should be carried out. Thus, the higher the number of error detection is triggered, the higher
the potential performance degradation due to error detection is presented. In TM systems,
error detection is accomplished during the conflict detection time of TM. For instance in a
redundancy-based reliable system utilizing TM with lazy conflict detection (e.g. FaulTM), the
comparison operation is carried out at the commit stage of the transaction. On the contrary,
for eager conflict detection, the error detection should be carried out at every time the shared
memory is updated (i.e. every write operation). Therefore, we could conclude that potential
performance degradation of lazy conflict detection is lower.
On the other hand, in lazy conflict detection any error occurring earlier in the transaction
will only be detected at the commit stage, so error detection latency will be higher. In ea-
ger conflict detection, however, the error could be detected earlier when a transactional store
containing the error is compared.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce FaulTM, a redundancy-based error detection and recovery ap-
proach leveraging a lazy-lazy hardware transactional memory (HTM) system. FaulTM pro-
vides an efficient error recovery mechanism by utilizing the local checkpointing mechanism of
TM. Also, it reduces the comparison overhead significantly by comparing the redundant execu-
tion streams at the end of the transactions instead of after every store instruction while avoiding
error propagation to the whole system by utilizing the isolation property of transactions. More-
over, it eliminates the requirement of a separate input replication mechanism by utilizing the
conflict detection scheme of TM.
Comparatively, FaulTM has a negligible transaction creation and abort overhead. The aver-
age number of instructions in reliTXs are generally less than 10K instructions which is very low
compared to system-wide checkpointing mechanisms (10M instructions) [43, 47] that reduces
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the re-execution overhead of the instructions from the beginning of the reliTX for the error
recovery. Moreover, smaller checkpoint interval is essential to support I/O operations [37].
84
6
Energy Reduction in Microprocessor
The increasing power and energy consumption of modern computing devices is perhaps a large
threat to technology minimization and associated gains in performance and productivity. For
instance, current scaling trends have led to multi-core processors at the architectural level, and
higher core counts are expected in the following years. Yet, it will not be possible to keep the
whole chip powered-on at the same time due to power envelope issues, a problem also known
as the dark silicon phenomenon [86].
As the power envelope becomes one of the key design concerns, a dramatic improvement
in the energy efficiency of microprocessors is required in order to keep the power under con-
trol. Since energy consumption grows proportionally to the square of supply voltage (i.e.,
Ener g y ≈ CL × V 2dd ), a very effective approach in reducing the energy consumption is to
reduce the supply voltage (Vdd) below the safe margin, close to the transistors’ threshold (near-
threshold execution). Voltage downscaling can offer substantial energy savings by trading off
performance. To take advantage of potential power savings, microprocessors have started to
provide high-performance and low-power operating modes [87]. While the processor runs at a
high frequency by using high Vdd in the high-performance mode, in the low-power mode, the
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processor reduces Vdd and the frequency.
However, the energy reduction in the low-power mode comes with a drastic increase in the
number of failures [8]. As Vdd decreases, failure rates for yield loss, hard errors, erratic bits,
and soft errors increase.
Dan et al. proposed Razor [2], a hardware solution for tolerating failures caused by lowering
supply voltage. Razor extends the pipeline stages with a new circuit design in order to detect
timing errors. Obviously, this circuit extension presents a hardware overhead which is not
used under nominal voltage. EnerJ [88], a software framework for approximate computing, is
proposed by Sampson et al. EnerJ executes the non-critical sections of applications in the low-
power mode while the rest is executed under nominal voltage. Programmers specify, which
parts should be approximate, thus programming language support is required. The architecture
has to support separate areas in memory and CPU for which the voltage can be reduced. In this
chapter, our goal is seeking architectural solutions for energy minimization without requiring
any substantial hardware changes or programming mechanisms.
In order to fully exploit the dynamic energy savings of voltage downscaling, a potentially
attractive idea is to implement reliability solutions that allow a system to operate below the safe
margin of Vdd . In this chapter, we investigate the usefulness of TM-based reliability schemes
for reducing energy consumption.
Dependable multiprocessor systems combine error detection and error recovery to provide
reliability in the safe margin. These systems such as embedded systems and supercomputers,
mostly rely on checkpointing/recovery for error recovery [89]. However, when the voltage of
processor is reduced, a poorly implemented checkpointing/recovery mechanisms may consume
more energy than the saved one. Therefore, for error recovery, we are interested in utilizing
Transactional Memory which provides a lightweight mechanism.
Transactional Memory (TM) was originally introduced to simplify the process of parallel
programming [65]. It also provides automated checkpointing/rollback, hence, it is also used for
implementing reliability as we present in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as well as shown in [82, 83,
90]. So far, it has been shown that the use of software TM (STM) consumes less energy than
traditional lock mechanisms [91]. The authors investigated typical parallel benchmarks and
measured the energy consumed, which motivates us to investigate further the pros and cons of
combining error detection mechanisms with TM if processors work on low voltage levels. We
believe that TM can simplify the process of energy-efficient reliable programming in a similar
way. Researchers showed that the use of TM can consume less energy than traditional lock-
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based mechanisms, for micro benchmarks [92] and also for the more sophisticated STAMP
benchmarks [91]. Moreover, we also show that the implementation complexity of reliability
schemes can be minimized by using existing TM hardware with minor changes in Chapter 5.
Hence, it is worthwhile to further investigate TM in combination with different error detection
mechanisms for processors working at low voltage levels.
In this chapter, we investigate the edge cases on voltage reduction while the error recovery
still leads to a reduced energy consumption. In the following section, we present the error
rate in combinational logic under scaling voltage. In Section 6.2, we summarized how TM
can be utilized for error recovery. In Section 6.3, we survey different existing error detection
mechanisms. In Section 6.4 we evaluate the energy reduction provided by these mechanisms.
6.1 Voltage Scaling and Error Rate
The energy usage of computer systems is becoming more important, especially for battery
operated systems such as mobile devices. One solution for efficient energy consumption is
power-down-when-it-is-idle which is used in many laptops. For instance, in mobile devices
it is preferable using "turbo mode" [93], where Vdd is increased to run faster and switch off
not only the processor, but the screen, antennas, etc. as soon as possible. Also, those systems
power-down the disk when it is not accessed. In the other option, the chip speed is dynamically
varied. In this way, the energy consumption also varies and at the peak moments, the user sees
the high number of instructions per second while when the user is not active, less number of
instructions is executed per second with less energy consumption.
Voltage reduction is currently the most promising way to save energy [94, 95]. The intuition
behind the power savings come from the basic energy equation that is proportional to the square
of the voltage. To lower the voltage and still operate correctly, the frequency (the cycle time)
should also be lowered. Since, frequency and the voltage should be adjusted together, obviously
lower voltage and frequency dissipate less energy per cycle.
The question here is whether the voltage reduction is better for energy saving. Suppose
that a task has a deadline in 100 miliseconds but it takes 50 miliseconds to complete when
the system is running at full speed. In the first option, the system runs at full speed for 50
miliseconds and then stops for the next 50 miliseconds by putting into a hibernate mode that
wakes up upon an interrupt. Note that the energy consumption in the hibernate mode can not be
zero. In the second option, the system runs the task at half speed also by reducing the voltage
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by half and completes it just before its deadline. In this case, the task would consume 1/4 the
energy of the normal system. However, when the supply voltage is reduced below the safe-
margin (i.e. A voltage is in the safe margin if the circuit runs without errors in more than 90
percent of the baseline clock period), the error rate increases drastically [2]. This is because,
as the voltage drops, more internal circuit paths cannot complete in the clock period. Clearly,
if pipeline can tolerate more errors, it can operate much lower supply voltage level.
6.2 Error Recovery
In order to reduce the supply voltage lower than the safe margin, it is required to include a
reliability scheme in the system. The more error is tolerated by the reliability scheme, the more
the supply voltage can be reduced. However, although lowering the voltage provides energy
saving, the reliability scheme presents additional energy consumption.
Reliability has two main aspects: error detection and error recovery. As we explain in
Chapter. 2, checkpoint/recovery provides a backward error recovery scheme. There are three
main strategies in checkpoint creating: global, coordinated-local and uncoordinated-local. As
we presented in Chapter. 4 and Chapter. 5, checkpointing can also be supported by transactional
approaches. In this way, error recovery is build on top of an existing hardware with minor mod-
ifications so that the implementation complexity is reduced. Initially, Transactional Memory
(TM) have been proposed as a data synchronization mechanism. While TM provides check-
point/rollback behaviour for free, it can easily be adopted for recovering from transient faults.
The semantics of transactions proposed by TM inherently support failure atomicity, i.e., TMs
guarantee that an operation, which cannot complete due to an unexpected event, can rollback
to a state prior to its invocation. Several researchers have exploited this fact to enhance ex-
ception handling mechanisms [96, 97, 98, 99]. Similarly, Oplinger and Lam [100] encapsulate
error-prone parts of the code within special transactional blocks in order to recover from faults.
However, these studies mainly target faults induced by software development. In this section,
we discuss how TM can be adopted for error recovery.
6.2.1 Adapting TM for Recovery
Although TM (and especially STM) is known to have a high overhead for certain workloads,
a significant portion of this overhead is due to data synchronization when detecting whether
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different threads accessed common data. For error recovery purposes, however, only the check-
point/rollback behaviour is necessary and the synchronization requirement is therefore largely
reduced. Hence, it is possible to design cost-effective TM for error recovery by providing min-
imal synchronization (e.g., Chapter5). Such TM designs can easily provide coordinated-local
checkpointing.
The cost of providing checkpoint/rollback behaviour depends mainly on the logging strat-
egy. Redo-logging (lazy data versioning) works in two stages, a pre-commit phase and a com-
mit phase. In the pre-commit phase the modifications are made on private copies and at the
commit phase these modifications are written to the memory. Since the modifications within
transactions are repeated—at least once for the private copy and once for the shared memory—
a significant overhead is introduced even to error-free executions. Undo-logging (eager data
versioning) performs in-place memory updates during transaction execution and introduces
overhead only upon abort, i.e., upon error recovery. The abort overhead is caused by the re-
placement of modified versions of data with their versions prior to the transaction.
While having lower time overhead, undo-logging can easily result in the propagation of a
fault between concurrently executing tasks, because speculative changes become effective im-
mediately on shared memory locations. Therefore, a synchronization mechanism is needed for
error recovery. High fault rates can cause important overheads and it may be more interest-
ing in such cases to use redo-logging. This would reduce the synchronization costs because
fault propagation can only occur during transaction commit. Furthermore, a rollback for redo-
logging is cheap in comparison to undo-logging. Thus, in the highly faulty environments, it is
better to use redo-logging. Since the fault rate under the scaling voltage is drastically high, we
limit the scope of this chapter to redo-logging.
Using undo- and redo-logging simultaneously can increase the recovery and reliability pro-
vided by the TM. The rationale is to use undo-logging for enabling rollback, while using redo-
logging to build a (correct) history of updates done by the transaction until the error is detected.
The introduced overhead is limited to an additional replication of write operations, while the
operand is already in the cache. Since transaction rollback cannot be guaranteed to be error-free
when operating at low voltage, the history can be used as FER during the re-execution of the
transaction to mask any faults. Doudalis and Prvulovic [101] proposed combining undo- and
redo-logging to support both bidirectional debugging and error recovery, which can be another
research direction for TM that we will not further discuss about it.
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6.2.2 Executing with TM for Recovery
In order to integrate TM within an error recovery scheme, the code that requires recovery should
be executed within transactions regardless of whether the original code includes transactions
or not. We name the process of executing a code within a transaction as transactification.
The need for transactification raises two issues: (1) determining the scope of transactification,
(2) choosing the right transaction granularity (the decision of when transactions start and com-
mit).
Within the context of voltage scaling, a TM should be capable of taking control of the ex-
ecuted code at any time, since the voltage level can be reduced at an arbitrary moment. This
implies that the scope of transactification should span the entire code, except the code that ex-
plicitly declares that transactification is not needed, e.g., non-critical sections in approximate
computing. If STM is used, all code (not only applications but also operating system code) run-
ning on a machine should also have a transactional version to switch to transactional execution
at any time. For a hardware TM (HTM), transactification is done transparently in hardware,
but the size of a transaction is limited. If the size of transaction can be kept small, it is possible
to use an HTM alone. Otherwise a hybrid TM is required, i.e., where the HTM limitations are
exceeded, STM is used as a fall-back.
Determining where the transactions start and end during low voltage operation is also an
important issue. Inserting the executed code inside a single transaction (during the whole time
the core operates at low voltage) is not feasible, since this requires an unbounded buffer in
order to store the unmodified states of all modified data (the transaction size cannot be known
in advance). Hence, once a core starts operating at low voltage we need to execute the code
inside back-to-back transactions with known write-set sizes. It is further important to take care
not to miss errors if there is a delay between occurrence of a fault and its detection. Otherwise,
an instruction might be already committed even though the execution was faulty. It is possible
to introduce delays to ensure that all the instructions within a transaction completed without
errors. At this point, the choice of the transaction granularity is critical. Small transactions
permit efficient TM implementations (e.g., HTM) but may introduce too many artificial delays,
slowing down the error-free execution. Large transactions can hide the artificial delays, but
make it difficult for the TM to be efficient (e.g., requiring STM at least as a fall-back). Also,
the probability of detecting an error in a transaction increases for larger transactions thus it
increases the recovery overhead.
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We focus our study on light-weight transactions that are supported by hardware and target
reliability rather than regular transactions with the purpose of concurrency control (see Chap-
ter. 4 and Chapter. 5). Thus, they do not require code transformation and they can be committed
when it is required. For instance, in regular HTMs, commit points of transactions are statically
defined in the source code. On the contrary, reliability purposed transactions can be committed
flexibly, for example they can commit when the HTM structures are full 5.
6.3 Error Detection Schemes
In this section, we review several lightweight error detection mechanisms and discuss their ap-
plicability for energy efficient computing. Typical error detection mechanisms in the literature
(1) run the code redundantly and compare the outputs, i.e., rely on replication, (2) use assertion-
s/invariants, (3) use encoded processing, or (4) monitor the error symptoms. We further discuss
how these error detection mechanisms can be combined with TM (irrespective of whether TM
is built in software or hardware). A qualitative comparison is provided at the end of the section.
6.3.1 Replication
To satisfy the strict reliability requirements of mission-critical systems, various redundancy-
based error detection solutions have been proposed [32, 33]. These solutions are also termed as
N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) Techniques in which N represents the number of replication.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is one of the most popular NMR technique which executes
the instruction stream three times. TMR compares the results of the replicas via a voting
circuit and upon results divergence decides that one of the copy is correct. Since it expects
a single result, it does not require a recovery and it presents an forward error correction. Dual
modular redundancy (DMR) schemes, another NMR technique, execute an instruction stream
redundantly in two synchronized processors and check if both produce identical results. If the
results diverge, a recovery mechanism can be triggered. The comparison of execution results
causes synchronization and comparison overheads in the execution time.
In Chapter 5, we present FaulTM which utilizes Transactional Memory for dual replication
so that it reduces the comparison overhead. This is because, FaulTM efficiently compares the
write-sets instead of comparing each individual store operation. The write-set has typically less
entries than the total number of store instructions, because multiple stores to the same address
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are mapped to a single entry. Also the comparison is done only at the commit stage of the
transactions, which presents less time overhead for synchronizing the replicated executions.
The comparison overhead can be further reduced by comparing hash-based signatures of write-
sets and register files of the transactions. It is trivial to apply FaulTM for triplication in which
instruction streams are triplicated with transactions and those three transactions synchronize
and compare their results from time to time.
Although redundancy provides a very high error detection capability, it suffers from 100%
(or 200% for triplication) energy and space overhead in the error-free execution. However,
the energy consumption is reduced exponentially when Vdd is lowered, in comparison to the
linearly increasing energy consumption of replication. Hence, it is worth to further investigate
replication as error detection mechanism.
6.3.2 Assertions/Invariants
Using assertions is a common technique for detecting software or hardware errors [102]. As-
sertions are conditions referring to the current and previous state of the program. If the states
do not match the expected results, an error is detected. Upon such event, the typical behaviour
is to issue a warning, but corrective actions can also be triggered [103].
An approach based on a coprocessor (watchdog) is proposed in [104]. It uses annotations in
the first phase of the error detection, where processes provide some information. In the second
phase the processes are continuously monitored and the collected information is compared with
the information previously provided. The authors claim an error coverage of 90% of transient
and permanent errors by control-flow and memory access checking.
As pointed out in [90], combining assertions with transactions is an interesting approach as
one can implicitly create the latter based on the invariants provided by developers. Inserting
invariants manually into the program has the drawback that the resulting assertions might be
unsound (lead to false positives) or incomplete [105] and might be inefficient because too many
evaluations are needed. The alternative is to add them automatically to a program, as proposed
in [106]. To detect faulty assertions Knauth et al. [107] use random mutation to detect the
most likely software bugs. This mechanism could be extended to improve the combination of
assertions and TMs. Another possibility is to automatically add invariants to a program, as
described in [106].
The authors of [108] propose an extension of STM Haskell with invariants that concentrates
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on C like consistency from the ACID characteristics. Consistency is ensured by dynamically-
checked invariants that must hold if the system is in a consistent state. The authors identified
that the frequency of invariant evaluation represents a tradeoff between overhead and detection
rate. In their work, they reduce the overhead by the following measures. The invariants are
(1) garbage-collected if their watched data structure does not exist any more, and (2) invariants
are only checked if a transaction wrote a variable read by the invariant.
6.3.3 Symptom-Based Error Detection
In order to provide reliability at a low cost, some recent error detection solutions [40, 57] moni-
tor program executions to inspect if there is a symptom of hardware faults. These symptoms can
be mispredictions in high confidence branches, high OS activity, or fatal traps (e.g. attempting
to execute an undefined instruction code).
In Chapter 4, we present SymptomTM, a symptom-based error detection mechanisms us-
ing transactions to recover from application crashes. Also a similar scheme has been disclosed
in a patent filed by IBM [109]. In this approach, applications are executed in back-to-back,
reliability purposed transactions which are monitored to detect if there are any symptoms of
hardware errors, which typically result in fatal traps. Unless any fatal trap exception is raised
in the transaction, the write-set is committed to shared memory at the end of the transaction.
Otherwise, the system aborts and re-executes the transaction. SymptomTM avoids catastrophic
failures induced by transient or permanent faults without any perceptible performance degra-
dation. Since there is no replication, the scheme has virtually no area/energy overheads. It
has, however, limited error coverage since it cannot detect silent data corruptions (SDC) and,
further, exceptions can be raised after the commit of the transaction.
Since some symptoms can be observed very efficiently (e.g., catching exceptions), symptom-
based error detection can be easily combined with other error detection mechanisms. Other
symptoms (e.g., infinite loops due to a corruption of the stop condition) require an instrumen-
tation of the code or support by the operating system (e.g, adding time-outs to operations).
6.3.4 Encoded Processing
Error correcting codes (ECCs) are commonly used to detect and correct soft errors in memory
by adding redundancy. ECCs usually provide single bit error correction and double bit error
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Method Memory Processing Error Detection Complexity
Replication high high high low
Assertions medium high medium high
Encoded Processing medium high high high
Symptoms low low low low
Table 6.1: Comparison of error detection schemes (bold is better)
detection [110]. However, soft errors might also be introduced during data transport and pro-
cessing in the logic building blocks. One way of applying the principles of ECC to runtime
errors is encoded processing [111]. The redundancy is added by applying arithmetic codes to
the values processed by the application. This can be done either using custom hardware or in
software by an encoding compiler [112]. All operations must preserve the encoding, which
results in more computations and higher energy consumption.
The level of error detection that can be achieved using encoded processing depends on
the selected type of arithmetic code, e.g., AN codes can detect value errors while ANBDmem
codes [113] can additionally detect lost updates in memory, but at the expense of a higher
processing overhead [4]. The observed rate of undetected errors is 9% and 0.5%, respectively.
Wamhoff at el. [83] proposed Transactional Encoding which combines arithmetic codes for
error detection and Software Transactional Memory for error recovery. In this design, value is
validated when it is read or written by checking its arithmetic code. If the code is incorrect, the
transaction must be aborted. Wamhoff at el. provide the design for both lazy and eager conflict
detections. For higher efficiency, they propose deferring the validation of a code word until
a transaction commits or the value becomes externally visible (lazy checking). This avoids
the costly check on each access of the value because the error propagates in the employed
arithmetic code. Eager checks can allow the application to identify the first occurrence of an
invalid value and to react more pro-actively.
6.3.5 Qualitative Comparison
Error detection is a critical step for enabling low voltage operation but it does not come without
cost. The energy efficiency is highly dependent on the selection of the right technique. In
the following, we summarize the aforementioned schemes and provide a comparison regarding
factors that influence the design decision. We concentrate on (1) the overhead introduced in
memory and processing, (2) the error detection coverage, (3) the requirements for setting up
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the error detection. Table 6.1 compares the overhead of the single error-detection schemes in
processing and in memory, when applied to an error-free system.
Memory and Processing Overhead. Replication has high memory and processing overheads
because the whole application executes in parallel. With assertions/invariants, the overhead
depends on the programmer or the automated tool that generates them. It can be medium to high
in memory, depending notably on the support for garbage collection. The annotations have to
be evaluated in any case (even if there are no failures). Encoded processing needs only a small
amount of additional memory to keep the arithmetic codes, but all executed operations incur
the significant overhead of maintaining the encoding. For the symptom-based error detection
only the symptoms have to be stored and checked, therefore the overheads are low.
Error Detection Coverage. There is usually a tradeoff between error detection coverage and
overhead. For example, whereas replication provides 100% error detection, it requires many
resources and hence might not be usable for energy efficient computing when the processor
runs in high performance mode. The assertion-based mechanism is highly dependent on the
implementation. Transient errors might not be detected, because they are simply not covered.
However, there are implementations that claim to reach 97% coverage with only 5-14% perfor-
mance overhead [114]. The detection capabilities of encoded processing depend on the applied
arithmetic code. Its complexity introduces linearly increasing runtime costs, while the error
detection rate increases exponentially [4]. Symptom-based error detection provides a limited
error coverage with a very-low performance overhead.
Requirements for Using the Mechanism. Although the energy efficiency of a system is the
main goal, a mechanism can only be successful if it can be easily applied, especially if the
error-detection mechanisms have to be combined with recovery. Replication has few require-
ments for the checking of the output and the application does not have to be changed. Similarly,
symptom-based error detection requires only the detection of exception which already exists
in the hardware. Assertions usually need language support to be defined and the implemen-
tation must verify them during the execution. Encoded processing can be implemented as a
combination of compiler and library, and integration with the application is straightforward.
6.4 Analysis
In this section we analyse the feasibility of applying the aforementioned error detection schemes
with TM-based error recovery. We are specifically interested in how much we can lower the
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Figure 6.1: Error rate as analysed by Ernst et al. in [2]
voltage while still providing high error detection capability.
For the evaluation we consider the following scenarios: 1) We show the fault rate of ex-
ecution units under scaling voltage; 2) We compare the error detection capability of each of
the schemes; 3) We investigate the energy overhead of the error detection schemes and the
combined error detection and recovery; 4) Finally, we consider combination of different error
detection schemes.
6.4.1 Fault rate
To the best of our knowledge, only Ernst et al. performed a study in [2], evaluating the error rate
of the execution units for the voltage levels below safe Vdd . Although there are newer technolo-
gies such that Intel Atom Processors which can execute between 1.1V to 0.75V safely [115], to
the best of our knowledge, there hasn’t been a study for the error rate in Atom Processors below
0.75V. However, the study presented in this chapter still applicable for these new processors in
which only the scope shifts beyond 0.75V. The results presented by Ernst et al. [2] are shown in
Figure 6.1. For this experiment a circuit-level design of a 64-bit Kogge-Stone adder has been
implemented, assuming an 870 MHz clock and an ambient temperature of 27 C. As an input,
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Figure 6.2: Fault coverage of each scheme according to the results presented in Chapter 5 and
[3, 4].
random sample vectors are generated. The error rate is computed as the fraction of sample
vectors that do not complete within the clock period of the current voltage and frequency. In
this study, we conservatively use the error rate of the random input sequence by knowing the
fact that the resulting error rate is higher than in a real application.
6.4.2 Error detection capability
For showing the error detection capability of each scheme, we summarize results found in the
literature (Chapter 4 for symptom-based error detection, Chapter 5 for dual-modular redun-
dancy (DMR), [3] for invariants and [4] for encoding) and display them in Figure 6.2. On
average, 20 % of the injected faults are benign since they are masked before the transaction
ends. Note that this is lower than the results reported in [3], because we conservatively classify
faults as not being benign, if the injected fault still exists at the end of the transaction.
DMR provides 100 % fault coverage since it detects all injected faults unless they are be-
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Figure 6.3: Normalized energy spent by each error detection scheme when the Vdd is 2 V
according to the results presented in Chapter 5 and [3, 4].
nign. The coverage of TMR is slightly lower than DMR, because if there are two faulty copies,
TMR can only detect a failure, but not correct it. Note that hardware based replication (DMR
or TMR) provides higher reliability since it does not have a vulnerability window as software-
based replication. Symptom-based error detection only covers 35 % of the faults, if transactions
are short (i.e., less than 10,000 instructions). Similarly, encoded processing provides 97 % fault
coverage, while invariants cover 93 % of the faults. Note that we include the benign faults into
fault coverage and leave only the harmful data corruptions out of the coverage.
6.4.3 Energy consumption
In the following section, we show the energy consumption of the error detection schemes under
full voltage and under scaling voltage.
Energy overhead of the error detection schemes.
We calculate the energy overhead under full voltage as the number of additional instructions
(memory instructions, integer/floating point instructions) by relying on the results found in the
literature (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, [3], [4]). The results are shown in Figure 6.3, where we
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Figure 6.4: Energy consumption under scaling voltage
normalized the values to the base, error-free energy consumption. Basically, high reliability
requires more energy. For example, DMR and TMR have an overhead of more than factor two
and three, respectively. The symptom-based error detection only has a negligible overhead, but
also only provides a low error detection capability.
Energy consumption under scaling voltage.
For the voltage scaling experiments we use the Gem5 full-system simulator [52] and run
the SPLASH2 [77] benchmark suite. The simulator runs with in-order cores executing X86
ISA running at 1 GHz with private 64KB L1D and L1I caches and a unified 2MB L2 cache.
During the simulation, we inject faults to the output of each instruction with the theoretical
99
Chapter 6. Energy Reduction in Microprocessor
error probability for the applied Vdd (given in Figure 6.1). Then, we assume that the faults are
detected with the error detection probability as shown Figure 6.2 (or the fault is benign). If an
error is detected, the corresponding transaction aborts and rolls back. If all transactions in the
application execute without any error (but with the possibility of re-executing the transaction
several times), the application completes reliably. We repeat this fault injection experiment 40
times for each application for each Vdd level and we calculate the reliability of the application
as the rate of the executions in which the application completes reliably. To estimate the energy
spent under the given Vdd , we calculate the total number of instructions executed (for error
detection given in Figure 6.3 and for re-execution in the error recovery) and multiply it with
the energy spent for one instruction under the given Vdd level. We repeat this fault injection
experiment for the transaction sizes of 10, 100 and 1000 instructions. Regarding the TM, we
do not make any assumption about the type of transactions (i.e., lazy/eager conflict detection
or hardware/software transactions).
In Figure 6.4, we summarize the normalized energy consumption of all applications in
the SPLASH benchmark by averaging their energy consumption. The energy consumption is
normalized to the error-free base case in which 2 V supply voltage is used. In Figure 6.5,
we display the averaged applications’ reliability of the combined error detection and recovery
under the given Vdd .
From these graphs we can make several observations: DMR provides the highest reliability,
because it is very unlikely to have two failures affecting the replicated copies of the same
instruction at the same time such that both replicated executions result in the same faulty value.
However, DMR presents a high energy overhead for high Vdds. When a transaction consists of
10 or 100 instructions, DMR starts to outperform the base-case, when Vdd is 1.4V (i.e. up to
28% reduction) or 1.2V (up to 54% reduction). For larger transactions (i.e., 1,000 instructions),
the overhead of DMR cannot be covered by lowering the Vdd any more. It is because, due to
the increase of the transaction size the number of faults causing rollbacks repeatedly becomes
considerably higher.
Error detection schemes other than DMR only provide a lower reliability. One reason is the
high number of transactions in the SPLASH applications, which can be up to 2 billion (barnes
with transaction size of 10 instructions). In this case, although the probability of a transaction
fail (i.e. in the transaction, at least one instruction fails but the transaction do not recovers) is
very low, the probability that having at least one transaction which produced undetected faulty
result increases drastically for long applications even for high reliability providing schemes
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Figure 6.5: Reliability under scaling voltage
such that TMR.
For recovery requiring schemes (i.e. all schemes except TMR), when the failure rate is
very high, the reliability provided by these schemes starts to increase again. It is because,
transactions starts to encounter many failing instruction and it is enough to detect only one
failure in the transaction in order to trigger the recovery. For instance, assume that there are
two faulty instruction in a transaction and the reliability scheme detects only one of them. In
this case, the transaction rolls back anyway although it did not detected all failures.
Symptom-based error detection and invariants have a low overhead and start to outperform
the base case very fast. They require up to 88% less energy than the base case for a trans-
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action size of 10 and Vdd=1V. However, these schemes are not enough to complete the whole
application reliably at this voltage level. When the failure rate gets very high, due to very
low Vdd values, the error detection capabilities increase again. At these low levels it is very
likely that more than one instruction per transaction fails. In this case it is easier to classify a
faulty transaction, because it is only necessary to find one failed instruction to roll back. How-
ever, symptom-based error detection starts to be energy-inefficient in the moment the reliability
increases.
TMR and encoded processing (schemes presenting high overhead in the base case less than
100% error detection capability), can only lead to a lower energy consumption than the base
case when Vdd is lower than 1.4V. Since TMR does not present any recovery overhead, the
supply voltage can be reduced to 0.8V (up to 80% less energy consumption than the base
case). However, at these voltage levels there will be at least one transaction that produces a
non-benign, faulty result.
6.4.4 Combining Error Detection Schemes
There is a tradeoff between energy efficiency and reliability, as we have seen for DMR and
symptom-based error detection and TM recovery. However, there are many applications that
are implicitly fault tolerant (e.g., from the area of multimedia and artificial intelligence). To
reduce the overhead of the error detection schemes, the programmer can define parts that are
less strict regarding outcome precision. Thus, we can for example combine symptom-based
error detection and DMR for consuming less energy, but providing full reliability for critical
parts. In Figure 6.6, we depict the energy overhead in comparison to the base case and DMR
only for a transaction size of 100 instructions. We assume that 30, 50 or 70 % of the application
are only secured by symptom-based error detection. With this combination it is possible to
lower the Vdd to 1 V (in comparison to 1.2 V with DMR only) and still be more efficient than
the base case. Specifically, we reduce the energy consumption by 66 % in comparison to the
base case. However, at these voltage levels the reliability of symptom-based error detection is
at 0 %, thus might be omitted at lower voltage levels. At a voltage level of 1.6 V the reliability
is around 10 %, but the energy consumption 20-50% lower than the single usage of DMR.
Another possibility would be to use approximate computing as e.g., studied by Sampson
et al. in [88]. The programmer can define approximate parts and these are considered as fault
tolerant. The rest can be protected by DMR and transactional memory. In this study, we prefer
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Figure 6.6: Possible normalized energy consumption of the combination of DMR and
symptom-based error detection (TX-Size=100 instructions).
utilizing symptom-based error detection instead of approximate computing for the non-critical
sections of applications, because with symptom-based error detection and TM recovery we can
still avoid system crashes. So that, if there is a failure causing system crash in these sections,
symptom-based detection can detect and recover the failure and can avoid the system crash.
In summary, the combination of error detection and TM-based error recovery can be used
when lowering voltage. The energy reduction depends on the size of the transactions. The
decision on which schemes should be selected is dependent on the required level of reliability
(i.e. if applications are mission-critical or not) and the targeted supply voltage. A possible
solution would be to provide all mechanisms and decide dynamically based on hints by the
application (e.g., configuration) or runtime on which mechanism to use.
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6.5 Summary
To improve the energy-efficiency of modern CPUs, one can reduce the supply voltage of cores.
Reducing the supply voltage increases, however, the likelihood for wrong executions of pro-
grams. In this chapter, we proposed using transactional memory (TM) for rolling back the
effects of wrong executions. To reduce the energy consumption, one needs an error detection
scheme that has both a sufficient coverage and a low overhead. We discussed multiple error
detection alternatives. Based on our evaluation, we conclude that one can reduce the energy
consumption of CPUs, in particular, if we have efficient hardware support for TM and for error
detection.
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Energy Reduction in Memory Structures
Technology minimization and associated gains in performance and productivity are in jeopardy
as the power density and energy consumption of modern computing devices increase. For
instance, smaller transistors allow computer designers to pack more chips in each technology
node in the same area. However, within the given power budget, not all portions of the chip can
be powered. The area of the chip which are not powered is termed as dark, and this is a recent
problem known as Dark Silicon Phenomena [86].
Downscaling the supply voltage (Vdd) close to the transistors’ threshold (near-threshold
execution) or lower than the threshold (sub-threshold execution) is a quite effective approach
for minimizing the energy consumption of the computer systems [116]. Therefore, as en-
ergy becomes a key design concern for computer systems, processors started provide 1) high-
performance and 2) low-power operating modes. Processors run at a high frequency by using
the nominal supply voltage (Vdd) in the high-performance mode, and they reduce Vdd in the
low-power mode to reduce the energy consumption by trading-off performance [117, 118].
However, this energy reduction comes with a drastic increase in the number of failures espe-
cially in memory structures (i.e on-chip SRAM memories such as L1 and L2 caches) [119, 120].
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These memory failures can be persistent (i.e. yield loss or hard errors) or non-persistent (i.e.
soft errors or erratic bits) while rates of both failures increase as the Vdd is decreased. Moreover
transistor scaling increases the vulnerability of transistors to radiation events since it increases
the likelihood of having multibit soft errors on adjacent bits [121]. Thus, it is essential to im-
plement reliability solutions addressing both persistent and non-persistent failures in caches in
order to reduce the Vdd and provide reliable cache operation for future technology nodes. There
are two main techniques to deal with high fault rates stemming from the above issues. The first
mechanism utilizes coding techniques such as parity or ECC. The second mechanism features
in-cache replication. While they are effective, both mechanisms have issues.
Utilizing Error Correcting Codes (ECC) in the low-power operating mode is an appeal-
ing and prevalent solution for reducing the safe operating margin for Vdd of memory struc-
tures [122, 123, 124]. ECC is the most widely used techniques for detecting and correcting
both persistent and non-persistent failures with additional area, power and encoding/decoding
time overhead [122, 123, 124]. ECC extends data lines with additional parity bits. The encoder
of the ECC generates parity bits when the data line is updated. In the reading of the data line,
the decoder regenerates the parity bits to check and correct any existing fault. However, the
increase in the error correction capability of ECC is much lower than the increase in power and
area consumption. For example, in 8-byte data, correcting a double-bit error costs 19% area
overhead while three-bit error correction requires a stronger and a more complex ECC with
100% area overhead [121]. Intel’s latest 22nm 15-core Xeon processor uses Double Error Cor-
rection, Triple Error Detection (DECTED), a very strong ECC, for its L3 cache data tag array;
however, the computational cost of DECTED ECC impacts the L3 data accesses, whose latency
is variable, thus significantly complicating the micro-architecture [125]. Due to the diminishing
benefits of stronger ECCs, providing reliability in an environment with a very high fault rate
(i.e. more than 10−3 failure probability for each bit) such as when the processor is operating
in a very low power mode, is not trivial. Thus, only a few ECC solutions address large-scale
multibit errors in a line [122, 124]. However, they require a complex encoder/decoder with a
high energy consumption which diminishes the energy saving potential of the low-power mode
execution.
The second mechanism, in-cache replication such as triplication, is a conventional way of
providing high reliability with a minimum correction latency in which replicated cache lines
are corrected via bitwise majority voter [126, 127]. However, replication schemes have two
main problems: (1) Writing/reading more than one cache line increases access latency and
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energy consumption of caches. (2) When processors operate with a very low Vdd , the number
of uncorrectable lines increases due to the multiple failures in the same bit-position. (i.e. for a
512-bit cache line with near-threshold Vdd , 14% of the triplicated lines are uncorrectable (We
used 420mV for Vdd and simple probability theory analysis to calculate the fault rate.).
In this chapter, our goal is designing on-chip SRAM memories which can tolerate very high
bit failure rates of ultra-low voltage execution with minimum overhead, and without harming
the access time and read/write energy of the cache in the nominal mode. To this end we propose
two schemes:
1. ECC-Based Solution: We Adopt a Single Error Correcting - Multiple Adjacent Error
Correcting ECC (SEC-MAEC code) - a fast and energy efficient ECC with a high error
correction capability - in the faulty lines of L1 caches for below safe voltage operations.
The SEC-MAEC code used [9] is designed for multi-bit soft errors occurring in the adja-
cent bits in order to correct them in one cycle. It can accomplish the error correction via
only 4 level gate pass
2. Redundancy-Based Solution: We present a simple, circuit-driven solution, Flexicache,
that duplicates or triplicates all the available lines in the cache and achieves each read
or write access to multiple lines without increasing access latency. Flexicache, automat-
ically configures itself for different supply voltages in order to tolerate different fault
rates. It works in one of the three modes:(1) Single Version Mode (SVM), (2) Double
Version Mode (DVM) or (3) Triple Version Mode (TVM). Flexicache also divides each
cache line into single-parity-protected partitions in order to increase the error correction
capability of replication schemes.
We compare the selected SEC-MAEC code with the Orthogonal Latin Square Code (OLSC),
a state-of-the-art fast ECC scheme utilized in L1 caches in order to lower the supply volt-
age [123]. We present that SEC-MAEC reduces the area overhead of decoder by 10X while
reducing the encoding and decoding latency into half. We also show that the energy spent for
encoding and decoding can be reduced up to 80%.
We compare Flexicache with conventional triplication schemes [126, 127] besides OLSC.
Flexicache can provide a higher error correction capability (i.e. providing a cache with a higher
capacity in low power mode) with significantly lower error correction latency. Flexicache can
continue to operate reliably up to 10% bit failure rate which provides operational capability in
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Figure 7.1: Bit Failure Rate vs Supply Voltage
320 mV by reducing the energy consumption of cache operations by 68%. Also, Flexicache
can operate until 9% bit failure rate without harming the uniform view of the cache. The area
overhead of Flexicache is only 8.6% compared to the typical single parity protected L1 cache.
In Section 7.1, we explain bit failures occurring in SRAM memory structures and we
present the previous proposal for correcting those memory failures. In Section 7.2, we ex-
plain the principles of the SEC-MAEC code that we utilized in this study and we present how
we extend the faulty cache lines with SEC-MAEC codes. In Section 7.3, we elaborate the basic
principals of Flexicache and its circuit design. In Section 7.4, we present the evaluation of
SEC-MAEC and Flexicache in terms of area, power, time and reliability by comparing OLSC,
the state-of-the-art ECC scheme. We also compare Flexicache with typical TMR scheme.
7.1 Background
In this section, we first explain the bit failures occurring in memory structures due to scaling
voltage. Then, we present the related work which allows running memory structures under
ultra-low voltages. We also give details of Orthogonal Latin Square Codes which is the state of
the art ECC scheme for level-1 memory structures when Vdd is below the safe margin.
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7.1.1 Failures in Memory Structures due to Voltage Scaling
Bit failures in the memory structures below the safe operating margin are classified into two
broad categories [122]: 1) Persistent Faults and 2) Non-Persistent Faults.
Persistent Failures:
The random variation in the number and location of dopant atoms in the channel region of
the device leads to the random variations in transistor threshold voltage. It causes threshold
voltage mismatch between the transistors close to each other. In a SRAM cell, a mismatch in
the strength between the neighbouring transistors caused by intra-die variations can result in
the failure of the cell [128]. A cell failure can occur due to the following reasons:
1. An increase in the cell access time: When the differential voltage developed across the
bit-lines during a read operation is not sufficient for sense amplifier to identify the correct
value, an access failure occurs.
2. Unstable read operation: When the stored value flips during a read operation, a read
failure occurs. This happens when the noise developed on the node storing 0 is larger
than the trip point of inverter.
3. Unstable write operation: When the cell contents cannot be toggled during write oper-
ation, a write failure occurs.
4. Retention failure: When the stored value in the cell is lost during standby, a retention
failure occurs.
The mapping between the bit failure rate and the Vdd is examined by Miller et al [124] for 32nm
technology which can be seen in Figure 7.1. It is shown that as Vdd is lowered, the bit failure
rate increases exponentially. We reference these previous results for our evaluations.
On the other side, open or short circuits cause irreversible physical changes in the semicon-
ductor devices (see Chapter 2). These permanent failures tend to occur early in the processor
lifetime due to manufacturing faults (called the infant mortality), or late in the lifetime due to
thermal and process related stress.
The location of a persistent failure is random and independent of whether the neighbouring
bit is faulty or not [116]. The locations of persistently defective bits can be detected by per-
forming built-in self test (BIST) [18] in the postmanufacturing period for each supply voltage
values.
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Segmented 2D ECC Disabling/ Flexicache SEC-MAEC
ECC Bit-Fix
Persistent Failures yes yes yes yes yes
Non-Persistent Failures yes yes no yes yes
Minimum Vdd 375 mV – 400 mV 320 mV 375 mV
Latency in the 1 cycle 1 cycle 0 cycle 1 cycle 1 cycle
Low-Power Mode
Other Latency no read-modify no no no
-write
Table 7.1: Comparison of SEC-MAEC and Flexicache with Architecture Based Error Correc-
tion Schemes for Scaling Vcc (Bold is better)
Non-Persistent Failures
Radiation events or power supply noise can cause a bit flip and corrupt a data stored in a
device until a new data is written [129]. As transistor dimensions and operating voltages shrink,
sensitivity to radiation events increases drastically. On the other side, process variation or in-
progress wear-out, combined with voltage and temperature fluctuations might cause correlated
faults of short duration. They are termed intermittent faults (or erratic failures), that last from
several cycles to several seconds [19]. Diagnosing an intermittent fault by BIST is hard since it
does not persist and conditions that cause the fault are hard to regenerate (for further explanation
see Chapter 2).
As Vdd decreases, the bit failure rate increases rapidly for both intermittent faults and per-
sistent failures [122, 124]. The impact of voltage scaling on soft errors is not drastic [122].
However, scaling down of transistor size increases the likelihood of having multibit upsets in
adjacent bits [121].
7.1.2 Related Work:
Multiple architecture-based error correction schemes have been proposed in the past. We dis-
cuss below the details of the most relevant ones. Table 7.1 summarizes their main characteris-
tics and compares with Flexicache and SEC-MAEC.
Error Correction Codes (ECCs) [130] extend each cache line with the collection of several
parity-bits to detect and correct persistent and non-persistent faults. However, ECC requires
very high overhead, requiring storage for correction codes as well as complex and slow en-
coders/decoders.
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Orthogonal Latin Square Code (OLSC) [123] is a state of the art ECC scheme used for
level-1 caches when the supply voltage is lower than the safe margin. We explain the details of
OLSC in Section 7.1.3. Multi-Bit Segmented ECC (MS-ECC) [122] utilizes OLSC at a finer
granularity in order to increase the error correction capability of OLSC to be used for ultra-low
voltage level. Thus MS-ECC can reduce the supply voltage until 350 mV in 35nm technology
by providing 6.5% useful cache capacity (We define useful cache capacity as the portion of the
cache which is not disabled) [124].
Kim, et al. [131], propose two-dimensional (2D) ECC to correct multi-bit errors with a
minimum area overhead in check bits. 2D-ECC calculates and saves the ECC values of the
rows and columns by using a simple ECC scheme such as SECDED (i.e Single Error Correction
Double Error Detection) in order to provide a strong error correction capability for L1 caches.
However, the correction capability of this scheme is strongly dependent upon the location of
defective bits. So that, it is not convenient to use in low-power mode when failures are random.
Also, it requires a read-modify-write operation for all Stores and for every cache miss which
increases the delay and power consumed by all write operations to the level-1 cache.
Miller et al. [124] proposed Parichute which utilizes Turbocodes for reducing Vdd of the
second and higher level caches. Although this scheme provides a very high error correction
rate and supports a significant voltage reduction, its error correction latency can be couple of
cycles (i.e. more than 5 cycles [124]) in the near-threshold voltage level. Thus, Parichute is not
convenient to be used in time-critical L1 caches.
Yoon et al. proposed Memory-Maped ECC in which error correction data is saved in the
memory hierarchy to be accessed in case of an error detection [132]. This scheme is not appli-
cable in the near-threshold voltage execution in which all cache lines present bit failures and
require error correction.
Several disabling schemes have been proposed for tolerating only persistent failures [133,
134, 135]. Wilkerson et al. [133] disables the faulty words in order to combine two consecutive
cache lines to form a single cache line where only non-failing words are used. Although the
area overhead of word-disable in high-power mode is only 8%, in the low power mode the
available cache size shrinks to the half when the error rate is lower than 0.01%. Abella, et
al. [134] disables sub-blocks instead of words in order to utilize more capacity in the low-
power mode. Both disabling schemes need to access a fault map in parallel. Wilkerson et al.
also proposed bit-fix in the same study as an alternative to disabling [133] in which the location
of defective bits are stored in one of the cache ways. However, this scheme can correct up
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to 10 failing bits in a cache line among 4 ways (i.e. bit failure probability is around 0.005).
ZerehCache [135] employs fine granularity re-mapping of faulty bits and relies on solving a
graph coloring problem to find the best re-mapping of defects to spare lines. Bit-fix [133]
stores the location of defective bits and their correct values to the quarter of cache ways. Koh
et al. proposes buddy cache which pairs a faulty cache block with another faulty cache block in
the same set [136]. Trivially, for a 4-way set associative cache, buddy cache in not applicable
when the fault rate is higher than 10−3 since the probability of having a fault in the same bit
position is high.
Besides architectural approaches, circuit-based hardening approaches have also been pro-
posed. Commonly, 6T SRAM cells are used for cache structures. Alternative type of SRAMs
such as 8T [137] or Schmitt-Trigger 10T [138] are also proposed to target low voltages. These
cells are more stable against parameter variations than 6T cells and also they keep strong guar-
anties for reliability. Some existing processors such as Atom [115] uses 8T cells. However,
theses cells present substantially high area (i.e. more than 30%) and energy overhead in the
nominal voltage compared to 6T cells. Maric et al. also proposed combining different cell
types together with ECC in order to balance the area overhead and energy reduction [139]. In
this chapter, our goal is to reduce the energy consumption in te low voltage without increasing
the area and energy overhead in the nominal voltage significantly. Thus, using different cell
types are not convenient for our goal.
7.1.3 Orthogonal Latin Square Codes
OLSC are based on the concept of orthogonal latin squares [123] and can be decoded using
majority voting. An OLSC encodes “orthogonal” groups of bits to form check bits. At de-
coding time, each data bit generates the final value through a voting process from a group of
orthogonally coded data and check bits. Thus, an OLSC does not need to generate a syndrome
but can “correct” errors directly from majority voting. To perform t error corrections in a data
block consisting of m×m bits, an OLSC requires 2×t×m check bits. In Figure 7.2, we present
the H-matrix of an OLS code for an 16-bit data correcting up to 2 bit errors (i.e. m=4, t=2).
The encoder computes each check bit Ci as the XOR over data bits corresponding to
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Figure 7.2: Parity check matrix for the Orthogonal Latin Square Code with k = 16 that can
correct two errors
columns of the H-matrix that have a ‘1’ , such that;
c0 = d0 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2 ⊕ d3
c1 = d4 ⊕ d5 ⊕ d6 ⊕ d7
...
c15 = d3 ⊕ d5 ⊕ d8 ⊕ d14
Each row in the H-matrix has exactly m bits of ‘1’s. Thus the calculation for each check bit
requires an m-input XOR operation with the critical path being ceil(log2(m)) levels of 2-input
XOR gates.
The decoder decides the correct value of di via (2t+1)-input majority voter. One input of
the voter is the received d ′i itself, the other 2t are derived from check bits that contain di as its
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Figure 7.3: OLSC 1-bit Encoder and Decoder
encoding variable, such that;
d ′0 = Ma jori t y (d0,
(c0 ⊕ d1 ⊕ d2 ⊕ d3),
(c4 ⊕ d4 ⊕ d8 ⊕ d12),
(c8 ⊕ d5 ⊕ d10 ⊕ d15),
(c12 ⊕ d6 ⊕ d11 ⊕ d13))
The critical path for the decoder is ceil(log2(m)) levels of 2-input XOR plus (2t+1)-input
majority function. Figure 7.3 presents the circuit logic for encoding and decoding single bit
in an OLS code for an 16-bit data correcting up to 2 bit errors. We implemented the majority
voter with 5 inputs required by the defined OLSC in a way that if any of the three inputs are 1,
the result becomes 1, otherwise 0. In this design, while the critical path of the encoder consists
of 2XORs, it consists of 2XORs+2ANDs+4ORs for the decoder.
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7.2 Utilizin SEC-MEAC for Operating Below Safe Vdd
For Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) utilized in L1 caches, decoding latency is a key parameter
since L1 is a time-critical component during the execution. Recently Reviriego et al. [9] have
proposed Single Error Correction, Multiple Adjacent Error Correction (SEC-MAEC) codes
whose encoders and decoders are very energy efficient and fast. These codes can correct single
bit errors and also multiple bit errors as long as they affect adjacent bits. This is useful to
correct multiple bit errors caused when a radiation particle hits the circuit. We argue that they
are also potentially attractive to use in the high-fault rate below safe voltage operation, which
also produces multiple bit errors. Additionally, the low decoding latency makes these codes
attractive to protect L1 caches. Thus, in this chapter, we investigate using SEC-MEAC codes
for scaling Vdd . In this section, we first explain the principles of SEC-MAEC. Then we present
the architectural design of a L1 cache which utilizes SEC-MAEC under low Vdd .
7.2.1 Background of SEC-MAEC
In this subsection, we explain the principles of the SEC-MAEC code.
Figure 7.4 shows the encoder and decoder of proposed SEC-MAEC codes. The SEC-
MAEC code with the ability of correcting s adjacent multiple errors in a data block consisting
of k bits {d0, d1, d2, ..., dk} generates k parity bits {p0, p1, p2, ..., pk}. In Figure 7.4, we illustrate
the encoder and decoder of a SEC-MAEC code where s=2 and k=8. Depending on the size of
the data block, the maximum value of s can be 2 (k = 8), 5 (k = 16), 10 (k = 32) and so on.
The encoder of the SEC-MAEC code computes parity check bits with the following equa-
tion:
pi = di ⊕ dmod(i−s,k) (7.1)
As it can be seen, the encode operation is accomplished for all bits in parallel, in one gate
level. For instance, even single parity bit calculation in which all data bits are XORed, and
only odd number of errors can be detected without correcting them, requires at least log2k gate
levels.
For a codeword (faulty or not) consisting of k data bits and k parity bits, SEC-MAEC
decodes it in two stages: 1) SEC-MAEC generates k bit syndrome bits {s0, s1, s2, ..., sk}, 2) it
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Figure 7.4: Encoder and Decoder of the SEC-MAEC code
calculates d ′, the corrected data after the decoding. Syndrome bits are calculated as:
si = pi ⊕ di ⊕ dmod(i−s,k) (7.2)
Briefly, syndrome bits detect whether there is an error in the codeword or not. If all syn-
drome bits are zero, that means that the codeword is error free. After the syndrome bits, the
correct data d ′ is also computed with the following equation:
d ′i = (si ∩ smod(i+s,k))⊕ di (7.3)
The decoding logic of SEC-MAEC code is also quite simple and fast. More precisely,
each correct d ′ bit is obtained with 4 gates (i.e. 3 XOR gates and 1 AND gate), and all bits
can be calculated in parallel. Therefore, SEC-MAEC provides error correction with fast and
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Figure 7.5: High-level overview of the architecture
area efficient encoders and decoders which makes it appealing to be used for low-power mode
executions in the cache.
7.2.2 Architecture of Utilizing SEC-MAEC
In this subsection, we explain the architectural design of the first level caches which utilize
SEC-MAEC for saving energy in the low-performance mode in which Vdd is reduced.
ECC schemes used for near-threshold voltages require a high number of parity bits (e.g
100% area overhead) in order to increase the error correction capability. However, this high
area overhead does not present any benefit in the high-performance mode in which failure
rate is very low. Thus, adaptive and variation-aware ECC-based schemes selectively enables
protection for only the faulty cache lines in the low-power execution mode [122, 124]. In
Figure 7.5, we present the high-level overview of the cache architecture protected by an ECC.
All writes to the faulty cache lines go through encoder while reading from faulty cache lines go
through the decoder. Also, for lines requiring no protection, encoding/decoding is bypassed,
which reduces access latency and the area overhead.
In order to enable the protection for the faulty lines dynamically, the hardware should have
the ability of determining the faulty lines. Failures due to voltage variation do not present a
dynamic behaviour, and they occur persistently in the given supply-voltage level. Thus, faulty
lines can be detected easily via simple built-in self test (BIST) in postmanufacturing or at boot
time. BIST writes and reads two test patterns to each line: one containing all 0’s and one with
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Figure 7.6: The organization of cache ways for faulty lines and the ECC values
all 1’s, so that, it can determine the relative vulnerability of cache lines in each voltage interval.
After the test, the cache configuration maximizing the capacity at each voltage interval is saved
to some memory location (i.e. ROM or main memory) in the system.
It is not trivial to configure the cache when the supply voltage is lowered. In a naïve ap-
proach, the ecc-protection is disabled entirely in the high-performance mode, and it is enabled
for all lines in the low-power mode after some Vdd level. This method has been utilized by
MS-ECC in L1 cache [122]. However, due to the non-uniform distribution of errors, variation-
aware protection algorithms that consider the relative vulnerability of cache lines are amenable
in order to maximize the useful cache capacity. In this study, we present a variation-aware
algorithm for the SEC-MAEC code when it is utilized in a 4-way L1 cache. In our algorithm,
we inspired by the one utilized for 8-way L2 caches [124] in which higher number of ways in
a cache line presents higher flexibility for the cache organization.
In Figure 7.6, we present an example for the organization of the cache ways for faulty cache
lines and ECC values of the faulty lines. We do not extend fault-free cache ways with ECC so
that in the high-performance mode execution, the entire cache capacity is available (e.g Line-1).
When only one way is faulty in the cache line (Line-2), instead of allocating a fault-free cache
line for ECC, we disable the faulty cache way. In this way, we present the same cache capacity
(e.g. 3 out of 4 ways are utilized) without increasing the access time due to encoding/decoding
logic. When there are 2 faulty cache ways in a line (Line-3), we combine these two ways.
We save the data in one of them and the ECC to the other one. So that we can still provide 3
useful cache ways out of 4 ways. When there are 3 faulty-ways in a line (Line-4), we combine
two of them and disable the third one. When all the ways are faulty (Line-5), we save data to
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Figure 7.7: Direct mapping between the data and ECC partitions
two of them and ECC values to the other two. Finally, when the supply voltage is very low
as in near-threshold execution, there can be a cache way which has more errors than it can be
corrected by the utilized ECC scheme (Line-6). In this case, we disable this cache way as well.
In order to accomplish this cache organization, we need to save two information for each cache
way: 1) is it fault-free, faulty-data, faulty-ecc or disabled (2 bits) 2) if it is faulty, the address of
the pair cache way for the ECC or data (2 bits). Thus, this cache organization presents 16-bit
(4-bit in a 4-way cache) area overhead per a cache line which is a negligible overhead for 2Kb
cache lines (512-bit per way). Also, it is possible to save this information in the tag area of the
cache.
The second question for the SEC-MAEC usage in the L1 cache is the organization of the
data-blocks. We use the SEC-MAEC with the configuration that k=8 meaning that the size of
the data block is 8 bits. In order to apply it, we divide the cache lines into partitions consisting
of 8 bits (i.e. 64 partitions in a 64B cache line). We also divide the ECC way into partitions
with the same size (64 8-bit partitions) and combine the data partitions with the ECC partitions
in the same order. We present this direct mapping in Figure 7.7.
For the 8-bit data sizes, when s=2, SEC-MAEC can correct two adjacent bit failures. Sim-
ilarly, when s=3 it can correct 2 failures that are 1-bit far from each other. Thus, due to the
random distribution of failures, some lines can be corrected with s=3 although they can not be
corrected when s=2 or vice versa. In order to take advantage of both configurations for differ-
ent lines, we decide s parameter dynamically during the BIST for each cache way. In order to
accomplish this dynamic decision, we extend each cache-way with a single bit determining s
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(a) DVM (Flexicache) (b) TVM (Flexicache)
Figure 7.8: The figure presents the basics Flexicache for DVM (Figure.7.8(a)) and TVM (Fig-
ure.7.8(b)) for 8-bit partitions.
parameter used (s=2 or s=3).
In a cache way, when the Vdd is in the middle-low level (i.e. lower than the safe margin but
higher than the near-threshold level), since the bit failure rate is not drastically low, there could
be several error-free partitions in a faulty cache way. One can think applying the optimization
of extending only the faulty partitions with ECC values in order to reduce the ECC overhead.
For instance if k of 64 partitions are faulty, parity bits for only those k partitions are calculated
and saved. However, in this case, the ECC partitions need to include the address of the data
partition that they are combined with. This addressing requires 8 additional bits (e.g. addressing
64 partitions in 4 ways) for each ECC partition which diminishes the benefit of ECC. Thus, in
this study we avoid this optimization and we utilize direct mapping between the ECC and data
values.
7.3 Flexicache: Circuit-Driven Replication
In this section, we present Flexicache. Flexicache is a novel, reliable cache design which
configures itself for different supply voltages from the nominal to the near threshold voltage
levels in order to duplicate or triplicate each data line when higher reliability is required. First,
we show the architecture design of Flexicache. Then we present the circuit design of Flexicache
by showing the details of sub-array and address decoder.
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7.3.1 Architecture of Flexicache
Flexicache is designed for SRAM caches, which are resilient to several failures. Flexicache
allows three modes of error protection according to the resilience level of the applied Vdd :
Single Version Mode (SVM), Double Version Mode (DVM) and Triple Version Mode (TVM).
Flexicache divides each cache line into parity-protected-partitions akin to many commercial L1
caches protected by single-bit parity in block, word or byte granularity [140].
Figure 7.8 presents the design of DVM and TVM for a hypothetical 8-bit partition. SVM,
which is not presented in the figure, provides reliability solely based on single bit interleaved
parity. Note that in a bit interleaved cache, multiple data words are stored in an interleaved fash-
ion along a single physical row of the cell array. In this way, physically-contiguous multi-bit
errors affect logically different data word and parity protection can detect these multi-bit errors
as if they are single bit errors. In this study, Flexicache runs in SVM in the nominal voltage
when the failure rate is minimum in order to provide full cache capacity for the applications.
Note that instead of parity, a stronger Single Error Correction Double Error Detection Code
can also be utilized to provide a higher reliability for mission critical applications.
Flexicache runs in DVM when the Vdd is medium-low and writes the data to two cache
lines. Note that the circuit design allows writing/reading multiple lines simultaneously (i.e.
without increasing the access time) as we explain in the following section. In a read, DVM
compares two duplicated, parity-protected partitions through the XORs to check if there is any
fault. In case of the complete match, Flexicache dispatches one of the partitions to the output
buffer. Otherwise, Flexicache calculates the parity of each partition and sends out the non-
faulty partition which has the correct parity. DVM provides a backup copy for each partition.
For instance, when a particle strike effects several adjacent bits in a line, the correct value
is read from its replica without requiring any decode-and-correct time. In order to avoid the
possibility of a strike affecting both coupled lines, Flexicache couples the lines with spatially
distant locations. (e.g 0th and 63th lines.)
When the Vdd is near threshold, in order to tolerate the drastically increased error rate,
Flexicache runs in TVM by writing the data to three cache lines simultaneously. On a read,
Flexicache uses bitwise majority voting to obtain the correct data and calculates the parity of the
data. Unless parity confirms that the result is correct, Flexicache calculates the parities of three
partitions and sends out the correct partition. In TVM, the whole cache should be divided into
three which is not trivial for a cache having 2n lines. One solution can be manually connecting
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(a) DVM (b) TVM
Figure 7.9: Examples for correctable and non-correctable faults
lines by taking into account that the lines in the same group should be in distinct positions
(e.g. 0th, 42th and 84th lines for a 128-line cache). However, this considerably increases the
complexity of the address decoder. Instead, we add spare lines to make the cache dividable
into three. For instance, for a 128-line cache, we add 16 spare lines and we connect every 48
lines.Note that using spare lines for tolerating yield loss is a common approach [135, 141] and,
the area overhead due to extra lines is similar to this approach.
DVM can correct odd number of errors if they effect only one copy of the data (Fig-
ure 7.9(a)). However, if the faults are in different copies of the data, DVM can only detect
the bit-positions of the faults without correcting them. Similarly, if there is even number of
faults in one partition DVM cannot correct them, either. TVM (Figure 7.9(b)), on the other
hand, can correct errors easily unless they are affecting the bits in the same position (it has
a significant possibility in very high bit failure rate). Otherwise, after calculating the parity,
TVM detects that the result of majority voter is not correct, and it can correct errors if one of
the three copies is error-free. If all three copies are erroneous, and some errors are in the same
122
Chapter 7. Energy Reduction in Memory Structures
Figure 7.10: The figure shows 1-bit decoder when Flexicache works in TVM. Note that parity
bit calculators are for per partition not per bit.
bit position, TVM can not correct the partition.
In Figure 7.10, we show the circuit design for decoding one bit when Flexicache is in
TVM. In TVM each partition is protected by parity and these parities are majority voted as
well. Thus, for each partition, there should be 4 parity calculation units. Also, one of them
should wait until the result of the majority voter is produced while other three can be calculated
earlier. The correct result is decided according to the parity check and the stored bits.
When there is an uncorrectable partition in a line, we utilize a partition-fix mechanism in
DVM and TVM to avoid wasting the correct partitions. Partition-fix is similar to the bit-fix
proposed by Wilkerson et al [133]. It uses a quarter of the cache ways to store locations and
the correct values of defective partitions. This reduces both the cache size and associativity in
the low-power mode. Thus, we utilize partition-fix mechanism only for the lines which have
uncorrectable partitions. Note that, our partition-fix mechanism is different from the bit-fix
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for a non-persistent bit failure correction. In bit-fix, the cache lines are not protected by any
other means, they only rely on memory tests and fixing the detected failures. In Flexicache,
the fixed partitions are also protected by DVM or TVM which can still correct non-persistent
failures. Previous triplication schemes [126, 127] write data to three cache lines and read the
correct value from the majority voter. In Flexicache, partitioning and parity protection of each
partition present higher error correction capability.
Persistent-fault tolerating proposals perform BIST [18] either postmanufacturing or at boot
time to determine the uncorrectable cache lines at each voltage level [124, 133, 134]. These
lines are stored in on-chip ROM or main memory and loaded before the processor transitions
into near-threshold. For non-persistent failures, if the system can not correct a fault in L1
cache, either the correct value is re-fetched from L2 cache if the write-through cache is utilized
or the system issues a machine check exception unless other means are utilized. Flexicache
performs BIST test as in previous proposals to determine faulty partitions in order to fix them
or disable the cache ways/lines including them. In runtime, Flexicache can detect and correct
non-persistent failures, as well. For uncorrected non-persistent failures, Flexicache can utilize
lightweight, global checkpointing such as SafetyNet [142].
7.3.2 Circuit Design
Conventional triplication schemes either write three lines sequentially [127] or increases the
number of read/write ports [126]. While sequential writes harm application performance,
increasing the number of ports increases the energy consumption.
Previously, Seyedi et al. designed dvSRAM which includes two values in each cell, pri-
mary value and secondary value [143]. These two values can be accessed, modified, moved
back and forth between the main and secondary cells within the access time of the cache. Sim-
ilarly, Flexicache needs to access replicated data within the cache access time with minimum
energy. Armejach et al [144] present how a reconfigurable cache using dvSRAM circuits can be
designed so that it can dynamically switch its configuration between a 64KB general purpose
data cache and a 32KB special purpose, dual version using data cache. Flexicache also requires
a reconfigurable cache design so that it can provide three different execution modes (i.e. SVM,
DVM, TVM) not to sacrifice the cache capacity in the high-performance execution mode.
In this section, we elaborate how we can design the circuit of Flexicache for L1 data cache
so that it can replicate cache lines without increasing access latency and with minimal energy
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Figure 7.11: Block Diagram of a Bank in a 64KB, 4-way Flexicache.
overhead. Note that it is straightforward to extend the design for the instruction cache and the
L2 cache. Flexicache can also be designed orthogonally to dvSRAM so that it can support both
optimistic concurrency and near-threshold voltage execution that we leave it out of the scope
of this study.
Block Diagram
In this section we present the design of Flexicache for 4-way, 64-KB data cache with 64-byte
cache lines, and two clock cycle access time. Figure 7.11 presents the block diagram of one of
4 ways. We use the 45-nm Predictive Technology Model [145] with 1V supply voltage. We use
Cacti [146] to determine the optimal number and size of Flexicache components (e.g. number
of sub-banks) and the cache architecture with optimal access time and power consumption.
For a one-bank array, Cacti suggests 2 identical sub-banks, 1 mat for each sub-bank and 4
sub-arrays in each mat (Figure 7.11). We utilize these high-level CACTI results as inputs to
subsequent cache circuit design steps: we construct for one way Hspice transistor level netlist
using 45-nm Predictive Technology Model [145]. During an access, only one of the two sub-
banks (i.e. left sub-bank and right sub-bank) and four identical sub-arrays of the mat (i.e. each
sub-array holds a part of the cache line) are activated. The address decoder and control signal
generator units are placed in the middle part of the array. Necessary data and address wires and
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drivers are placed in the middle part of each sub-bank. Flexicache divides each sub-array to
eight equal slices (i.e sub-array slice) each containing 16 lines with the individual precharged
circuit, the write circuit, the sense amplifier circuit and input and output buffers. (64KB = 4
bank×8 sub-bank/bank×8 slice/sub-bank×16 lines/slice×128 bits/lines). Also, it extends each
sub-array with an extra slice (i.e. to make it divisible by 3).
128+16 word-line addresses and 13 control signals are generated in the middle part of
the array while 512 data-in/data-out bits are routed from the up side of the sub-bank. The
necessary optimized drivers (chain of two series inverters) are in paths, and they can reach their
related loads in the sub-arrays. We place necessary control signal unit circuits in the middle of
Flexicache which generate suitable enable signals according to the Vdd level. The enablers and
control signals activate the pertinent parts of sub-arrays while inactivating others. They also
select the buffers which should be activated to transfer the appropriate data to the output.
Details of Sub-array
Figure 7.12 presents the abstract view of the block diagram of one sub-array in Flexicache.
According to the decoded addresses and the Vdd level, one, two or three slice(s) are activated
and the data coming from the bus is written to the enabled slice(s). Cosemans et al. [147]
evaluated the energy consumption of the cache elements during read or write operations in a
design based on 90nm technology. For instance, during the read operation, timing components
(including delay elements and control wires) is the most energy consuming element (i.e. 30%).
Similarly, address decoder consumes around 25% of the read/write energy. Since Flexicache
still uses the most of the energy-hungry components (e.g. buses, data drivers and the address
decoder) only once in DVM and TVM, it slightly increases the energy consumption of timing
elements and the address decoder. On the other side, Flexicache only duplicates (triplicates)
the energy consumption of cells and sense amplifiers which consumes less than 15% of the
read/write energy. Thus, Flexicache presents modest additional energy consumption in DVM
and TVM for reading and writing multiple cache lines. Note that in reading energy, we place
XORs and majority voters close to the cells so that the corrected data can go through single bus
without duplicating/triplicating the bus energy.
Figure 7.13 shows the block diagram of each sub-array structure in detail. The figure
presents the necessary buffers, comparators, parity calculators and control and data lines in
detail. For writing the selected cache line in SVM, signal IEU1 is high and activates input
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Figure 7.12: The figure presents the basic components of Flexicache such as buses and decoder
buffers IB1 and IB2 and data can transfer to the selected cache-line via Bus4 and Bus1; and
similarly for reading the selected line, signal OEU1 is high and output buffers OB6 and OB13
are active and data is transferred from Bus1 to Bus3. Bus3 (Bus4) is connected to output data
drivers (input data drivers) which are located close to each sub-array. At each access time,
the enabler signals (CDE and CTE) are high and activate connector buffers, CD1, CD2, CD3,
CD4, CT1 and CT2 and connect nodes B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 to each other (Each connector
buffer contains two series inverters with enablers). Similar to many typical L1 caches error
protection is based on bit-parity calculation in order to achieve high performance. We divide
each cache-line into 8 partitions each contains 16 bits where each interleaved parity protects
one partition. At each reading time parity bit calculated and compared with the original parity
bit.
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Figure 7.13: Address Decoder and Sub-Array in Flexicache
For writing in DVM, signal IEU1 is high and data is transferred from Bus4 to Bus1 via IB1
and IB2 and is written to two selected lines at the same time. Parity calculator circuits generate
parity bits and write them in parity bit cells as well. For reading the two selected lines, signals
CTE is high and CDE is low, connector buffers, CD1, CD2, CD3 and CD4 disconnect B1
with B2 and also B3 with B4 while connector buffers, CT1 and CT2 connect B2 with B3 and
also B4 with B5. With this method, Bus1 is divided into two parts; sub-array slices 0,1,2,6 are
connected to the first part and sub-array slices 3, 4, 5, 7 are connected to the second part. Signal
OED1 is high; output buffers OB1 and OB2 transfer two selected data to the XOR circuit to
check the cell contents are identical. Signal EN10 activates two parity calculator circuits to
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calculate parity bits of selected lines. Then the result of these parity calculator circuits are
compared with the original parity bits of each selected-lines. These two comparators generate
two enable signals EN11 and EN12. Whenever one of comparator shows equality (when EN11
or EN12 is high), the related output buffer transfers its data to Bus3. If two compared data are
equal, signal EN10 is low and output buffer OB7 transfers data to BUS3.
In TVM, for writing the selected cache-lines signal IEU1 is high and data is transferred
from Bus4 to Bus1 via IB1 and IB2 and written in three selected lines simultaneously. Similar
to SVM and DVM, signals CDE and CTE are high to connect separated Bus1 nodes with each
other. At the reading time, CTE is low and CDE is high so Bus1 is divided into three parts;
sub-array slices 0, 1, 2 are connected to the first part and sub-array slices 6, 4, 5 are connected
to the second part and sub-array slices 3, 7 and extra slice are connected to the third part.
CT1 and CT2 circuits disconnect B2 with B3 and B4 with B5. For reading the three selected
lines, each from separate sub-array slice group, signal OET1 is high, OB3, OB4 and OB5 are
active and data including parities are transferred to a majority voter (the correct value is decided
by bit-wise majority voter). The majority voter output for cache-lines is DataM and for their
parity-bits is ParityM. Then, the parity calculator circuit calculates the parity bits of DataM.
Later one comparator circuit compares these results (the parity bits of DataM) with ParityM.
If there are any differences, signal En13 will be high and the parity bits of selected lines are
calculated and compared with their original parity bits. Whenever one of parity comparators
shows equality, En14, En15 or En16 is high, the related output buffer (OB10, OB11 or OB12)
is active and transfers data to Bus3. If signal En13 is low, DataM is transferred to Bus3 via
OB9.
Address Decoder
Figure 7.14 presents an abstract view of the address decoder. In the figure, A0 to A7 represents
the addresses bits. The decoder uses the 4 least significant bits (i.e A0 to A3) in order to address
the line number within a slice. Also, it uses A7 to activate either the left sub-bank or the right
sub-bank. Voltage Level Detector activates either SVM, DVM or TVM. These three signals
together with A4 to A6 generates enable signals (EN0 to ENex) which activate slice(s). At each
time, depending on the mode, one, two or three Enable Signals are high and data is written to
(and read from) one two or three cache lines simultaneously.
The details of address decoder are present in Figure 7.15. Voltage level detector circuit
129
Chapter 7. Energy Reduction in Memory Structures
Figure 7.14: Abstract view of the address decoder of Flexicache
generates four output signals V1, V2, V3 and V4 according to the supply voltage, Vdd ; if V1 is
high, the cache is in SVM and only one word-line address is activated at each access time; if V2
is high, the cache will be in DVM and two word-line addresses will be activated at each access
time; if V3 is high, the cache will be in TVM and three word-line addresses will be activated at
each access time; if V4 is high, the supply voltage level is lower than the threshold voltages and
the memory cells operate in sub-threshold mode which is beyond our work in this paper and
we leave it for future; so the cache-lines will be deactivated in this state. Pre-decoder 2, control
signal generator unit 2 and control signal generator unit 3 and control signal generator unit 4
generate enabler signals, En1, En2 . . . and En9 to activate 144 word-line addresses. There are
two groups of buffers located in the right and left side of the pre-decoder 1. Each buffers group
contains 9 sub-groups, and each sub-group has 16 buffers. The outputs of pre-decoder 1 are
connected to the buffers of each sub-group and generated 144 word-line addresses. All buffers
of each sub-group are activated with one enabler signal. For example all buffers of sub-group 1
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Figure 7.15: Necessary decoders and control signal generators
are enabled by signal En1. When partial address 0 and En1 are high, WL0 will be generated. In
this way, all word-line addresses from 0 to 143 are generated. If A7 is high, the left part of each
cache way is activated; similarly, If A7 is low, the right part of each cache way is activated.
At each access time, depending on the mode, one, two or three Enable signals are high and
data is written to (read from) one, two or three cache-lines simultaneously. For example in
DVM, WL0 and WL48 are activated simultaneously; whenever one of the addresses 0 or 48
are activated, X1 or X4 are high and Vn1 is high so En1 and En4 are high. En1 and En4 are
enablers for buffers and let partial address 0 pass and generates WL0 and WL48.
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Figure 7.16: Slices activated at a time in DVM and TVM
Switching Between Modes
The Vdd can be increased or decreased in the runtime, thus, Flexicache needs to switch between
modes. In a naïve approach, before mode switching, the whole cache is flushed which presents
a cache warm-up performance overhead immediately after switch. In this section, we present
a more efficient approach. We organized the activated slices in each mode in order to ease
the switching. In Figure 7.16, we present the activated slices at a time during the read/write
operation of DVM and TVM.
In order to switch TVM→DVM→SVM, it is adequate to flush the slices in the last column
of the old mode in the tables shown in Figure 7.16. In another word, when Flexicache switches
from DVM to SVM, slices 3, 4, 5 and 7 are flushed from the cache. Similarly, when Flexi-
cache switches from TVM to DVM, slices 6, 7 and Extra slice are flushed. Also, if Flexicache
switches from TVM to SVM (although many systems do not allow this fast voltage increase),
combination of both columns (i.e. slices 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Ex) are flushed. Obviously, before this
flushing operation, the slices which are not flushed (i.e staying slices) should be corrected with
the old mode. One option can be stopping the execution of the application right after the volt-
age increase, using the to-be-flushed lines for correcting the staying lines by utilizing the old
mode and continuing the application execution after all staying lines are corrected. In the sec-
ond option, in order to avoid this stopping overhead, all staying lines are traced after changing
the mode. When a line is read for the first time after the mode change (or a dirty line is evicted
from the cache), this line is corrected by using the old mode. The second or the third replica of
the line can be flushed after this correction. If a line is written without reading after changing
the mode, the flushing can be done without requiring any correction.
However switching SVM→DVM→TVM is not that trivial since the correct data should be
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updated in the second or third replica before reducing the supply voltage. Thus, for instance,
when Flexicache switches from DVM to TVM, before reducing the supply voltage, lines in
the slices 6, 7 and Ex are first evicted from the cache. Then, these lines are updated as the
third copy. As an example, lines in slice 6 should be updated by reading the lines in slices
0 and 3 and obtaining the correct data via DVM circuit. It is only safe to reduce the supply
voltage after that. Although switching SVM→DVM→TVM present the performance overhead
of a runtime barrier for updating the second or third copies, it is not a show-stopper since this
switch operation is required when going towards low-power mode from the high-performance
mode meaning that the application can trade off the performance for power.
7.4 Evaluation
7.4.1 Evaluation of Utilizing SEC-MAEC
In this subsection, we evaluate how much energy reduction in L1 caches can be provided by
SEC-MAEC code. We compare SEC-MAEC with Orthogonal Latin Square Code (OLSC)
which is the state of the art, multi-bit correcting ECC used for the voltage scaling in L1
caches [123]. The complexity of OLSC scales well with the number of error corrections, thus,
Chishti et al. [122] use OLSC for L1 caches. We utilized the OLSC code with a block size of
16 with the error correction capability of up to 2 failures in a block. Note that OLSC block size
is optimized for the block size of m2, and its encoder/decoder complexity increases when the
larger blocks are used. Thus, we choose the best combination for OLSC.
We analyse 1) useful cache capacity, 2) error correction latency, 3) area overhead and 3)
energy minimization. We calculate the useful cache capacity as the ratio of the portion of the
cache which can be used reliably (i.e. the lines which are not disabled after the memory test at
the boot time). We use fault injection methodology to measure the cache capacity under the bit
failure rates (i.e. probability of a bit fails). We repeat each fault injection experiment 100 times
for each failure rate.
In Figure 7.17, we compare the useful cache capacity provided by SEC-MAEC and OLS
codes versus the bit failure rate. In order to present the benefits provided by cache-way-
organization and dynamic-s-decision separately, we show two configurations of SEC-MAEC
in the figure. SEC-MAEC (s=2) presents the benefit of cache-way organization on useful cache
capacity. SEC-MAEC (s=2/s=3) presents the benefit of dynamic decision of s-parameter on
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Figure 7.17: Useful Cache Capacity
top of cache-way organization. Both SEC-MAEC and OLSC provide similar cache capacity
when the Vdd is close to the safe operating margin (i.e higher than 550mV). When the Vdd is
middle low (i.e. between 550mV-430mV), SEC-MAEC extends some of the cache ways with
ECC protection. On the other hand, OLSC does not activate the ECC protection for any cache
way when the Vdd is higher than a threshold value. Note that, this threshold value should be
determined as the Vdd level in which provided useful cache capacity without ECC protection
is around 50%. Thus, when Vdd is middle low, SEC-MAEC presents higher cache capacity
due to its cache organization in the architecture. In the near-threshold voltage execution (lower
than 450 mV), while the cache capacity provided by SEC-MAEC (s=2) is lower than OLSC,
SEC-MAEC (s=2/s=3) presents a high cache capacity similar to OLSC.
In Table 7.3, we compare the area overhead and the latency presented by encoders and
decoders in SEC-MAEC and OLSC. We first present the number of gates in the critical paths.
SEC-MAEC has nearly half number of gates in the critical path compared to OLSC both for
the encoder and decoder. This also affects the time spent in the encoder and the decoder,
thus, the latencies of SEC-MAEC are much less than OLSC. Note that in this study, we only
target correcting Vdd dependent, persistent failures, and soft errors are an orthogonal issue. We
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SEC-MAEC OLSC
Encoder Decoder Encoder Decoder
Number of 1 XOR 3 XORs 2 XORS 2 XORs
Gates in the + 1 AND + 2 ANDs
Critical Path + 4 ORs
Total Number 512 XORs 1,5K XORs 1,5K XORs 6K XORs
of Gates + 512 ANDs + 10K ANDs
+ 4,5K ORs
Latency 39 ps 182 ps 78 ps 324 ps
Table 7.2: Number of Gates in Encoder and Decoder for a 64B cache lines
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Figure 7.18: Encode/Decode Energy Normalized to the energy of the encoder/decoder of OLSC
at 1V
assume that the memory structure is protected for soft errors by any other additional means
such as parity or Single Error Correction Double Error Detection (SECDED) Code. The area
overhead of parity/SECDED bits is relatively low, and they can be saved to the tag area of the
cache. Obviously, when the Vdd is below the safe margin, the decoder of parity/SECDED can
be activated after persistent failures are corrected. Nevertheless, the low latency of the decoder
of SEC-MAEC codes leaves additional time for the decoder of soft error protection.
Similarly, the area overhead of the encoder and the decoder in SEC-MAEC is significantly
smaller than the one in OLSC. While the encoder of SEC-MAEC is only one-third of the
encoder of OLSC, the decoder is in the size of 10% of the one in OLSC. This saving in the area
overhead is proportional with the static energy consumed by the encoders and the decoder. We
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also compare the dynamic energies of the encoders and decoders in each supply voltage level
in Figure 7.18. In the figure, we normalize energies to OLSC. Obviously, SEC-MEAC presents
substantially less energy consumption for both encoder and decoder.
7.4.2 Evaluation of Flexicache
In this section, we compare Flexicache against a conventional triplication scheme (TMR) and
MS-ECC [122]. Note that MS-ECC utilizes OLSC that we explain the details of it in Sec-
tion.7.1.3. We use 4-way set associative, 64KB L1 cache with 2-cycle access time, 64B line
size. We divide each line into 32 partitions for both OLSC and Flexicache with the partition size
of 16 bits. For the design of Flexicache, we use the 45-nm Predictive Technology Model [145]
with 1V supply voltage. We use Cacti [146] to determine the optimal number and size of Flex-
icache components (e.g. number of sub-banks) and the cache architecture with optimal access
time and power consumption. For a one-bank array, Cacti suggests 2 identical sub-banks, 1
mat for each sub-bank and 4 sub-arrays in each mat. We utilize these high-level CACTI results
as inputs to subsequent cache circuit design steps: we construct for one way Hspice transistor
level netlist using 45-nm Predictive Technology Model [145].
Flexicache targets to tolerate ultra high bit failure rates occurring in the near-threshold
voltage level without harming the performance of the cache in the low error rate. For the
calculation of the Vdd that Flexicache operate reliably, we inject persistent faults into random
locations according to bit failure rate (i.e. probability that a single bit fails) given in [124].
We calculate the useful cache capacity as the portion of the cache which is not disabled. For
non-persistent failure such as soft errors, we inject multi-bit failures varying between 1 to
10 bits. We present the experimental results for the aspects of 1) useful cache capacity, 2)
error correction latency, 3) energy reduction of cache operations, and 4) reliability against non-
persistent faults (mean time to failure) and 5) uniform view of the cache. 6) area overhead,
Useful Cache Capacity
Figure 7.19 compares the cache capacities. We extend Flexicache with extra slices in order to
make it divisible to three, and we normalized the useful cache capacity to the non-extended
capacity for fair comparison. First, when the Vdd is high, Flexicache do not sacrifice the useful
cache capacity due to its flexible circuit design which dynamically switch its configuration to
64KB general purpose data cache (i.e. SVM) in the high-performance mode. Second, due to
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Figure 7.19: Useful capacity after disabling uncorrectable lines.
the partitioning and partition-fix mechanism of Flexicache, it provides higher cache capacity
than the conventional triplication schemes even in the low-power mode. Third, Flexicache can
operate until the persistent bit failure rate is 12% while TMR can operate until 6% bit failure
rate and MS-ECC can operate until 2% bit failure rate (Bit failure rates are not shown in the
graph). Therefore, TMR and MS-ECC can provide more than 20% of the cache capacity when
the supply voltage is as low as 400mV while Flexicache can provide the similar amount of
useful cache capacity when the supply voltage is 320mV.
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Flexicache MS-ECC
Encoder Decoder Encoder Decoder
Number of Gates in 4 XORs 7 XORs + 2 XORS 2 XORs +
the Critical Path 2 ANDs + 2 ANDs +
2 ORs 4 ORs
Total Number 480 XORs 3K XORs + 1,5K XORs 6K XORs +
of Gates 1,5K ORs + 4,5K ORs +
3,5K ANDs 10K ANDs
Latency 1 cycle 1 cycle 1 cycle 1 cycle
Energy Overhead 2,5% 20% 5,5% 50%
(In the nominal voltage)
Area Overhead 0.06% 0.12%
(Encoder+Decoder)
Table 7.3: The table analysis the area overhead and latency.
Latency
In Table 7.3, we compare the area overhead and the latency presented by encoders and decoders
in Flexicache and OLSC. We first present the number of gates in the critical paths. Although,
in Flexicache, the number of gates in the critical path are higher than the one in MS-ECC, both
encoding and decoding in each scheme can be accomplished in 1 cycle. Note that the decoding
latency can be tolerated since decoding is done simultaneously with writing. On the other hand,
total number of gates in the encoder and decoder of MS-ECC is much higher than the one in
Flexicache which presents higher overhead in both read/write energies (4th line in the table)
and area (5th line in the table). Both Flexicache and MS-ECC require changes in the address
decoder of the cache to be able to write more than one line simultaneously. The overhead of
these address decoders are similar in both schemes.
Energy Reduction
Figure 7.20 presents the energy consumption of cache operations (i.e. read/write energy and
static energy). For read and write energies, TMR allocates three cache ways in a non-modified
cache which triplicates the energy consumption. Similarly MS-ECC allocates two cache ways
(1 for data and the other for parity bits) when the supply voltage is lower than 700 mV, thus
at this point MS-ECC also roughly duplicates reading and writing energies. This is mainly
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(a) Read Energy (b) Write Energy
(c) Static Energy (d) Average Energy
Figure 7.20: Energy reduction in cache operations
because the size of the in/out data is duplicated (or triplicated). Also, the energy consumption
of the OLSC decoder is very high (i.e. 50%). Thus, which diminish the energy saving of scal-
ing voltage for read energy as it can be seen at 600mV when OLSC is activated in MS-ECC
(Figure. 7.20(a) and Figure. 7.20(b)). On the other hand, Flexicache accomplishes replication
and fault recovery within a way without increasing the size of the data in/out bus coming to
the way. Thus, reading and writing energies of Flexicache is much lower than MS-ECC and
triplication. For the static energies (i.e. energy spent in one cycle when the cache is idle),
Flexicache presents slightly higher energy consumption than an unmodified cache mainly due
to the additional extra slices (Figure. 7.20(c)). Note that these additional slices also increase
the cache capacity that we excluded this increased capacity in our previous results. The static
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(a) The percentage of detected errors. (b) The percentage of corrected errors.
Figure 7.21: Non-persistent fault injection
energy consumption of MS-ECC is negligibly higher than a non-modified cache due to OLSC
encoder/decoder. It has been showed that dynamic energies are only the 30% of cache energy
consumptions and among them they are mostly (two out of three) read operations. By consid-
ering that, in Figure 7.20(d), we present the average energy consumption of a cache at a time.
The figure shows that only Flexicache can operate when Vdd is 320 mV by presenting 39%
reduction in the energy consumption compared to non-modified cache when it executes in the
high-performance mode with the minimum safe Vdd (i.e. 700 mV). MS-ECC can reduce the
energy consumption by only 5% compared to the same minimum safe voltage level.
Reliability against Particle Strike
In Figure 7.21(a) and in Figure 7.21(b), we inject non-persistent, multi-bit faults (i.e. size
of the faults are between n=1-10 bits which means n adjacent bits become faulty due to a
particle strike) to the non-disabled cache portion and, we present the fault coverage for error
detection (Figure 7.21(a)) and error correction (Figure 7.21(b)). We define the fault coverage as
the percentage of the injected faults which are detected or corrected. In the high-performance
mode, MS-ECC can not detect or correct non-persistent faults since it does not extend the cache
lines with ECC codes. On the other hand, each cache line is extended with ECC protection in
the low-power mode when the persistent fault rate is very high. At this point, additional multi-
bit non-persistent faults lead the total number of faults in the cache line to be higher than OLSC
can correct. Thus, non-persistent fault correction capability of MS-ECC is around 20% or less.
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Figure 7.22: The figure presents the percent of disabled lines in very-high error rate. Flexicache
presents a uniform cache view until 9% bit failure rate.
Note that error detection capability and error correction capability of MS-ECC are identical
since OLSC intends to produce the correct data without trying to detect if there was a fault
or not. In SVM, Flexicache can not correct faults, but it can detect half of the injected faults
(i.e. when the size of the fault is odd). In DVM, it can correct half of the injected faults since
it uses parity for the error correction while it can detect more than 90% of the injected faults.
TVM can provide more than 90% error correction capability until Vdd is 400mV. When Vdd is
320mV, only TVM can provide useful cache capacity. At this point, it can detect 58% of the
injected non-persistent faults and can correct half of the injected faults. In this study, we switch
from SVM to DVM when the Vdd is 600mV. One can decide to utilize DVM for higher Vdds
for reliability critical applications or systems in faulty environments in order to provide higher
reliability with the cost of useful cache capacity.
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Uniform View of the Cache
Both Flexicahe and MS-ECC disable a whole cache line when none of the 4 ways can be
correctable in the line. However, when a cache line is disabled, the uniformity of the cache is
lost and the system should be notified about it. In Figure 7.22, we present the percentage of the
disabled lines in each scheme according to bit failure rate in the low-power mode. According
to the figure, Flexicache can present a uniform view to the system until the error rate is 9%
since it couples lines instead of ways (i.e. couples horizontally instead of vertically) and thus it
has comparatively more cache ways available for a given line.
Area Overhead
Figure 7.23 shows the layouts of one sub-bank [148] for both Flexicache and typical cache
arrays; the second symmetric sub-bank is omitted. After adding parity bits, parity calculators,
extra slices, XORs, majority voters, buffers and peripheral circuits, Flexicache presents 12%
area overhead compared to the typical cache without any protection. Note that the biggest
portion of this overhead belongs to the extra slices which we add to make the cache dividable
by there, therefore, actually increasing the size of the cache. This layout allows Flexicache
dynamically switch between SVM, DVM and TVM which provides maximum 100%, 50% and
33% useful cache capacity as we presented in Figure 7.19.
7.5 Summary
Although downscaling the supply voltage provides a substantial energy saving in computer sys-
tems, when the Vdd is reduced lower than the safe operation margin, it causes drastic increase
in the number of persistent failures especially in memory structures. Utilizing Error Correct-
ing Codes (ECC) in the memory structures is the most appealing approach to reduce the supply
voltage below the safe operating margin. However, ECC schemes presenting high encoding/de-
coding overhead diminishes the performance of the system. In this chapter, we propose two
approaches to support that level1 cache can operate at the ultra-low voltage level. In the first
approach, we utilize a fast and low-complexity SEC-MAEC code in L1 caches under scaling
supply voltage. We also demonstrate how to organize 4-way cache in the architecture level in
order to maximize the cache capacity. In the second approach, we present Flexicache, a novel,
reliable cache design which configures itself for different supply voltages from the nominal
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Figure 7.23: The figure shows the layout of a sub-bank and address decoder of Flexicache (top)
and a typical cache (down).
to the near threshold voltage levels in order to duplicate or triplicate each data line if higher
reliability is required. Flexicache can continue to operate reliably up to 10% bit failure rate.
Therefore, it alters the possibility to operate in 320 mV. Compared to OLSC [122] and conven-
tional triplication, Flexicache provides a cache with a higher capacity in low power mode with
significantly lower error correction latency and with less energy consumption.
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8
Increasing the Lifetime of NAND Flash
Memories
NAND flash memory has been widely used as a storage medium for many systems such as
laptops, PDAs, and mobile phones because of its high performance, large storage density, non-
volatility and low power consumption. The per-bit cost of NAND flash memory continues to
fall dramatically every year due to aggressive technology scaling and the introduction of multi-
level flash cells. This allows NAND flash to be applicable for even more applications, such as
solid-state disks (SSDs) for personal computers and enterprise servers.
However, the widespread adoption of flash-based storage in performance-intensive applica-
tions has led to concerns regarding the reliability and endurance of the underlying flash mem-
ories. A flash memory cell has limited endurance, i.e. data cannot be reprogrammed into the
cell more than a limited number of times. A single-level flash cell (SLC) can tolerate ∼10k
program/erase (P/E) cycles while a 2-bit multi-level cell (MLC) can only survive for ∼3k P/E
cycles for 30- 40nm (i.e., 3x-nm) technology generations. The available P/E cycles are ex-
pected to decrease even more in the near future as flash cells continue to scale down in size and
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more than 2 bits are programmed per cell. Generally, storage systems have strict requirements
on reliability. For example, the uncorrectable bit error rate during usage should be less than 10-
15 and stored data should be available for 5-10 years [10]. Enterprise-class SSDs are expected
to support at least 10 full disk writes per day for at least five years under fully random data
patterns. Assuming typical write amplification of 2 times (due to additional writes caused by
garbage collection and wear leveling [149]]) and ideal wear-leveling, current MLC flash based
storage will use up all its reliable P/E cycles (e.g., 3000) within 5 months. It is therefore clear
that flash memories cannot satisfy the lifetime requirements for enterprise SSDs, which require
much longer than 5 months of lifetime.
One way to improve flash lifetime is to use stronger error correction codes (ECC) [7].
Stronger ECC detects and corrects raw bit errors that happen over the lifetime of a flash cell,
thereby increasing the number of P/E cycles each cell can tolerate without exposing the raw
bit errors to the user. Unfortunately, stronger ECC has two major shortcomings: (1) high im-
plementation overhead and (2) diminishing returns on flash lifetime improvement. The latter
is because the raw bit error rate increases exponentially with P/E cycles while ECC error cor-
rection capability increases less than linearly, as detailed in later sections. As such, techniques
that tolerate raw bit errors in flash cells without relying on stronger ECC are desirable. In this
paper, we present new techniques that achieve this and thereby allow us to utilize unreliable
flash media in a reliable way at high numbers of P/E cycles.
In this section we propose 2 main schemes to increase the lifetime of flash memories:
• The first scheme is Flash Correct-and-Refresh (FCR) that periodically reads, corrects,
and reprograms or remaps the stored data before it accumulates more retention errors
than that can be handled by the ECC on SSD controller.
• The second scheme is Neighbor-cell Assisted Correction (NAC) in order to mitigate pro-
gramming errors. During the guaranteed lifetime of flash memory, the data is read by
using the global optimum reference voltage and the data is corrected via ECC. When
ECC fails to correct data, NAC is triggered and the data is re-read by using local read
reference voltages which is defined by the data values stored in the neighbor cells.
Flash memories can be equipped with the "bad block management" scheme which maps bad
blocks to additional good blocks in order to increase the lifetime of the flash memory [150].
Both schemes presented in this chapter are orthogonal to the idea of extending flash disks with
additional blocks, so that they increase the lifetime of the disk even further.
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Figure 8.1: Threshold Voltage Distribution of 2-bit MLC Flash
In the next section, we present the background of flash memory operations and faults occur-
ring in flash memories. Than we present Flash Correct-and-Refresh (FCR) and Neighbor-cell
Assisted Correction (NAC) schemes in Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 respectively. We evaluate
FCR and NAC in Section 8.4.
8.1 Flash Memory Background
Floating gate transistor is the atomic storage unit of NAND flash memory. Its threshold voltage
can be modulated by the amount of electrons programmed on the floating gates. NAND flash
memory can be of two types: single level cell (SLC) flash and multi-level cell (MLC) flash.
Only one bit of information can be stored in a SLC flash cell, while multiple bits (e.g. 2-4 bits)
can be stored in a MLC flash cell. For n-bit MLC NAND flash memory, the threshold voltage
range of its transistors is divided into 2n separate regions and each region represents a unique
n-bit value. Figure 8.1 shows 2-bit MLC which is separated 4 regions (i.e. P0, P1, P2, P3)
representing the bit values of 11, 10, 01, 00 respectively. The threshold voltage of a given cell
is mainly affected by the number of electrons trapped on the floating gate. Figure 8.1 shows
the bit mapping to Vth and the relative proportion of electrons on the floating gates of a 2-bit
MLC flash. The bits stored in a 2-bit MLC NAND flash memory cell can be classified into
most significant bit (MSB) and least significant bit (LSB), depending on the location of the bit
inside the bit-string.
A NAND flash memory chip is composed of thousands of blocks. A block consists of a
2-D array of flash cells. Each row of the array forms one wordline and each column forms
one bitline. The address of the wordline increases one by one from bottom to the top. Thus,
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Figure 8.2: All-bit-line NAND flash block architecture
a cell location can be uniquely determined by its wordline and bitline address inside a block.
For all-bit-line NAND flash memory, the MSBs of all the cells on the same wordline can be
programmed and read simultaneously, which forms an MSB page. Similarly, all the LSBs of
the cells on a wordline form one LSB page. Each page has its unique physical address inside a
block and an example of the page address mapping inside a flash block is shown in Figure 8.2.
We can see that the LSB page number on wordline n is 2n-1 while the corresponding MSB
page number is 2n+2 for all-bit-line flash memory. The exceptions are the bottom wordline
(i.e. wordline 0) and top wordline (i.e. wordline N) of a block. The numbers of LSB /MSB
page on bottom and top wordline are 0/2 and (2N-3)/(2N-1) respectively.
The size of each page is generally between 2kB and 8kB (i.e. 16k and 64k bitlines). The
stack of flash cells in the bitline direction forms one string. The string is connected to a bit
line through SGD (the select gate at the drain end) and connect to the common source diffusion
through SGS (the select gate at the source end).
In this section we first explain flash memory operations. Than we present how faults occur
in flash memories.
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Figure 8.3: 2-bit MLC flash programming scheme. Cell states are encoded in format (LSB,
MSB)
8.1.1 Flash Memory Operations
Flash memories generally support three fundamental operations as follows:
Erase Operation
During erase operation, a high positive erase voltage (e.g. 20V) is applied to the substrate of
all the cells of the selected block and the electrons stored on the floating gate are tunnelled
out through Fowler-Nordheim (FN) mechanisms [151]. After a successful erase operation, all
charge on the floating gates is removed and all the cells are configured to P0 (11) state. Erase
operation is at the granularity of one block.
Program Operation
During program operation, a high positive voltage is applied to the wordline, where the page
to be programmed is located. The other pages sharing the same wordline are inhibited (from
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being programmed) by applying 2V to their corresponding bitlines to close SGD and boost the
potential of corresponding string channel. The programming process is typically realized by
incremental step pulse program (ISPP) algorithm [152]. We first provide background on ISPP.
ISPP. Before a flash cell can be programmed, the cell must be erased (i.e., all charge is re-
moved from the floating gate, setting the threshold voltage to the lowest value). When a NAND
flash memory cell is programmed, a high positive voltage applied to the control gate causes
electrons to be injected into the floating gate. The threshold voltage of a NAND flash cell is
programmed by injecting a precise amount of charge onto the floating gate through ISPP [152].
During ISPP, floating gates are programmed iteratively using a step-by-step program-and-verify
approach. After each programming step, the flash cell threshold voltage is boosted up. Then,
the threshold voltage of the programmed cells are sensed and compared to the target values.
If the cell’s threshold voltage level is higher than the target value, the program-and-verify it-
eration will stop. Otherwise the flash cells are programmed once again and more electrons
are added to the floating gates to boost the threshold voltage. This program-and-verify cycle
continues iteratively until all the cells’ threshold voltages reach the target values. Using ISPP
programming, flash memory cells can only be programmed from a state with fewer electrons
to a state with more electrons and cannot be programmed in the opposite direction.
Flash memory is programmed page by page: the MSB page of a wordline is programmed
at a different time from the LSB page of the same wordline. A contemporary two-bit-per-cell
MLC flash cell is programmed to a desired value in two stages, as shown in Figure 8.3. After
an erase operation (applied to the page the cell resides in), the cell starts out at the erased state
(ER). If the LSB of the cell is programmed as 0 (during the programming of the corresponding
LSB page), the flash cell moves into a temporary program state (Temp). Otherwise it remains
in the ER state. During the programming of the corresponding MSB page, if bit value 1 is
programmed into the cell’s MSB, the flash cell either remains in the ER state or moves from
the Temp state into the P2 state. If 0 is programmed into the cell’s MSB, the flash cell moves
either from the ER state to the P1 state or from the Temp state to the P3 state.
In general, flash memory manufacturers recommend that the pages inside a flash block be
programmed sequentially in page number order (0, 1, 2, ...). With this programming policy,
pages in Figure 8.2 would be programmed in the following order: page 0 (LSB of WL 0),
page 1 (LSB of WL 1), page 2 (MSB of WL 0), page 3 (LSB of WL 2), page 4 (MSB of WL
1), and so on. This is called in-page-order programming. On the other hand, a flash block
can be programmed without following this recommendation, a method called out-of-pageorder
150
Chapter 8. Increasing the Lifetime of NAND Flash Memories
programming. This increases the flexibility in programming flash. This method can have many
variants. For example, pages in a block can be programmed in a completely random order, or
the pages in a block can be programmed in their wordline number order.
Read Operation
The read operation is also at the page granularity. The SGD, SGS and all deselected wordlines
are turned on. The wordline of selected read page is biased to a series of predefined reference
voltages and the cell’s threshold voltage can be determined to be between the most recent two
read reference voltages when the cell conducts current.
Reading a flash cell is mainly to determine the voltage region that its threshold voltage falls
in. For LSB reading of 2-bit MLC flash memory, a reference voltage (e.g. REFb in Figure 8.1)
is selected to compare with the threshold voltage of the flash cell. If the threshold voltage of
the flash cell is larger than REFb, it will be read as 0 otherwise it will be read as 1. For MSB
reading, the threshold voltage of a cell will compare to two reference voltages (e.g. REFa and
REFc in Figure 8.1). If the cell’s threshold voltage is within the range of [REFa, REFc], it will
be read as 0 otherwise it will be read as 1. The above selected reference voltage is generally
called read reference voltage. Recent flash memory [153] allows the read reference voltage
to be configurable so that different reference voltages can be tried to so that a better one can
be found to achieve lower error rate, which is called read-retry. Previous works [154, 155]
leverage read-retry to identify the exact threshold voltage of each cell and study the threshold
voltage distributions of flash memories.
8.1.2 Errors in NAND Flash Memories
Cai et al [156] classify the observed errors into four different types from the controller’s point
of view: Erase error, Program interference error, retention error and Read error. All types of
errors are highly correlated with P/E cycles. At the beginning of the flash’s lifetime, the error
rate is relatively low and the raw bit error rate is below 10−4, within the specified lifetime
(3k cycles). As the P/E cycles increase, the error rate increases exponentially. The P/E cycle-
dependence of errors can be explained by the deterioration of the tunnel oxide under cycling
stress. During erase and program operations, the electric field strength across the tunnel oxide
is very high (e.g., several million volts per centimeter). Such high electric field strength can
lead to structural defects that trap electrons in the oxide layer. Over time, more and more
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defects accumulate and the insulation strength of the tunnel oxide degrades. As a result, charge
can leak through the tunnel oxide and the threshold voltage of the cells can change more easily.
This leads to more errors for all types of flash operations. Now, we explain these errors.
Retention error happens when the data stored in a cell changes over time. The main reason
is that the charge programmed in the floating gate may dissipate gradually through the leakage
current. The long-term retention errors are the most dominant; their rate is highest compared
to other errors.
The retention errors are value dependent. The most common retention errors (00→01,
01→10, 01→11 and 10→11) are all cases in which Vth shifts towards the left. This is because,
the electrons stored on the floating gate gradually leak away under stress induced leakage cur-
rent (SILC). When the floating gate loses electrons, its Vth shifts left from the state with more
electrons to the state with fewer programmed electrons. A cell in state 11 cannot shift to another
state by losing electrons because there is no other state to the left of it
Retention error rates are highly dependent on retention test time. If the time before we
test for retention errors is longer, the floating gate of flash memory is more likely to lose more
electrons through leakage current. This eventually leads to Vth shift across Vth windows and
causes errors. For example, the 3-year retention error rate is almost three orders of magnitude
higher than one-day retention.
Program interference error happens when the data stored in a page changes (unintention-
ally) while a neighbouring page is being programmed due to parasitic capacitance-coupling [154].
Due to coupling capacitance between neighboring floating gates, the programmed threshold
voltage of a cell may change when neighbor cells are programmed later. Program interference
is the phenomenon in which the threshold voltage of a flash cell, called the victim cell, unin-
tentionally changes (i.e., gets disturbed) while another cell, called the aggressor cell, is being
programmed [154, 156, 157]. If the change in threshold voltage due to program interference
causes the victim cell’s voltage to shift to a different threshold voltage range, then the victim
cell’s value becomes incorrect, leading to an error when the cell is read. The program inter-
ference error rate ranks the second (after retention errors) and is usually between error rates of
1-day and 3-day retention errors.
The most dominant programming interference errors are 11→10 and 10→01. Their relative
percentages are 70% and 24% respectively. Less common errors are 10→00, 11→01, and
01→00. Their relative percentages are 2.2%, 1.5% and 0.4% respectively. Similar to retention
errors, program interference errors also show strong asymmetry with respect to the cell value,
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but they occur in the opposite direction with regard to the Vth shift. The cell states mainly shift
from the states with fewer programmed electrons to the states with more electrons (i.e., from
left to right in Figure 8.3). When a page is being programmed, a high positive programming
voltage is applied to all the control gates on the selected wordline, including those of the cells
of the other pages that share the same word-line but that are not supposed to be programmed.
This high positive voltage could attract additional electrons into the floating gates of these other
pages through tunneling even though such pages may have already been programmed. If there
are too many electrons attracted to these gates, the Vth of disturbed cells will shift towards the
right into the higher threshold window. Note that it is not observed any program interference
errors in cells that are in state 00. Even if additional electrons are injected into the cells in state
00 and the Vth may shift right under programming voltage interference, the cell will hold its
value because its voltage threshold window will still stay the same.
Erase error happens when an erase operation fails to reset the cells to the erased state. This
is mainly due to manufacturing process variations or defects caused by trapped electrons in the
tunnel oxide after stress due to repeated P/E cycles. Erase errors are the least significant among
NAND flash errors and they occur often only after millions of P/E cycles, which is more than
100x times the specified lifetime of the flash memory tested in [156].
Read error happens when the data stored in a cell changes as a neighboring cell on the same
string is read over and over. Read errors happen mainly due to threshold voltage shifting to the
adjacent threshold voltage window. The read error rate is slightly less than 1-day retention error
rate
8.2 Flash Correct-and-Refresh (FCR):
Mitigating Retention Errors
As discussed previously, retention errors are the most dominant errors and are highly correlated
with retention time. In order to preserve the information in memories, it is straightforward
to use a memory refresh mechanism which periodically reads information from an area of
computer memory and immediately rewrites the read information to the same area. Refreshing
is required in semiconductor dynamic random access memory (DRAM), the most widely used
type of computer memory. Thus, we propose a set of new techniques called Flash Correct-and-
Refresh (FCR) that exploit the dominance and characteristics of retention errors to significantly
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increase NAND flash lifetime while incurring minimal overheads. FCR schemes periodically
read, correct, and reprogram or remap the stored data before it accumulates more retention
errors than that can be handled by the ECC on SSD controller. Thus, we can achieve a low
Uncorrected Bit Error Rate (UBER) while still using a simple, low-overhead ECC. Two key
questions related to designing a system that uses FCR techniques are: (1) how to refresh the
data (remapping or reprogramming); (2) when to refresh the data (periodically or adaptively).
8.2.1 Remapping-based FCR
Unlike DRAM cells, which can be refreshed in-place, flash cells generally must first be erased
before they can be programmed. To remove the slow erase operation from the critical path of
write operations, current wear leveling algorithms remap the data to another physical location
rather than erasing the data and then programming in-place. The flash controller maintains a
list of free blocks that have been erased in background through garbage collection and are ready
for programming. Whenever a write operation is requested, the controller’s wear leveling algo-
rithm selects a free block and programs it directly, remapping the logical block address to the
new physical block. The key idea of FCR is to leverage the existing wearleveling mechanisms
to read, correct, and remap to a different physical location each valid flash block in order to
prevent it from accumulating too many retention errors. Operational flow of FCR consists of
four main steps:
(1) During each refresh interval, a block with valid data that needs to be refreshed is se-
lected;
(2) The valid data in the selected block is read out page by page and moved to the SSD
controller;
(3) The ECC engine in the SSD controller corrects all the errors in the read data, including
retention errors that have accumulated since the last refresh. After ECC, the data are error free;
(4) A new free block is selected and the error free data are programmed to the new location,
and the logical address is remapped.
Note that the proposed address remapping techniques can leverage existing hardware and
software of contemporary wear leveling and garbage collection algorithms of the flash based
SSD controller.
The error rate can almost be linearly decreased if we keep decreasing the period and increase
the number of times for data regeneration over data storage time. As the remapping based FCR
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can greatly decrease the raw BER from the flash media and it has two benefits: 1) Given fixed
lifetime increase requirement of flash-based SSD, the ECC engine on SSD controller can be
greatly simplified. 2) Given fixed ECC on flash SSD controller, FCR can greatly increase the
maximum number of P/E cycles that flash memory can tolerate while keeping the qualified
storage reliability requirements for host applications.
However, periodic FCR scheme will introduce additional erase operation overhead. This
is because after the flash data are corrected and remapped to the new destination block, the
old data in the original block will be marked as outdated. Thus, the block will eventually be
erased and reclaimed by garbage collection. The more frequent FCR, the more additional erase
operation will be introduced. As we know that flash can only tolerate limited number of P/E
cycles, each erase operation will make the flash block worn out and come closer to the end of
life. There might be a cross point that over frequent refresh will use up more P/E cycle than the
P/E cycle gained by FCR techniques. In the next section, we propose a new technique that can
reduce erase operations by leveraging the intrinsic properties of retention errors and the physics
of ISPP program operation of contemporary NAND flash.
8.2.2 Hybrid FCR
To reduce the overheads associated with remapping, we propose a hybrid data correct and
reprogramming/remapping-based flash refresh scheme that can perform in-place refresh most
of the time, without a preceding erase operation and can greatly reduce the overhead. This
in-place refresh takes advantage of the fact that retention errors arise from the loss of electrons
on the floating gate over time and the flash cell with retention errors can be reprogrammed to its
original correct value without erase operation under contemporary ISPP programming scheme.
When a NAND flash memory cell is programmed, a high positive voltage applied to the
control gate causes electrons to be injected into the floating gate through Fowler-Nordheim
mechanisms [151]. Thus, NAND flash memory cells can only be programmed from a state with
fewer electrons to a state with more electrons step by step with ISPP programming and cannot
be programmed in the opposite direction. However, retention errors are caused by the loss of
electrons from the floating gate overtime and cells with retention errors change from a state with
more electrons to fewer electrons. Thus, cells with retention errors can be reprogrammed to the
value before retention by re-charging additional electrons step by step through ISPP without
additional erase operations.
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The in-place reprogramming mechanism works as follows. First, we select a block to be
refreshed and read the data out of the memory page by page into the flash controller. By
selecting suitable refresh interval, the total error number is below the correction capability of
the ECC and the controller can fully correct all the errors in the read data. Then we can re-
program the flash cells in the same location using the read data after error correction (hence
in-place reprogram) without erasing the whole block. For in-place reprogramming, there are
three possible cases: 1) If the new corrected value corresponds to the state with less charge
than that of the old erroneous value, we will fail the programming and the cell will remain on
its error state. 2) If the new corrected value corresponds to the state with more charge than
the old erroneous value, then the final programmed value on the cell will be the new corrected
value and the error will be corrected. Recall that this is because the flash cells can only be
programmed from the state of fewer electrons to the state with more electrons. Note that, the
location of the cell can be uniquely determined by its wordline and bitline address inside a
block and the cell can be re-programmed with additional electrons. 3) If the corrected value is
exactly the same as the original value, the in-place reprogramming will not change the stored
data value, as ISPP will stop programming the cell as soon as it detects that the target value has
already reached. Note that most of the cells are reprogrammed with the exactly the same data
as error rates are generally below 1%. So the re-program interference to the neighbor pages
will be low as only few cells are really programmed with additional electrons into the floating
gates during in-place reprogramming.
A potential issue with in-place reprogramming schemes is that the accumulation of pro-
gramming errors across the multiple continuous reprogramming of the same flash block. This
is because in-place reprogram is suitable for correcting retention errors but not program errors
due to the fact that the in-place program can only add more electrons into the floating gate in-
stead of removing. However, the retention error rates are two orders of magnitude higher than
the program error rate. So, only in cases of high reprogramming frequency, will the program-
ming error rate become comparable to that of the retention errors. If the program error counts
reach the error correction capability of ECC, it is highly probably that the data read in the next
refresh interval can no longer be recovered as the sum of current accumulated program errors
and newly produced retention errors may exceed the error correction capability of ECC on the
SSD controller.
To mitigate the accumulated reprogramming errors issue, we propose a hybrid reprogram-
ming/remapping refresh technique to control the number of consecutive in-place programming
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to the same location. The main idea of this proposed technique is to remap the corrected data
to a new free block to eliminate all errors when the accumulated right shift program error count
is too high. The workflow of hybrid refresh is as follows:
1) Select the flash block that have data need to be refreshed at each reprogram period and
read the data from that block page by page.
2) SSD controller buffers the LSB page and MSB page of the same word-line and combines
the bits of the location of LSB and MSB pages to identify the threshold voltage state of the cells
on the selected word-line.
3) The ECC engine corrects the two page data respectively and combines the bits of cor-
rected page as a pair to form the cell states to be corrected to.
4) The corrected state pair is then compared with the programmed states before correction
to identify the percentage of right shift errors and left shift errors. If the right shift error count
is less than a certain threshold level (i.e. 30% of the maximum number of errors that could be
corrected by ECC, which is conservative), then we still trigger in-place reprogramming as the
sum of the remaining program errors plus the maximum retention errors before the next refresh
interval would still be within the error correction capability of ECC. Otherwise, remap-based
data refresh needs to be triggered. A new free block should be allocated and be programmed
to save the corrected data page by page. Note that after a remapping-based refresh, the existing
retention errors and the accumulated right shift program errors are eliminated. Then, the data
in the newly allocated block can be refreshed using in-place refresh for the next few refresh
periods until accumulated program errors are too high once again and another re-mapping based
refresh need to be triggered. With such hybrid refresh technique, the additional erase operation
can be greatly reduced compared to remap based refresh, as only one erase operation is needed
after every N-times in-place reprogramming.
8.2.3 Adaptive-Rate FCR
It is observed that the rate of retention errors is very low during the beginning of flash lifetime
(i.e. nominal lifetime) [156]. Until more than 1000 P/E cycles, the retention error rate is lower
than the acceptable raw Bit Error Rate (BER) that can be corrected by the simplest BCH code.
Hence, at the beginning of its lifetime, flash memory does not need to be refreshed. Retention
error rate increases as the number of P/E cycles increases. We leverage this key observation to
reduce the number of unnecessary refresh operations. We further propose dynamic adaptive-
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Figure 8.4: Global and Local Read Reference Voltages
rate refresh techniques to improve flash memory lifetime while eliminating unnecessary refresh
operations. The main idea of adaptive-rate FCR is to adapt the refresh rate to the number of
P/E cycles a block has incurred. Initially, refresh rate for a block starts out at zero (no refresh).
Once ECC becomes incapable of correcting retention errors, the block’s refresh rate increases
to tolerate the increased retention error rate. Hence, refresh rate is gradually increased over each
flash block’s lifetime to adapt to the increased P/E cycles. The whole lifetime of a flash block
can be divided into intervals with different refresh rates ranging, for example, from no refresh
(initially), yearly refresh, monthly refresh, weekly refresh, to daily refresh. The frequency
of refresh operations at a given P/E cycle count is determined by the acceptable raw BER
provided by the used ECC and the BER that corresponds to the P/E cycle count. Note that this
mechanism requires keeping track of P/E cycles incurred for each block, but this information
is already maintained to implement current wear-leveling algorithms.
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8.3 Neighbor-cell Assisted Correction:
Mitigating Programming Errors
In this section, we present Neighbor-Cell Assisted Correction (NAC) that exploits the char-
acteristics of programming errors to extend the lifetime of NAND flashes. As the P/E cycles
increase, the rate of the programming errors increases exponentially. Binary BCH codes [7]
which is widely deployed in Flash memories is mostly adequate to correct the programming
errors in the nominal lifetime. We utilize NAC scheme in the extended lifetime of the Flash
memory when ECC fails to correct programming errors.
In order to explain principles of NAC, we define two reference voltages to read flash mem-
ory: (1) global optimum read reference voltage, (2) local optimum read reference voltage. We
define the global read reference voltage between neighboring state Pi and Pi+1 as the mean
value of REFx = (µP(i) +µP(i+1))/2 (See Figure 8.4 for µ of each Pn in 2-bit MLC) . Similarly,
we define the local read reference voltage between neighboring state Pi and Pi+1 when the data
read from the direct aggressor cell is ab as REF xab = (µP(i)Xab + µ
P(i+1)
Xab )/2 the mean values of
conditional distribution REFx11 REFx00, REFx01 and REFx10 to read conditional distribu-
tion x11, x00, x01 and x10 respectively. In Figure 8.4 we show the local and global reference
voltages for 2-bit MLC. In this way, we define four local read reference voltages as REFx11,
In order to measure the minimum Bit Error Rate, we program random data into 2Y-nm flash
devices. Then, we read out the data by using the global read reference voltages and local read
references. We compare the read out data from the cells with the originally programmed data
to count the number of errors. according to our experimental results, reading with local opti-
mum read reference voltage for each conditional distribution can reduce raw BER by 86% on
average compared to reading with global optimum read reference voltage.
This result directly motivates us to classify the cells in each wordline into N types depending
on the values of their direct aggressor cell. For the cells of each type, we can use its local
optimum read reference voltage to read and we can get approximately 1/N-th of the whole page
each time. We can repeat the above reading by N times for all types of cells. Eventually, we
can combine the read values of the N steps together as a complete page. Thus, we can achieve
lower raw BER. This needs to classify the cells according to their direct neighbor aggressor
cell and we call this technique as neighbor-cell assisted reading (NAR). NAR may significantly
degrade the system read performance. To read the data out, reading with global optimum read
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Figure 8.5: Flow of the Neighbor Assisted Error Correction
reference voltage only needs one read operation. However, NAR first needs to read both the
LSB page and MSB page of the direct neighbor aggressor cells. After that, NAR needs to read
the selected page for N times using different local optimum read reference voltage for N types
flash memory cells. The read latency degradation is 1/(N+2). For 2-bit MLC all-bit-line flash
memory (N=4), the performance will be degraded by up to 83.3%, which can significantly slow
down the system reading. To mitigate such performance degradation with NAR, we propose
to first read with global optimum read reference voltage, which only needs one read operation.
Only when ECC fails to correct such data, NAR will be triggered. Thus, the average read
latency is degraded to 1/(1+Pfail (N+2)). Here Pfail is ECC failure rate to correct the data
reading with global optimum reference voltage. If ECC failure rate is low, the average read
latency is still low. We call this optimized technique neighbor-cell assisted correction (NAC).
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8.3.1 Flow to Trigger NAC
The detailed flow to trigger NAC is shown in Figure 8.5. We allocated a small portion of
the buffer in the flash controller as the NAC-buffer for saving current data and its neighbors.
When flash controller starts a read operation, it first checks whether the required data is in the
NAC-buffer or not before requesting the page from the flash. If not, NAND flash interface
will fetch the requested data and send it to the ECC engine. If ECC successfully corrects all
the errors, flash controller sends the corrected data to the target destination, such as a host
machine, and also puts it into the NAC buffer. If the ECC fails, neighbor data is required
for further correction with NAC. If the requested page is in the NAC-buffer and it is error
free, the data can be forwarded from the buffer to the host machine without reading the flash
memory. Such data forwarding is much faster than real flash memory reading, which has a
longer latency including reading data and ECC error correction. If the data is in the buffer but its
ECC correction fails, which is indicated by a flag of failure for the last ECC decoding, normal
ECC processing cannot recover the data and neighbor data is needed for further correction with
NAC. In all-bit-line NAND flash memory, NAC requires only the LSB and MSB pages in the
neighbor wordline directly above current requested wordline. Thus, when ECC fails to correct
the page, unless neighbor LSB and MSB pages are in the NAC-buffer, flash controller will read
the neighbor pages out from flash memory. In the meantime, a status tag will indicate whether
ECC successfully corrected the neighbor data or not. After saving the neighbor pages to the
NAC-buffer either error-free or erroneously, each stored page in the NAC-buffer is assigned
one tag to indicate ECC decoding status. At this point, NAC is ready to correct failed data.
The optimum size of the NAC-buffer is a key question here. In order to determine the optimum
size, we assume the worst case scenario in which all the pages require NAC correction including
their neighbor pages. It is common that pages are read from the flash memory in the page order
due to large data access or the sequential reading applications. For instance, as in Figure 8.2,
when Page 3 is failed and corrected by NAC, Page 5 and Page 8 are saved to NAC-buffer. Page
5 and 8 are also the neighbors of Page 6, hence, we prefer buffering those pages until Page 6
is read. However, when Page 5 is read between Page 3 and Page 6, 2 more neighbor pages
are added to the NAC-buffer (i.e. Page 7 and Page 10). Therefore, we set the optimum size of
the NAC-buffer as 5 pages to be able to buffer Page 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 at the same time. Trivially,
when we add a new page to the NAC-buffer, if there is no free space, we evict the page with
the lowest page number. Also, if there is a page which has a different block id than the added
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page, we rather eliminate that page instead of eliminating a page with the same block id. In
this case, pages with the highest page numbers would not stack in the NAC-buffer.
In Figure 8.6, a series of examples are shown on how to use NAC buffer. Note that we only
present the examples in which one more local optimum read reference is enough to correct a
page with NAC.
Case 1: If the required page happens to be in the NAC-buffer with no ECC failure, it is no
longer necessary to read the flash memory. The buffered data is forwarded and zero reads are
required as in Figure 8.6 (a).
Case-2: If the required page is read from the flash memory correctly, it is saved to NAC-
buffer without reading its neighbors. Only one read is needed as in Figure 8.6 (b).
Case-3: If the ECC correction of a page fails and this page shares the same wordline with a
page which has been corrected by NAC previously, the neighbor pages of the failing page had
already been fetched to the NAC-buffer. It is no longer necessary to read the neighbor pages
again. Only two reads are needed as in Figure 8.6 (c); one for reading the page with the local
optimum reference voltage and one for reading with the global read reference voltage.
Case-4: If the required page happens to be in the NAC-buffer but ECC fails to correct the
page (e.g. in the case that the page was the neighbor of a page which previously corrected by
NAC), it is no longer necessary to read the page with global read reference voltage again. The
page is read from the flash disk with local read reference voltage, and its neighbor LSB and
MSB pages are also loaded in NAC-buffer as Figure 8.6 (d). Three reads are required unless
any neighbor was buffered.
Case-5: If the ECC correction fails for a page and if neither the page nor its neighbors are
not in the NAC-buffer, four reads are needed as in Figure 8.6 (e) for reading the page with
local read reference voltage in addition to reading the page and its neighbors with global read
reference voltage.
8.3.2 Prioritized NAC
The errors can be classified into eight types when read with global optimum read reference
voltage REFx (see in Figure 8.4). The errors for cells written in lower state (e.g. Pi state)
with direct aggressor cell in value 11, 10, 00 and 01 but misread as higher state (Pi+1 state)
are denoted as Pi(11)→Pi+1, Pi(10)→Pi+1, Pi(00)→Pi+1, Pi(01)→Pi+1. Similarly, the er-
rors for cells written in higher state (Pi+1 state) with direct aggressor cell in value 11, 10,
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Figure 8.6: Examples of the NAC-buffer management when Neighbor Assisted Correction is
in use.
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00 and 01 but misread as lower state (Pi state) are Pi+1(11)→Pi, Pi+1(10)→Pi, Pi+1(00)→Pi
and Pi+1(01)→Pi. Pi+1(11)→Pi, Pi(10)→Pi+1 and Pi(01)→Pi+1 are the three dominant er-
rors. The reason of such dominance is that cells with threshold voltage near the borderline
of neighboring distribution (read reference voltage) tend to have errors. The threshold volt-
age distributions of victim cells before and after neighbor cells are programmed are illustrated
in Figure 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) respectively. Victim cell with aggressor cell programmed in ER
state (11) has less positive additive interference. In Figure 8.4, the cells at the bottom region
of higher state P(i+1) (denoted as P(i+1)low) before neighbors are programmed tend to stay
at the bottom region of type N11((denoted as P’(i+1)low)) after neighbor aggressor cells are
programmed to 11, which introduces the least additive program interference. On the other
hand, cells at the top region of lower state P(i) (denoted as P(i)high) before interference tend
to stay at the top region of type N01((denoted as P’(i)high)) if neighbor aggressor cells are
programmed to 01, which introduces the largest additive program interference. It is possible
that the threshold voltage of cells originally programmed in lower state but receive higher in-
terference become larger than the cells originally programmed in higher state but receive less
interference after different neighbor program interference as illustrated in Figure 8.4(b). Thus,
cells with threshold voltage at the bottom and top region of a state may distort into the lower
neighbor state and higher neighbor state respectively and cause failures when optimum read
reference voltage REFx is applied. Another finding is that Pi+1(11)→Pi error is the largest
one. This is because the program interference of aggressor cells in 10 and 01 are close (N01
and N10 overlap in Figure 8.4). Then more cells locate at the top region of each state of overall
distribution. The global optimum read reference voltage deviate toward higher state than lower
state and thus more cells of N11 tend to be misread as lower state.
The above discoveries can help reduce NAC performance overhead by starting the correc-
tion step from the faults that dominate. After the data read with global optimum reference
voltage fail to be corrected by ECC, we prioritize to select REFx11 as the local optimum ref-
erence voltage to read the failed page to fix the dominant Pi+1(11)→Pi error. The read data of
cells with direct aggressor cell in ER state (11) during global optimum reading will be replaced
by the data value obtained with the new local optimum reading REFx11. For cells of type-N11
with threshold voltage larger than REFx or smaller than REFx11, the value read with REFx and
REFx11 are exactly the same. For cells of type-N11 with threshold voltage within the range
of [REFx11, REFx], the value read with global and local optimum read reference voltage are
different. The cells of type-N11 in Pi+1 state with threshold voltage in [REFx11, REFx] was
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originally misread with REFx can now be fixed correctly. The cells of type-N11 in Pi state
with threshold voltage in the same region was originally correctly read with REFx but will be
now be fixed in a wrong way using REFx11. Since REFx11 is the optimum read reference
voltage for cells in type-N11, the number of corrected cells is larger than that of mis-corrected
cells. Since the read data of cells with direct aggressor cell in other state are unchanged, the
total number of errors of the data after fixing with local optimum reading REFx11 will be sig-
nificantly reduced even with just one time fixing. Since a large percentage of raw errors have
been corrected, the number of remaining errors may be within the error correction capability of
ECC. Thus, ECC may be able to correct the remaining errors directly without further fixing the
other type of errors by reading with other local optimum read reference voltages (e.g. REFx01
and REFx10). In such case, system performance can be improved. If ECC still fails, we can
apply the similar methodology to read with REFx10 and REFx01 respectively to further fix the
errors read with global optimum reference voltage REFx.
8.4 Evaluation of FCR and NAC
We use Disksim [158] with SSD extensions [159] to quantitatively evaluate FCR and NAC.
Each scheme is simulated using various real workload traces: iozone [160], cello99 [161], oltp,
postmark [162], MSR-Cambridge [163] and a web search engine [164]. We present the details
of evaluation traces in Table 8.1.
We configure the simulated flash-based SSD with four channels. Each channel has 8 flash
chips. Each flash chip has 8192 blocks containing 128 pages. The page size is 8KB. The
total storage capacity is 256GB. The energy of flash read, program, and erase operations are
collected from an experimental flash memory platform [165], and are used in the simulation
infrastructure to obtain the overall energy consumption.
8.4.1 Evaluation of FCR
In this section, we evaluate the lifetime improvement of our FCR mechanisms. Note that, we
presented the lifetime in days by calculating the days required in each benchmark to consume
the limited number of P/E cycles. We first will compare and evaluate the remapping based FCR
over no refresh techniques, which only relies the ECC engine on SSD controller to recover all
the possible errors in the flash media, including the retention errors generated overtime. Then,
165
Chapter 8. Increasing the Lifetime of NAND Flash Memories
Cello99: This trace of typical researcher activity (i.e. simulations, compilation etc.)
from the HP Storage Research Lab is collected from January 14 to December 31,
1999.The trace from the first month is used in our experiments. It features 62% writes
while the read request sizes are relatively small (mostly 8KB).
Postmark: In this trace, randomly generated files between the sizes 1 r 2KB to
10KB are read/written randomly. When a file is to be read, a randomly selected file
is opened, and the entire file is read into memory. Appending data to a file opens a
random file, seeks to its current end, and writes a random amount of data. In this
trace, most of the read operations are 64KB or 128KB
MS-Cambridge: I/O traces of enterprise servers at Microsoft Research Cambridge.
The request sizes diverge between 1 KB - 512KB
Financial OLTP: An I/O trace from OLTP applications running at two large financial
institutions. Has around 50% read request. Generally features small read requests (i.e
less than 8KB) with maximum request size of 64KB.
Web Search Engine: Three I/O traces from three popular search engines. It is a read
intensive trace (i.e. 99%) with request sizes lower than 32KB
Table 8.1: Details of Traces
Figure 8.7: Flash lifetime (in days) provided by remapping-based FCR. The baseline represents
the lifetime without any refresh (Y-axis is in log scale).
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we use the remapping based FCR as baseline, and compare hybrid FCR and adaptive FCR with
it.
Remapping-Based FCR: Figure 8.7 compares the lifetime provided by FCR to the baseline
with no refresh. Flash lifetime is evaluated under various ECC configurations (ranging from
weak 512b to strong 32k-bit BCH codes) with five refresh periods for all workloads. All P/E
cycle overheads introduced by remapping are taken into account in these evaluations. First,
given the same workload, stronger ECC always provides a longer lifetime than weaker ECC.
For example, for IO-zone trace without refresh, lifetime can be increased by 3.5 times if 32k-bit
BCH codes are used instead of 512b codes. This is because strong ECC can tolerate high raw
BER at high P/E cycles and thus improves lifetime.
Second, FCR improves lifetime over both periodic FCR mechanisms for all workloads. On
average, FCR provides 46.7x higher flash lifetime compared to no-refresh. We conclude that
FCR is a promising mechanism for significant and consistent lifetime enhancement of flash
memory.
FCR techniques can introduce additional energy consumed by refresh operations. We eval-
uate the energy overhead of FCR and find that it is only 1.5%. Recall that FCR starts out
with no refresh and gradually increases the refresh rate up to daily refresh as the P/E cycles
accumulate. Its energy overhead is significantly lower than always daily refresh.
Hybrid FCR: As we have already discussed before that given the same workload and same
refresh technique, the strong ECC always outweighs weak ECC in terms of lifetime improve-
ment. To make a fair comparison between hybrid FCR and re-mapping based FCR, we assume
that the same ECC codes are applied in SSD controller for both these two technologies. In
Figure 8.8, we compare the lifetime improvement of hybrid FCR versus remapping-based FCR
under 512b-BCH error correction codes. From the simulation results, we get the following
observations. First, hybrid FCR always has better lifetime improvement than remapping-based
FCR for all workloads. This is because hybrid refresh greatly reduced the additional full disk
P/E operations overhead by in-place refreshing while flash storage’s endurance is hard limited
by the maximum number of P/E cycles. Generally, hybrid FCR improves 3× times lifetime
over remapping based FCR. Second, the benefits of hybrid FCR become more obvious for read
intensive traces, i.e. web search workload. However, it is not that obvious for write intensive
applications. This is because, although hybrid FCR can greatly reduce additional P/E operation
cycles, the relative overhead is different for write intensive workloads and read intensive work-
loads. For example, OLTP have 0.14 full disk P/E operations per day on average. The iozone
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Figure 8.8: Flash lifetime (in days) provided by remapping-based FCR versus hybrid FCR
(Y-axis is in log scale).
has about 20 full disk P/E operations per day. Daily re-mapping based refresh introduce one ad-
ditional full disk P/E operation. If we trigger out-place replace after every 10 in-place refresh,
the hybrid refresh can decrease the P/E overhead of daily refresh to 0.1 per day. It is obvious
that the relative reduction of P/E cycles decreased only 5% for iozone, while up to 80% over-
head decrease for oltp workload. Thus, the lifetime improvement benefits more for balanced
and read intensive workload than write intensive applications. Third, the hybrid FCR starts to
show positive impact on the lifetime of Web Search applications for longer period refresh (i.e.
55% longer lifetime than no refresh). For low write workload, such as MSR-cambridge, hybrid
FCR increase lifetime even for short refresh period, such as daily refresh. Note that remapping
based FCR decreases lifetime for both web search and MSR-cambridge workload especially
for short periodic refresh.
Adaptive-Rate FCR: Figure 8.9 compares the lifetime improvement of adaptive-rate FCR
with baseline no refresh technique and our proposed FCR. As adaptive does not trigger refresh
periodically, we select the longest lifetime that remapping based FCR and hybrid FCR can
provide among various intervals for comparison. Adaptive-rate FCR is better than both no
refreshing and hybrid FCR for all the traces. This is because adaptive-rate FCR avoids the
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Figure 8.9: Lifetime comparison of no refresh, remapping-based FCR, hybrid FCR and
adaptive-rate FCR (Y-axis is in log scale).
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Figure 8.10: Raw bit error rate of experimental 2Y-nm NAND flash memory without NAC and
with NAC using different number of bit fixings
unnecessary refreshes. Also, even read intensive applications benefit from adaptive-rate FCR
since adaptive-rate FCR avoids unnecessary refreshing when the flash is in the low P/E cycle
range. On average, adaptive-rate FCR provide 46.7x lifetime improvement compared to no-
refresh case, 1.5x and 4.8x times lifetime improvement over hybrid refresh and remapping-
based FDR.
8.4.2 Evaluation of NAC
In this section, we evaluate the lifetime improvement of our NAC mechanism.
P/E Cycle Lifetime Evaluation: We program random data into 2Y-nm 2-bit MLC flash
memory up to 50k P/E cycles. Assuming that errors due to long retention can be fixed by
flash refresh techniques, the programmed data are read out after one week retention at room
temperature. The raw BER reading with global optimum read reference voltage without NAC
170
Chapter 8. Increasing the Lifetime of NAND Flash Memories
and reading with NAC with one, two, three and four bit-fixing over P/E cycles are shown in
Figure 8.10. To guarantee system reliability, the raw BER must be less than the acceptable raw
BER (e.g. 10−3) of baseline ECC. Thus, the maximum P/E cycle lifetime of the flash memory
without NAC is only 18k P/E cycles as shown in Figure 8.10. Compared to without-NAC
technique, the P/E cycle lifetime increases by 22% (22k P/E cycles), 33% (24k P/E cycles) and
39% (25k P/E cycles) for one bit-fixing, two bit-fixing and three bit-fixing respectively using
NAC. Since the fourth bit-fixing mainly corrects errors for the conditional distribution that is in
the middle of overall distribution and there are less errors in the raw BER curve over P/E cycles
with three and four bit-fixing almost overlaps and there is no observable P/E cycle lifetime
improvement from three bit-fixing to four bit-fixing.
NAC frequency Analysis: As can be seen in Figure 8.10, the extended lifetime due to
NAC can be divided into three regions: one bit-fixing (stage 1), two bit-fixing (stage 2) and
three/four bit fixing (stage 3). In the beginning of extended lifetime, the raw BER is about 10−3
and the ECC failure rate before NAC is 10−14. NAC will seldom be triggered. As P/E cycles
increase, the raw BER after reading with global optimum read reference voltage increases.
Such raw BERs before NAC at the end of stage-1, stage-2 and stage-3 are 1.6×10−3, 2×10−3
and 2.2× 10−3 respectively. These cause the ECC failure rates before NAC to be 10−5, 10−2
and 33% respectively. This means that ECC does not always fail during the extended lifetime
region and NAC are not always triggered. We can use the ECC failure rate before NAC at the
end of each stage to estimate the NAC frequency in that stage in the worst case. Note that the
ECC failure rate is generally lower than that as they increase over P/E cycles. We can see that
in stage-1, NAC frequency is still very low (< 10−5). However, the ECC failure rate would not
satisfy storage requirement (10−15) without NAC protection. In stage-2, NAC is triggered at
the rate <1%. Only in the third region, the NAC is triggered often (e.g. <33%).
Workload Analysis To be able to explain the NAC performance, we first need to analyze
the behavior of read operations in the workloads. NAC presents time overhead for reading
neighbor LSB and MSB pages of victim pages where ECC error-correction fails. However, we
preserve these pages in the NAC buffer – in fact keeping the most recently read 5 pages - so that
if these neighbor pages are requested soon after, they can be served from the NAC-buffer. In
Figure 8.11, we present the ratios of the pages read in each workload whose neighbors are also
requested temporally (i.e. Neighbor LSB/MSB hit ratio in the NAC-buffer). In the same figure,
we also analyze if some page requests in the workloads repeat soon after, so that, these pages
can be read from the NAC-buffer instead of the flash memory (i.e. victim page hit ratio). First,
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Figure 8.11: The Hit Ratio of the NAC-Buffer in Error-Free Execution (i.e., when ECC fail rate
is zero
for cello, Ms-Cambridge and web-Search workloads, more than 30% of the read operations are
sequential requests. For these workloads, the size of each request can be much higher than the
page size therefore the read requests are mostly sequential. For instance, in MS-Cambridge, up
to 512 consecutive pages are read in a single read request. Financial and postmark workloads
have relatively smaller request sizes; therefore, they feature less sequential read requests when
compared to other workloads. Note that the hit ratio of LSB neighbors is higher than the hit
ratio of MSB neighbors. This is because the number of pages between the victim page and
its MSB neighbor is higher than the number of pages between the victim page and its LSB
neighbor (e.g. Page 3 and Page 6 are the LSB and MSB neighbors of Page1. While Page 3
is only 2 pages ahead in the sequential read, Page6 is 5 pages ahead.) In Figure 8.11, we also
present the NAC-buffer hit ratio for the victim pages. The hit ratio of NAC-buffer is quite low
(i.e. less than 5%) which indicates that only few pages are accessed repeatedly from the NAC
buffer. It is because, in order to reduce the disk accesses, Operating System keeps the mostly
used data in main memory instead of accessing the flash disk. Financial and Cello workloads
hit the NAC-buffer a couple of times while postmark and web-search workloads have poor page
locality (i.e. zero hit rates to NAC-buffer).
NAC Overhead Analysis: In Figure 8.12, we evaluate the overall performance impact of
NAC for read latency at distinct P/E cycles. We activate the NAC-buffer when the first ECC
failure is experienced in the flash memory. After that, each requested page is first searched in
the NAC-buffer before accessing the flash disk. Note that the time spent for this search op-
eration is around 1% of the latency of flash disk access latency (i.e. hit latency/miss penalty
of NAC-buffer). We make three major observations. First, NAC does not present any perfor-
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Figure 8.12: The overhead of NAC at different P/E cycles with different ECC failure rates in
each P/E cycle.
mance impact when the flash is within the lifetime allowed by the base flash (i.e. less than
18K P/E cycles). Second, for the low P/E cycles in the extended lifetime, NAC presents either
only negligible performance degradation or slight performance improvement. This is because,
for cello, financial and Ms-Cambridge workloads, the 5-entry NAC-buffer behaves akin to a
small cache in front of the flash memory. Therefore, the pages, which are requested repeat-
edly in a short time, are read from the NAC-buffer without accessing the flash memory (hit
ratio of victim pages in Figure 8.11). Another reason is that, in real applications, the pages are
commonly read in order. In other words, when a page is read, sometimes, its neighbors are
also read either in the same read request or in the consecutive read requests. Thus, when NAC
fetches the neighbor pages to the NAC-buffer with additional read overhead, this overhead is
amortized in the following reads. The only overhead which is not amortized is incurred when
the erroneous page is read again with a different read reference voltage. The third observation
from the figure is that, in order to provide a 33% lifetime improvement in flash memory (i.e.
from 18k to 24k P/E cycles), less than 5% performance degradation is incurred. Moreover, this
performance degradation is only introduced for the higher P/E cycles in which a normal flash
memory without NAC protection is considered to be non-functional. In Figure 8.12, there is a
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Figure 8.13: The performance overhead of NAC according to page sizes when ECC failure rate
is (a) 1% at 24k P/E cycle and (b) 33% at 25k P/E cycle (Each bar is normalized to its base
system).
sharp increase between 24k P/E cycles and 25P/E cycles. The main reason of this increase is
the drastic increment of ECC failure rate from 10−2 to 33%. Hence, at 25k P/E cycles, one out
of every 3 read operations requires NAC correction with the overhead of reading the erroneous
page repeatedly by using 3 different read reference voltages. At this level, cello, Ms-Cambridge
and websearch workloads present less degradation than financial and postmark since they have
more sequential read requests (as in Figure 8.11), and they can amortize the penalty of reading
neighbor pages.
How Page Size Affects Performance: Page size is one of the key parameters in designing
flash memory. Thus, the page sizes of different flash memories could be different in a range
from 2kByte to 8kByte among manufactures and generations. In this section, we will evaluate
how the system performance is affected by flash memory page size. In Figure 8.13(a) and (b),
we present the performance degradation of NAC according to page sizes when the ECC failure
rate is 1% and 33% respectively. These two ECC failure rate corresponds to ECC failure at
the end of stage-2 and stage-3 of extended P/E cycles. Reducing page sizes from 8 KB to 2
KB affects two main aspects essential for the performance degradation of NAC: Hit ratio of
victim pages and neighbor pages in the NAC-buffer. However, when the page size is reduced,
these two aspects are affected in the reverse order. For the hit ratio of victim pages, assume that
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two consecutive requests read 16KB from the same address. When we use 8KB pages in the
flash memory, the first request fetches two pages to the NAC buffer, and the second request hits
these two pages in the NAC buffer. However, when we reduce the page size to 2KB, at the end
of the first request, only the last 10 KB of the read data stays in the NAC-buffer, and second
request does not hit the buffer. Thus, using smaller pages reduces the hit rate of victim pages
in the NAC-buffer. On the other side, for the hit ratio of neighbor pages, we request 8KB from
the flash disk. When we read the page from the flash disk in finer granularity (i.e. 2KB), the
neighbors of the first page is read within the same request. However, for larger page sizes, the
request reads only one page without neighbors. Thus, reducing page sizes increases the hit ratio
of neighbor pages in the NAC-buffer. There are two main observations that we can make from
Figure 8.13(a) and (b). First, when the ECC failure rate is 1%, for the benchmarks presenting
high hit rates for the victim pages (i.e. cello, financial and Ms-Cambridge), increasing the page
size reduces the performance degradation of NAC. For the rest of benchmarks, increasing the
page size slightly increases the performance degradation of NAC in the same ECC failure rate.
Second, when the ECC failure rate is high at 33%, the hit ratio of neighbor pages becomes more
important than the hit ratio of victim pages. Thus, increasing the page size mostly increases the
performance degradation of NAC.
8.5 Summary
NAND flash memory has been widely used as a storage medium for many systems. Although
flash memories present high performance, large storage density, non-volatility and low power
consumption, a flash memory cell has a limited endurance. In this chapter, we present two
main flash data correct techniques: 1) Flash Correct and Refresh (FCR) and 2) Neighbor-cell
Assisted Correction (NAC) .
FCR greatly reduces the raw BER of flash media by controlling the dominant retention er-
rors below a certain level that simple ECC can handle through periodic data correct and refresh
operations. Our hybrid FCR and adaptive FCR can greatly reduce the overhead introduced by
additional P/E operations due to refresh. Our experimental evaluation results show that FCR
is effective in improving flash storage system lifetime with only minor overhead. FCR’s flex-
ible configurability makes it potentially applicable to a variety of systems. Its benefits would
increase as the endurance of flash memory further decreases in the near future as flash cell size
continues to shrink and more than 2 bits are programmed per cell.
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NAC is a low-overhead and high-accuracy error correction method which corrects pro-
gramming errors by leveraging information from neighbor cells to correct errors in cells that
are being read from flash memory. Our experimental evaluations show that NAC can signifi-
cantly reduce the raw bit error rate and improve flash memory lifetime at zero or very modest
performance overheads. As flash memory scales down to smaller technology nodes and cell-
to-cell interference therefore becomes an even more dominant cause of errors, we expect that
the error correction techniques proposed in this chapter will become even more important for
reliable operation.
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Conclusion
It is foreseen that technology trend will increase the transient and permanent fault rates in future
processors. Thus, providing reliability for both the applications running on personal comput-
ers as well as running on mission-critical systems is becoming an absolute necessity. On the
other side, due to the lower power budget of the computer systems such that mobile devices,
it is attractive to scale down the voltage. However, when the voltage level scales to below the
safe margin especially to the ultra-low level, the error rate increases drastically. Moreover,
new memory technologies can provide only limited amount of nominal lifetime and when they
excite this lifetime they also present high number of faults. In this dissertation, we present reli-
ability designs for three main purposes: 1) Increasing the reliability performance of computer
systems, 2) Reducing the energy consumption of the computer system by allowing it to operate
reliably at ultra-low voltage level, 3) Increasing the lifetime of new memory technologies by
presenting reliability schemes to be utilized in the extended lifetime.
In Chapter 3, we introduced FIMSIM, our fault injection infrastructure for microarchitec-
tural simulators. We inject transient, permanent and intermittent faults both as a single bit fault
or as multi-bit faults to in-order microarchitecture using Alpha [53] instruction set. We utilized
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FIMSIM to evaluate our reliability schemes such as SymptomTM and FaulTM.
In Chapter 4, we introduce SymptomTM, an availability approach that leverages lazy-lazy
hardware transactional memory (HTM) system for error recovery and detects errors by moni-
toring error symptoms. SymptomTM avoids error propagation to the whole system by utilizing
the isolation property of transactions.
In Chapter 5, we present FaulTM, a redundancy-based error detection and recovery pro-
posal based on Hardware Transactional Memory (HTM) providing high reliability for mission-
critical systems. FaulTM reduces the comparison overhead of replication significantly by com-
paring the redundant execution streams at the end of the transactions instead of after every
store instruction. SymptomTM and FaulTM are the two first research proposals that leverage
transactional memory hardware for error detection and recovery. During the time frame of this
thesis, there have been several other proposals that we explain them at the end of the Chapter 5.
In Chapter 6, we discussed multiple error detection alternatives that utilize Transactional
Memory for error recovery in order to minimize the energy consumption of CPUs by executing
at ultra-low voltage level. Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the replication can provide
energy reduction up to 28% while still providing high reliability.
In Chapter 7, we propose two approaches to support that L1 caches can operate at the ultra-
low voltage level. In the first approach, we utilize a fast and low-complexity SEC-MAEC code
in order to reduce the error correction latency and energy consumption. In the second approach,
we present a novel circuit design which configures itself for different supply voltages in order
to duplicate or triplicate each data line if higher reliability is required. Flexicache can continue
to operate reliably up to 10% bit failure rate. Therefore, it alters the possibility to operate in
320 mV.
In Chapter 8, we present two main flash data correct techniques which greatly increase the
lifetime of flash memories: 1) Flash Correct and Refresh (FCR) and 2) Neighbor-cell Assisted
Correction (NAC). FCR controls the dominant retention errors below a certain level that simple
ECC can handle through periodic data correct and refresh operations. We present three versions
of FCR; remapping-based, hybrid and adaptive-rate. Our hybrid FCR and adaptive FCR can
greatly reduce the overhead introduced by additional P/E operations due to refresh. Our exper-
imental evaluation results show that FCR can provide on average 46× lifetime improvement.
On the other side, NAC is a low-overhead and high-accuracy error correction method which
corrects programming errors by leveraging information from neighbor cells to correct errors in
cells that are being read from flash memory. Our experimental evaluations show that NAC can
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significantly reduce the raw bit error rate and improve flash memory lifetime at zero or very
modest performance overheads.
9.1 Future Work:
Some of the contributions described in this thesis may be further extended, more specifically,
we believe that fault injection (Chapter 3), scaling voltage (Chapter 7), and reliability for
emerging technologies (Chapter 8) offer clear further research directions that might be worth
exploring.
Fault injection in the micro-architectural simulator, such as FIMSIM, provides the corre-
lation between the criticality of circuit level faults and their impact on the application level.
In this thesis, we only inject faults to in-order microarchitecture using Alpha instruction set.
However, different instruction sets and different architectures (i.e., in-order or out-of-order)
may affect the reliability of the applications differently. By extending FIMSIM for different
architectures, those effects can be further investigated.
In Chapter 7, we present flexicache which configures itself entirely according to the level
of the applied voltage. However, configuring the cache in the fine granularity may provide
higher benefits for applications such that reducing the voltage when applications can tolerate
high memory latencies for some part of its variables. Thus, providing a hybrid configuration of
Flexicache which includes replicated and non-replicated parts at a time is a promising future
research direction.
Technologies such as Flash exhibit new, previously unencountered, fault types such as en-
durance. Endurance refers to the inability of a memory cell to function correctly after a number
of writes. In Chapter 8, we propose several sophisticated techniques to mitigate the Flash
endurance problem. In order to mitigate any fault types associated with future memory tech-
nologies, similar unconventional ideas should be utilized.
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